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A  century of child soldiers








As of today, it is estimated that there are approximately 300,000 children serving as 
part of regular armed forces, terrorist or armed groups in a variety of roles across the 
globe.  The term child is here defined as a person under the age of 18 years.  In recent 
years Western forces have had occasion to engage such persons. 
 
It has been forcefully argued that children having regard to their preponderance and 
utility, particularly when coupled with the development and miniaturisation of 
modern weaponry are uniquely adapted to the modern battlefield and insurgent roles. 
 
Whilst there is nothing new in the deployment of young people in warfare and combat 
roles, and which has a very long historical pedigree, it has been suggested that the 
very fact that a child is utilised to engage regular forces represents the very antithesis 
of what a soldier represents; particularly when considered from a Western 
perspective.  In other words a ‘child soldier’ does not fit the cognitive framework of 
regular troops: their training, legal structures and ethical and cultural values. 
 
This thesis is an attempt to consider the extent to which Western regular forces regard 
their combat roles when called upon to engage children, and in particular, the extent, 
if at all, their combat efficiency is influenced as a consequence.  The UK, US and 
Israel are the subject of consideration by means of targeted questionnaires directed to 
military personnel who have either engaged children or undergone training in this 
regard.  By this approach it is intended to discover whether the fact of child 
engagement had any or any appreciable influence upon the manner in which such 
soldiers regarded the military contract upon which they may have been engaged or 
have been trained to apply. 
 
In addition to considering the approach of the modern soldier, part of the field work 
involved examination of current training regimes carried out by a two-day visit to the 
International Land Warfare Centre, Warminster where the themes of this thesis were 
examined and additionally by a further series of targeted interviews of senior officers 
responsible for the design of training programmes. 
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In order to extend the data base and to provide a historical context, the experience of 
UK service personnel in the Second World War was made the subject of examination 
with particular reference to individual engagements with members of the Hitler Youth 
during the latter stages of that conflict.  This required examination of the oral archive 
at the Imperial War Museum, London. 
 
The conclusion that was reached and which was in some ways counter-intuitive, was 
that notwithstanding the fact that soldiers did regard children as those in need of 
protection and nurturing, perhaps as a consequence of their education, cultural factors 
and common humanity, when deployed on the battlefield, however that is defined, a 












This thesis is set within the context of the modern battlefield and in particular, 
although not exclusively confined to, the conduct of asymmetric warfare.  There are a 
number of core texts concerned with the issue of the deployment of child soldiers that 
are useful as introductions to the subject including the work of Singer1, Rosen2, and 
Brocklehurst3.  Between them they deal with the particular problems that arise from 
the incidence of fighting children, whilst the latter two illustrate the problem form the 
perspective of case studies, including Palestinian children4, and children in Northern 
Ireland5.  Apart from being general texts, they are useful in identifying the unique 
nature of engagements with children and make general recommendations as to how 
forces may be restructured in order to meet such threats. 
 
The question of the overall context as to how the battlefield has changed within the 
‘Postmodern era’ and of which children are part is the subject of a much wider literary 
field.  The work of Bobbitt6, Van Creveld7, Boot8 and Benbow9 are of special interest 
in explaining the emergence of new forms of warfare and the potential for western 
nations to be ill equipped to fight given existing governmental structures, cultural 
backgrounds and the current state of their military thinking.  The particular problem 
raised by the British experience is given prominence in an essay by Dandeker entitled: 
1 P. Singer, op cit. 
2 D. Rosen, op cit. 
3 H. Brocklehurst, op cit. See also T. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, On War in the 21st Century, 
Zenith Press, Minneapolis, 2006, Ch. 14, ‘Characteristics of 4th Generation Warfare’, pp. 207-224. 
4 D. Rosen, op cit., Chapter 4, Fighting for the Apocalypse, pp. 91-131. 
5 H. Brocklehurst, op cit., Chapter 4, ‘Children in Northern Ireland’, pp. 83-111. 
6 P. Bobbitt, Terror and Consent, op cit. 
7 M. Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, Free Press: New York, 1990. 
8 M. Boot, War Made New, Technology, Warfare and the Course of History 1500-Today, Gotham  
Books, New York, 2006. 
9 T. Benbow, The Magic Bullet? Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs, Brassey’s, London, 
2004. 
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The United Kingdom: The Overstretched Military’,10 and more generally by 
Freedman in an essay entitled:  ‘The Revolution in Strategic Affairs’.11 
 
(ii). The Deployment of Children in History 
 
The history of children being deployed in battle has a very long pedigree going back 
to at least 1212 and the ‘Children’s Crusade’ to the Holy Land.  Specific examples 
derived from modern history are numerous. Banks12 is a useful illustration of the US 
experience in the Civil War; R. van Emden13 and G. Coppard14 in the Great War; 
whilst Koch,15 Wilmot,16 Hastings,17 Evans18 and Ambrose19 provide illustrations in 
the Second.  Each provide case examples of the utility of children as enlisted soldiers, 
many being deployed with devastating effect notwithstanding their young age.  It will 
be a matter of examination as to whether their military contribution had any real effect 
at a strategic level as opposed to being relevant at a tactical one. 
 
This problem is examined in a number of specific cases, including children in Nazi 
Europe20; children exposed to violence in Northern Ireland21, children in the London 
Blitz22; children recruited as suicide bombers on the UK mainland;23 and children 
similarly recruited in the continuing Palestinian conflict.  Beyond the strict definition 
of military endeavour, the resilience of children has been demonstrated in a number of 
10C. Dandeker, ‘The United Kingdom: The Overstretched Military’, in The Postmodern Military, 
Armed Forces after the Cold War, eds. C. Moskos et al., Oxford UP., Oxford, 2000, Ch. 3, pp. 32-50. 
11 L. Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, IISS, Adelphi Paper 318, Oxford UP, p. 7; see 
also J. Mackinlay, Globalisation and Insurgency, IISS, Adelphi Paper 352, and M. Kaldor, New and 
Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1999. 
12 M. Banks, ‘Avery Brown (1852-1904), Musician: America’s Youngest Civil War Soldier’, 
America’s Shrine to Music Newsletter, February 2001. 
13 R. van Emden, Boy Soldiers of the Great War, Headline, London, 2005. 
14 G. Coppard, op cit. 
15 H. Koch, op cit. especially Ch. xi, ‘War’, pp. 228-252; see also R.Evans, op cit., especially Ch. 7, 
‘Downfall’, pp. 721-722. 
16 C. Wilmot, op cit., especially Ch. xxix, ‘The Autumn Stalemate’, pp. 562-579.  
17 M. Hastings, Armageddon, The Battle for Germany 1944-45, Macmillan, London, especially Ch. 6, 
‘Germany Besieged’, pp. 178-201. 
18 D. Evans, op cit. 
19 S. Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1997. 
20 D. Dwork, op cit; M. Gilbert, op cit especially Ch. 8, ‘Surviving as Slaves’ p. 197-212; A. Frank, op 
cit.  I. Gutman, Resistance, The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Mariner Books, Boston, 1994, especially Ch. 
9, ‘Between the Expulsion and January 1943, pp. 161-176; M. Gilbert, The Righteous The Unsung 
Heroes of the Holocaust, Black Swan, 2003, London, especially Ch. 1, ‘Rescue in the East’, pp. 25-57. 
21 M. Fraser, Children in Conflict, Harmondsworth, Penguin, London, 1974. 
22 L.Smith, op cit., especially pp. 106-120. 
23 S. O’Neill & D, McCrory, The Suicide Factory, Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque, Harper 
Perennial, 2006; E. Husain, The Islamist, Penguin Books, London,  2007. 
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sociological studies amongst them the study of the insight of children suffering 
terminal leukaemia in a large American hospital in the mid-west.  The study is useful 
since it represents an effort to gain insight into two significant problems in social 
science: childhood socialization and social order, in which it is argued that children’s 
acquisition of information about their world and their place in it is best understood as 
a socialization process.24 
 
Underpinning this research is the premise that current British Military Doctrine makes 
no mention of child combatants and thus seems to suggest that British forces have no 
official policies on dealing with child soldiers, nor do they dedicate any specific 
training to the subject.  This principle is well documented within current literature.25  
Given the scale of the problem, and the need or professional armed forces to engage 
with children, the doctrine may need to be reformed as a consequence.  
 
(iii). The Legal Question and the Protection of Children26 
 
International law, and in particular the International law of Armed Conflict, provides 
a comprehensive framework for the protection of children, a system that mirrors 
protections afforded to children in most western societies.  Core references are 
provided by Dinstein27, the Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict28, and articles, 
foremost amongst which are Mann29 and Happold30.  Specific aspects of operational 
law and policy are sourced from the Military Annual Training Tests Programme.31 
 
The child as a protected person is given particular force by the Preamble to the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Fourth Geneva Convention32 although 
24 M. Bluebond-Langner, op cit., esp. Ch. 3: ‘What Terminally ill Children Know about their World,’ 
p. 135. 
25 A. Mircica et al., op cit. 
26 Definition derived from The UK’s First Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
HMSO, February 1994. 
27 Y. Dinstein, op cit. 
28 UK MOD, op cit. 
29 H. Mann, International Law and the Child Soldier, 36 ICLQ 32, 35 (1987). 
30 M. Happold, Child Soldiers in International Law: The Legal Regulation of Children’s Participation 
in Hostilities, 47 NILR 27, 47 (2000). 
31 Matt 7(Issue 2), August 2008. 
32 See also ‘The Work of the ICRC for the Benefit of Civilian Detainees in German Concentration 
Camps between 1939 and 1945’,ICRC,1975; and I. Cohn, ‘The Convention  on the Rights of the Child: 
What it Means for Children in War,’ IJRL 291 (1991). 
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particular assistance on the work of the Red Cross is derived from the work of Cohn 
and Goodwin-Gill.33 
 
Reliance is often placed by commentators and the military upon the provisions of 
international law as a means by which forces may be protected from the incidence of 
child soldiers.  Yet, as Kruper has indicated international humanitarian law does not 
necessarily keep up with changes in the nature of warfare, and many nations and 
armed groupings for their own political and military ends, choose not to comply with 
its terms.34 Put another way, issues of ‘realpolitik’ outweigh moral imperatives which 
the law is designed to protect.  One possible conclusion is that the West and UK Land 
Forces in particular have no alternative other than to confront child soldiers 
notwithstanding existing legal prohibitions, in the event that it chooses to deploy its 
forces in theatres where children are used in combat. 
 
International law proceeds from the perspective of a universalist ethic. Given that 
nation states in the Third World are more likely to utilise the services of children than 
those in the west, is it reasonable to expect such nations to apply laws protecting 
young people to their own population, when they do not necessarily accept the 
principle?  It should be borne in mind that it was not until the late seventeenth century 
that the concept of childhood emerged within Western culture,35 quite apart from the 
position in the developing world.  What is more pertinent, however, is the extent to 
which individual soldiers react, and the extent to which they are willing to so engage. 
 
(iv). The Western Military Experience (UK, US and Israel) 
 
Numerous texts are available concerning the deployment of UK forces in theatres 
where child soldiers have been encountered, including Afghanistan36, and Iraq37.  The 
latter offers powerful descriptions as to why foot soldiers find it difficult to engage 
with children from a psychological perspective.38  In short, soldiers are trained to 
33 I. Cohn & G. Goodwin-Gill, op cit. 
34 J. Kruper, op cit. 
35 D. Archard, Children, Rights and Childhood (2nd Edition), Routledge, London 2004, p. 34, quoting 
P. Aries, ‘L’Enfant at la vie familiale sous l’ancien regime’, 1962. 
36 P. Bishop, Ground Truth, Harper Press, London, 2009. 
37 R. Holmes, op cit. 
38 R. Holmes, ibid., p. 317. 
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fight other soldiers and terrorists: fighting and training to fight children is beyond 
their collective experience. 
 
The application of doctrines of counterinsurgency are well developed within academic 
literature, most particularly Marston,39 Moyar40 and Crouch41 at a general level, and 
with particular regard to case studies in Jones42 and Jackson43.  In the context of the 
US Army detailed treatment is given in the work of Petraeus.44  Here again the tenor 
of his thinking  is to regard children as those in need of protection, and not to regard 
them as combatants who can present real challenges to regular forces, however 
skilled.  This approach naturally accords with western perceptions. 
 
Islamist extremism on the UK mainland is a subject of special concern.  Government 
estimates indicate that some 2000 people have been identified as a threat, although it 
is suspected that there are as many again who are yet to be identified.45  Current 
strategies recognise that changing technology means that the prospect of a chemical, 
biological or radiological attack are very real whilst the means by which such threats 
can be met and overcome remain undefined.  Where the weapon is deployed by a 
child and orchestrated by a determined enemy, then the means to counter such a 
scenario becomes all the more unclear and subject to profound disagreement. 
 
In the context of Israeli Defence Forces with particular reference to their activities in 
the Occupied Territories, the work of the B’tselem organisation is of particular value 
given that they have conducted many interviews of serving soldiers who have served 
in the Occupied Territories and, according to many of those interviewed have engaged 
children involved in demonstrations against the occupation, and involving stone 
39 D. Marston et al., Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2008. 
40 M. Moyar, A Question of Command, Counterinsurgency from the Civil war to Iraq, Yale UP, 2009. 
41 C. Crouch, Managing Terrorism and Insurgency, Regeneration, Recruitment and Attrition, 
Contemporary Terrorism Studies, Routledge, London 2009. 
42 S. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, Rand National Defense Research Institute, Santa 
Monica, 2008. 
43 R. Jackson, The Malayan Emergency & Indonesian Confrontation, Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2008. 
44 D. Petraeus, The US Army & Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Chicago UP., 
Chicago, 2007. 
45 Speech by E. Manningham Buller, Director General of the Security Service, November 2006 at 
Queen Mary College, London. 
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throwing and other forms of protest.46  Of significance to the study is the fact that the 
Palestinians’ have based two insurgencies upon the use of children, including their 
deployment as suicide bombers. 
 
(v). The Psychological Question 
 
There are numerous basic texts dealing with the issues of psychological breakdown in 
battle, many of them historical; including Marshall,47 Mott48 and Ahrenfeldt49, and 
many casting new light upon an age old problem from differing perspectives such as 
Daws,50 Shephard51, Babington52 and Jones53. 
 
The precise problem of the extent to which the engagement of children with regular 
forces has been made the subject of a number of papers including Meijer,54 Ben Ari,55 
and Boyden and De Berry56, the latter of which suggests that the problem presented 
by child soldiers to regular forces should be seen in the context of the fact that 
medicine, psychiatry and psychology adhere to a biomedical paradigm. In other 
words: an artificial construct as to how children are regarded.  As a consequence, the 
accepted wisdom which is shared throughout the West is that the effects of war are 
negative and the assumption is made that children exposed to stressful events are 
themselves prone to traumatic reactions and, in the longer term, to developmental 
46 Our Harsh Logic, Israeli Soldiers’ Testimonies from the Occupied Territories 2000-2010, Compiled 
by the Organization ‘Breaking the Silence’, Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt & Co., New York, 2012. 
47 S. Marshall, Men against Fire, The Problem of Battle Command in Future War, Gloucester Mass., 
1947. 
48 F. Mott, War Neurosis and Shell Shock, London, 1919. 
49 R. Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Army in the Second World War, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1958. 
50 G. Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese, Robson Books, London, 1995. 
51 B. Shephard, op cit. 
52 A. Babington, Shell-Shock A History of the Changing Attitudes to War Neurosis, Pen & Sword, Leo 
Cooper, London, 1997. 
53 E. Jones et al., Shell-Shock to PTSD, Military Psychiatry from 1900 to the Gulf War, Psychology 
Press, Hove, 2005. 
54 M. Meijer, Transactional Analysis of Child Warriors as the Opposing Force, NATO Manuscript, 
2007, see especially, 2.5, ‘Shock, Shame and Guilt’; A. Speckhard, Child Warriors as the Opposing 
Force:  Addressing the Psychological Issues for Soldiers and Child Combatants, Presentation to 
HFM/ET – 068, Exploratory Team Meeting, Amsterdam, July 2006; J. Hughes, Psychological Well-
being of Professional Armed Forces’ Personnel facing Child Soldiers.  Presentation as aforesaid, July 
2006. 
55 E. Ben Ari, Facing Child Soldiers, Moral Issues and ‘Real Soldiering’: Anthropological Perspectives 
on Professional Armed Forces, Unpublished Paper, 2009, p. 4. 
56 A. Boyden & De Berry, Children in the Front Line: Ethnography, Armed Conflict and Displacement,  
Berghaum, Oxford,  2008, xi-xxvii. 
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impairment.   One of the conclusions of Ben Ari57 is to observe that in its endeavour 
to tackle the child soldier issue by setting the problem within a wider context of 
human rights awareness, the West has inadvertently made the task of confrontation 
with children more difficult, particularly from the perspective of psychological issues 




The above survey has suggested five hypotheses which will be explored in this thesis.  
They are as follows: - 
 
(i). That the use of children has been the subject of increase within the third world and 
within terrorist and other armed groups.  Children are plentiful, easily indoctrinated 
and offer unquestioning obedience to their recruiters, whilst history demonstrates that 
they are potentially ruthless adversaries.  The targeting of children by regular forces 
has the potential to create damaging political fallout, particularly in a world of mass 
communication. 
 
(ii). That child soldiers have an increasing utility in postmodern conflict within the 
context of asymmetric warfare, and in particular, militant Islam.  Weaponry is 
compact and lightweight, cheap and plentiful, whilst conflicts around the world are 
now characterized not as temporary outbreaks of instability but rather as protracted 
states of disorder.  Singer points out that these trends coupled with the socioeconomic 
dislocation of children and changes in the modern battlefield are necessary factors in 
the emergence of the child soldier as a global phenomenon.58 
 
(iii). British infantry when confronted with child soldiers are reported to experience 
greater psychological trauma than when faced with armed adults. In a recent research 
paper prepared by the Research and Technology Organisation (‘RTO’), a branch of 
NATO the following is reported: - 
 
57 E. Ben Ari, op cit. 
58 See P. Singer, ‘Children on the Battlefield: the Breakdown of Moral Norms’, in Pirates, Terrorists 
and Warlords, the History, Influence, and Future of Armed Groups Around the World, ed. J. Norwitz, 
Skyhorse Publishing, New York, 2009, p. 359. 
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‘From observations of soldiers of the industrial democracies who face these young 
combatants it is concluded that children are not seen as hated enemies and soldiers 
usually exhibit a great amount of empathy toward children in war-torn societies.  
Consequently, engagements with child soldiers can be incredibly demoralizing for 
professional troops and can also affect unit cohesion.  For example, British forces 
operating in West Africa in 2001 were reported to suffer deep problems of clinical 
depression and PTSD among individual soldiers who faced child soldiers.  Literature 
searches by the MOD in 2006 on consequences uncovered very little data specifically 
relating to the psychological impact of child soldiers on personnel.’59 
 
There may be a number of reasons why this may be so and which arise from a 
combination of practical, ethical, medical, anthropological, psychological and cultural 
reasons.  These considerations are the subject of comment within the NATO, RTO 
report in the specific context of recent developments in asymmetric warfare, the use 
of children and the absence of any peer-reviewed publications.60 
 
 Most armed forces, including the British, base much of their experience on structures 
that have subsisted during the latter part of the 20th Century, and which involve what 
Bacevich has termed ‘real soldiering’.61  When regular forces face a concurrent rise in 
the incidence of the child soldier and which runs contrary to the ethos of their own 
cultural perspectives and training, it is hardly surprising so the argument runs, that an 
adverse psychological reaction results from a requirement to shoot children, 
notwithstanding that such a requirement results from an operational need.    Given the 
stress that the West places upon Human Rights considerations, how can infantry be 
taught to place the child soldier question, and more particularly the need to engage 
and where necessary shoot children, in the context of a relevant training programme 
consistent with international law and cultural considerations, if at all?  Does the child 
soldier matter to the ordinary soldier and should the threat be separately categorised 
from any other threat he may face?  Are current training regimes adequate, and is the 
threat such as have been defined overstated, and does it matter to society as a whole? 
59 NATO, RTO Technical Memorandum, ‘Child Soldiers as the Opposing Force’, Final Report of the 
HFM-159 Task Group, January 2011, ES-1. 
60 Ibid., sections 2-1- 2-10. 
61 A. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War, Oxford UP., 
Oxford, 2005. 
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 (iv). It is suggested that the current training regimes in UK forces are inadequate to 
prepare service personnel who are likely to engage child soldiers.  It may equally be 
the case that the incidence of the child soldier is a fact of life on the modern 
battlefield, however it is defined, and no amount of training can alter that fact.  
Adverse psychological reactions may well be a necessary by-product of modern 
conflict as they have in past conflicts, and child conflict, as this thesis defines it, is 
merely another example.  How have other nations organised their forces to cope with 
this manifestation?  As an example, Israel has altered its own ROE to deal with this 
issue, the upshot being that in the intifada more than 20% of those killed have been 17 
and under.62 
 
(v). International law, domestic law and international convention have little or no 
utility in dealing with the issue of child soldiers.  Why is this so?  The use of children 
in warfare has long been outlawed, yet the numbers employed in combat continue to 
grow to the extent that child soldiers are present in every conflict zone US forces 
operate in.63  It is suggested that the political demands of certain states, groups, and 
causes outweigh moral imperatives and international conventions.  Children are above 
all effective, even when utilised unknowingly as is the case in Afghanistan where 
children are regularly employed to plant improvised explosive devices, and in the 
context of the child suicide bomber.64  Is the UK obliged to recognise that, in effect, 
law and convention do not really matter to the issue of the safety of her soldiers and to 
operational requirements?  The imperatives of the battlefield, as in past conflicts, take 
precedence over the niceties of the law, but what political fallout may result and with 
what consequence?  Within the context of the West, it may be argued that inevitable 
tensions arise from training and education based upon respect for law, convention and 
ethical considerations as against a foe that has no respect for such matters, and is 




62 Los Angeles Times, 31st March 2002, ‘Articles tell Palestinians side of Fight’. 
63 P. Singer, op cit., p. 359. 
64 Interview by Anthony Callaway with Lt. Col. G. Davies at the International Training and Land 
Warfare Centre, Warminster on the 20th October 2009. 
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This work is a multi-disciplinary exercise and which involves the exploration of a 
number of themes some of which are the subject of overlap and interlinkage.  They 
include historical and military questions, the latter being concerned with current 
training regimes; political and legal issues, cultural, anthropological and 
psychological matters.  In other words there is no single source which is capable of 
being tapped for a definitive answer. 
 
Whilst the main part of the thesis is based upon secondary and published material, the 
questions concerning psychological fallout from child engagement is dependent upon 
a series of structured interviews organised around members of the armed forces in the 
UK, and the US and in accordance with a specifically designed questionnaire.  As to 
the Israeli experience reliance is placed upon published data and interviews with 
Israeli soldiers who have served in the occupied territories through the B’Tslem 
organisation and interviews conducted thereby.   In order to provide historical 
background specific engagements by members of UK land forces with the Hitler 
Youth towards the end of the Second World War have also been examined. 
 
As to training regimes the conclusions derived from this research are based upon 
published material and interviews with academics and officers tasked with advising 
the military in the UK and the US and most particularly upon information sourced at 
the International Defence Training and Land Warfare Centre, Warminster. 
 
(ii). Book Search 
 
a). Historical.  Across the broad sweep of history and the vast numbers of books 
devoted to recording detail and setting down interpretations of the history of warfare, 
children feature prominently both from the perspective of victim and as agents 
devoted to fighting. It has proved to be a useful exercise to consult indexes and seek 
references to ‘child’, ‘children’ or ‘child soldier’, and some useful passages are 
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sometimes revealed.  Of course, this is without prejudice to specific texts which are 
devoted to the specialism in its various forms in different wars and historical periods. 
 
b). Political. Like so many problems of a strategic nature they can only be  understood 
within their political framework.  In other words the nature of the deployment of 
children very much depends upon the circumstances, broadly construed, of those who 
seek to use them and the purposes to which they are put. The recruitment of boy 
soldiers by the UK in the Great War for example is very different from the 
recruitment of children by either the Taliban or suicide bombers as an adjunct to the 
Palestinian cause in more recent history.  The story of the Hitler Youth in the closing 
stages of the Second World War is different again from the African experience 
involving various regimes recruiting children for their own ends such as in Sierra 
Leone, Ethiopia or Mozambique, and different again from the Iraqi experience and the 
recruitment of children by the Ba’athist Party under Saddam.  The point here is that 
whilst political background is important, there are no single source  references capable 
of being tapped; it is more a question of considering each individual case and placing 
the role of children and more particularly their utility to such causes in those contexts. 
 
c). Legal.  Necessarily the legal aspects of this subject are narrower than the far 
broader remit of points (i) and (ii).  Relevant references are to be found within the 
Geneva Conventions, the Additional Protocols, and various instruments prohibiting 
the deployment of children in conflict throughout the twentieth century,65 including 
the European Protocols. 
 
 d). Cultural and Anthropological.  The manner in which society views children as 
‘persons to be made the subject of protection’ has varied over time  and, even today, is 
not a matter in respect of which there is universal agreement. In order to provide a 
perspective the issue has been examined in the context of Roman society and the 
modern world. There are specific texts available which detail the emerging concept of 
childhood, including the work of Aries and Achard, already mentioned. 
 
65 Appendix A. 
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e). Psychological.  The issue of children being exposed to violence in its various 
forms is a very large subject.  This research is confined to that in relation to the 
exposure of children in war and conflict although not necessarily confined to direct 
experience and to research texts having this bias and to avoid the temptation of 
conflating this type of exposure with the subject of children who are subjected to 
domestic violence .The title of this thesis focuses upon the issue of the ‘Child 
Soldier’, a concept which has a wide definition.  A standard definition was adopted in 
2 major and recent international conferences.  The first in Cape Town in 199766 which 
had as its main purpose the problems of social reintegration of child soldiers in 
Africa, and a further conference in Paris in 2007 co-hosted by UNICEF.67 The 
preferred definition which was to emerge was much wider than that confined to those 
who carry weapons and take part in hostilities, but extends to those who are recruited 
for any purpose associated with conflict including spies, messengers, cooks and even 
those recruited for sexual purposes or matters which may be collateral to conflict 
itself.  It is suggested that this is demonstrative of modern thinking so to reflect the 
modern world and the fact that war and conflict affects every part of society, national 
and international, and children.   In this regard the experience of children who lived 
throughout the Blitz in London, the experience of Anne Frank or those who have 
lived throughout their  minorities in conflict ravaged societies is of value, 
notwithstanding the obvious point that they do not come within the definition of a 
soldier.  In a more modern setting, this should also include those who think they are 
acting as soldiers in the context of Islamic extremism. 
 
(iii). Internet Search 
 
Much of the web site material is devoted to promoting the human rights of children 
and adopts a perspective that suggests children are without agency in terms of issues 
of recruitment: that they are denied the right to education, subjected to the death 
penalty, are disappeared and are punished by cruel and inhumane methods. The 
following are of value: 
66 Cape Town Principles and Best Practices (27th April – 30th April 1997), 
www.uincef.org./emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles (1).pdf.> 
67 The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed 
Groups (February 2007) Prin. 2.1; www.child-
soldiers.org/childsoldiers/Paris_Principles_March_2007.pdf> 
 53 
                                                 
a). Amnesty International: www.amnesty.org/en/children 
b). Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict:  www.watchlist.org/ 
c).Oxfam: www.oxfam.org.uk/ 
d). Save the Children Fund: www.savethechildren.org.uk/ 
e). UNICEF: www.unicef.org.uk/ 
f). United Nations Children’s Fund: www.un.org/en/globalissues/children 
g). The International Labour Organisation: ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang-
en/index.htm. 
 
As to general strategic issues: 
a). Chatham House: www.chathamhouse.org.uk 
b). IISS: www.iiss.org 
c). IISS: www.survival.oupjournals.org 
d).NATO: www.rto,nato.int. 
 
As to specific subjects: 
a). The strategic implications of the Aids Virus: www.ginie.org/ginie-crises-
links/prsomalia.html. 
b). The use by Israel of the intifada as a propaganda tool:  www.ngomonitor.org 
 
(iv). Military Training 
 
At the beginning of this work the author applied for and was successful in obtaining 
MOD Security Clearance at level SC.68  This has enabled access to a variety of MOD 
sources including a number of high ranking personnel, some 5 in number69 and a 
series of interviews at The International Defence Training and Land Warfare Centre, 
Warminster consisting of 3 interviews,70 including one American Officer, Lt. Col. 
68 Defence Vetting Agency Ref. 1578077/1 dated 4th December 2008 with expiry date of the 4th 
December 2013 attached at Appendix B. 
69 Rear Admiral Lionel Jarvis (Surgeon General) on the 15th April 2008 at the MOD; 
    Brig. David Meyer on the 29th October 2008 at the MOD; 
    Brig. Barry Le Grys (Engineer in Chief of the Army) on the 3rd September 2008 at the In and Out    
    Club, St. James’, London; 
    Lt. Cmdr. John Atwill RN on the 15th January 2009 (Telephone Conference); 
    Lt. Col. Richard Walker RM on the 11th May 2007 at CTCRM Lympstone. 
70 On the 14th and 15th March 2010 I attended the Land Warfare Centre and conducted a series of  
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Klein. As to the Israeli experience two interviews were conducted with academic 
sources.  The first was with the Reader in Middle Eastern Affairs at Chatham 
House,71 and the second with a specialist in Child Conflict.72 In broad terms the 
objective was to estimate the extent to which the child soldier was the subject of 
recognition, and if so, whether there were specific training policies to deal with the 
issue in either the UK, the US or Israel. 
 




It is probably fair to observe that the incidence of child soldier engagement 
experienced by UK and US soldiers is rare in so far as a soldier may have  knowingly 
been called upon to engage a child face to face.  Given this  hypothesis it has proved 
difficult to obtain a suitable population of interviewees against which the issue may 
be tested, particularly from the perspective of psychological consequence. The 
problem was compounded since the MOD did not give permission for any interview 
programme to  involve serving personnel and, in the UK case the research was obliged 
to resort to veterans.  This was not the position with the US, in which case there was 
access to a small sample of serving personnel.  The Israeli position was somewhat 
easier as a consequence of the B’Tselem organisation which has published a series of 
interviews and which are readily accessible. 
 
Given the nature of the problem as defined by the question, this research is 
necessarily qualitative and by no means a quantitative exercise.  It may be suggested 
that its conclusions may be considered as anecdotal and which are drawn from too 
narrow a sample of personnel to permit firm conclusions to be drawn.  However, of 
UK and US personnel data has been collected from 7 soldiers and of which 2 soldiers, 
one UK and one US, have knowingly engaged children at close range in the context of 
deployment in Iraq.  In the Israeli case 5 soldiers have been examined. 
 
Interviews with: Col. Juliet Bartlett (Col. Op. Law); Lt. Col. L. Klein, US Officer: (SO1 Coordination 
Operational Law);   Lt. Col. G. Davies (SO1 Op. Law). 
71 Dr. Yossi Mecklenberg, on the 15th December 2012 at Regent’s Park College. 
72 Professor Eyal Ben Ari (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) on the 3rd January 2008. 
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b). Questionnaire Design 
 
Attached at Appendix C73 and Appendix D74 are draft copies in similar format 
although adapted for use in the cases of the UK and the US.  The questionnaires are 
designed to meet the following objectives: 
 
(1). To assess the length of service in respect of each soldier; 
 
(2). To discover whether, and in what circumstances, a particular soldier may have 
knowingly engaged a child during the course of combat; 
 
(3). To assess whether that soldier had a psychological reaction to the fact of 
engagement; 
 
(4). To discover whether the soldier interviewed had received any form of  specific 
training concerning the incipient risk that they may encounter children, and, to cross 
refer any answer received with the issue of military  training (ante); 
 
(5). To assess the attitude of each soldier to the subject of child engagement, both in 
its own right, and to assess as far as was possible, whether it had an influence on how 
each soldier viewed his role and the military contract by which he was engaged. 
 
c). A Comparison from History: The Hitler Youth 
 
In order to amplify the data obtained from the modern era a survey of the experience 
of Allied Soldiers who had engaged members of the Hitler Youth at the closing stages 
of the Second World War was obtained.  Although the historical context is different, 
the questions are the same: How do soldiers regard a child enemy and does it make 
any difference to the manner in which they engage such an enemy? 
 
The sound archives at the Imperial War Museum (IWM) provide a plentiful source of 
such material and over a period of four days75a total of six interviews were selected 
73 Appendix C. 
74 Appendix D. 
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which seemed to address the questions posed.  In selecting samples regard was had to 
the following matters: 
 
(1).The possible incidence of psychological fallout from the encounter on the part of 
the Allied soldier; 
 
(2).The way in which the Allied soldier regarded his assailant as ‘unpredictable 
youths outside his ordinary experience’; 
 
(3). The extent to which, if at all, ‘the youth’ of the opposition was the means by 
which fear was created in the Allied soldier, and how it may have affected  the manner 




The sum total and breakdown of the interviews conducted is as follows: 
(i). Training and Policy: 10; 
(ii). Child Engagement: 12; 
(iii). Historical Comparison: 6; 
(iv). Total: 28. 
75 October 2012. 
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Children and International Law 
 
Whenever the concept of ‘child soldier’ is addressed within the media or within 
literature it is always from the perspective that children are innocent and vulnerable 
and from the belief that young fighters are a cultural anomaly.  From a western 
standpoint this is perhaps understandable since children do not fit the interpretative 
frameworks or cognitive schemes of combat troops.1  It is an accepted truth that 
children need to be protected, to be nurtured and cared for throughout their minority, 
and to regard those who deploy children in combat, and whether in a combatant or 
supportive role, as criminals engaged in criminal acts2. 
 
The perception of children involved in conflict has been shaped towards the end of the 
twentieth century by the development of a global social consciousness that is 
supported by the protection of human rights and by the need to separate the 
belligerent from the civilian that is reflected in the growth of legal instruments, both 
international and national and in the growth of non-governmental organisations 
having the essential aim in the protection of children.  However, even in the context 
of the modern world, quite apart from the position that may have pertained in 
medieval or earlier times3, this universalist attitude is not shared by many states 
and/or societies as the growing numbers of children engaged in conflicts has 
identified,4 even in situations where the individual state has made itself a signatory to 
instruments prohibiting the use of child soldiers.5 
 
1 E. Ben-Ari, Facing Child Soldiers, Moral Issues and Real Soldiering: Anthropological Perspectives 
on Professional Armed Forces, Unpublished Paper, 2007. 
2 Additional Protocol 1977 to the Geneva Conventions 1949, Arts. 77(2); 77(3). 
3 See S. McGlynn, By Sword and Fire, Cruelty and Atrocity in Medieval Warfare, Weidenfeld & 
Nicholson, London, 2008, especially ‘Chivalry and the Laws of War, pp. 71-80. 
4 See Introduction. 
5 By way of example Afghanistan is a signatory to the Convention on the Rts. Of the Child, as well as 
the First, Second, Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions of 12th August 1949, the Int. Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rts. 1966, and the Int. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rts. 1966, yet 
within its jurisdiction children are regularly employed in combatant roles. 
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Although the rights of the child were recognised by international instrument as long 
ago as 19246, the modern legal structure commenced with the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, largely as a reaction to the excesses of 
the Second World War.  This measure has subsequently developed by the introduction 
of various Protocols, Charters and Conventions that collectively provide a 
comprehensive code prohibiting the deployment of children in conflict.7  In broad 
terms and with few exceptions they have been universally accepted.  The origins of 
the modern law has as its origin, the Allied declaration after the Second World War 
which culminated in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal in 1945 that 
declared murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population before or during the war were ‘crimes 
against humanity’.8 
 
Since this time examples of international action in order to protect child soldiers apart 
from what may be construed as strictly legal measures are voluminous, perhaps the 
most important being the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989.  In essence 
they are focussed around the report of Graca Machel to the UN in August 1996, 
entitled ‘The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children’ following her appointment by 
the General Assembly in December 1993 to study the impact of armed conflict on 
children and followed by a 10 year strategic review in August 2007.   The specific 
recommendations are as follows: 
 
(i). The launching of a global campaign aimed at eradicating the use of 
children under the age of 18 in the armed forces.  The encouragement of the 
media to expose any such use and the need for demobilization; 
 
(ii). United Nations bodies, specialized agencies and international civil society 
actors should … encourage the immediate demobilization of child soldiers; 
 
(iii). All peace accords should include specific measures to demobilize and 
reintegrate child soldiers into society; 
6 See League of Nations Declaration of the Rts. of the Child, 1924 
7 See Appendix A 
8 See J. Fox, ‘The Jewish Factor in British War Crimes Policy in 1942’, The English Historical Review, 
January 1977; and A. Neave, Nuremberg, Hodder & Stoughton, 1978, p. 326 
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 (iv). States should raise the age of recruitment and participation in the armed 
forces to 18 years. 
 
Other examples are manifest of special courts being established apart from the Rome 
Statute and which established the International Criminal Court (‘the ICC’),9 to try 
those alleged to have been perpetrators of the use of children in conflict and most 
particularly the Special Court for Sierra Leone in June 2004; and the issue of an arrest 
warrant for Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army in July 2005 and 
the trial of Thomas Dyilo in January 2009 in the ICC. 
 
From an historical perspective war has, perhaps, always fascinated men above and 
beyond any political purpose it may have served, and still does serve, as instruments 
of national policy10. During the twentieth century a clear strand of thought emerged 
casting doubt on the utility of war as such an instrument, and which promoted instead 
the importance of human rights, the dignity of the individual and the supplanting of 
war by the principles of reason and consent, the most famous discourse being set forth 
in ‘The Great Illusion’, by Norman Angell in 1911.  Angell put the point thus: - 
‘Man… is coming to employ physical force less because accumulated 
evidence is pushing him more and more to the conclusion that he can 
accomplish more easily that which he strives for by other means.’11 
Of course, the experience of the Great War three years later and the Second World 
War which was to follow as a consequence, demonstrated that such sentiments were 
misplaced and way ahead of their time, but there is little doubt that a civilising 
attitude, and/or reticence to embark upon armed conflict emerged as a product of the 
last century.  That is not to say that conflicts do not happen or that state-on state 
warfare does not continue to happen, but, as asserted by the UK’s Chief of the 
General Staff, wars are being fought by a combination of economic, cyber and proxy 
actions.12  
 
9 17th July 1998. 
10 M. Van Creveld, The Culture of War, Spellmount,Glos.,  2008, p. 249 
11 N. Angell, The Great Illusion, Heinemann, London, 1911, p.222 
12 D. Richards, ‘Future Conflict and its Prevention: People and the Information Age’, Address to the 
IISS, 18th January 2010; www.iiss.org/recent-key-addresses/general-sir-david-richards-address/. 
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  It is within this broad coalition that law developed in such a way as to regard 
children as deserving of special protection.  Some authors have pointed to the decline 
in large scale interstate warfare that has occurred since 194513, possibly as a reaction 
to the anti-feudal, anti-hierarchical tendencies of the Enlightenment.  Even during the 
nineteenth century a series of movements and writings began to develop which had as 
their essential aim the abolition of war in its entirety; perhaps the best known being 
the writings of Bertha von Suttner who wrote the seminal work ‘Die Waffen Nieder’ 
(‘Lay Down Your Arms’). 
 
The influence of the Great War cannot be underestimated.  Described by Woodrow 
Wilson as ‘the war to end all wars’, there is little doubt that its experience seared not 
only the conscience of the British nation, but also the world.  The bloodshed of the 
war proved crucial in forming Canadian and Australian national identities sharply 
distinct from that of Britain.14  More particularly the advent of the war passed many 
barriers in the realm of what most people considered morally permissible.15  In the 
drive for military advantage, the distinction between soldier and civilian became 
blurred, the advent of the use of poison gas on an industrial scale, the British attempt 
to starve the population of Germany into submission by blockade; the attack on 
neutral shipping, all laid the foundations for the extreme conflicts that were to follow 
and what Lord Lansdowne described as ‘the prostitution of science for the purposes of 
pure destruction.’               
 
After the Great War the greatest statement against warfare came to be exemplified in 
the League of Nations.  Although now dismissed as a failure from its very inception 
along with its concurrent aim of universal disarmament as a chimera, it should be 
remembered that the cause of the League had the support of many millions of people 
basing their beliefs on the principle that reason could become the guiding force in the 
affairs of humanity chastened by the experience of war.16  This was followed by the 
13 See F. Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, published in The National Interest, 16, summer 1989, pp. 
3-18; and E. Luard, The Blunted Sword: The Erosion of Military Power in Modern World Politics, 
Tauris, London, 1989. 
14 A, Hochschild, To End All Wars, How the First World War Divided Britain, Macmillan, 2011, p. 
361. 
15 ibid., p. 373. 
16 D. Hurd, Choose Your Weapons, The British Foreign Secretary, 200 Years of Argument, Success and 
Failure, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2010, p. 300. 
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Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the Geneva Disarmament Conferences of 1931-32, 
both of which employed the aim of abolishing war as an instrument of national 
policy.17  
 
Concurrent with the development of formal legal instruments intended to outlaw the 
use of children is the scale of the contemporary problem of child deployment.   In the 
modern world, post-1945, children are deployed across the world in a variety of 
locations and roles, from participation in the Chinese Cultural Revolution,18 to 
Afghanistan19, Sri Lanka20 and the Balkans.  Combat roles they fulfil concern the 
planting of improvised explosive devices (‘IED’s), intelligence gathering, suicide 
bombing, portering, cooking, support roles or the carrying out of revenge attacks for 
the murder of members of their own families, and fighting.  The position of young 
girls should not be overlooked.  Public awareness of the impact of armed conflict 
tends to focus on the position of boys and young men, as do coincidentally, 
governmental and non-governmental organisations designed to effect the reintegration 
of such persons into society.21  Perhaps this is understandable upon the premise that 
young girls are perceived to be less warlike from a gender and psychological 
perspective than their male counterparts. Indeed, a fighting woman, let alone girl, is 
counter-intuitive from a Western perspective. Available evidence reveals this to be a 
misconception.  There has been a large scale involvement of girls in Sri Lanka, 
Colombia and Sierra Leone and the Philippines22, and in a particular case in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the recruitment of exclusively female units. 
 
Perhaps as a reaction to the growth in such deployment is the rise in the incidence of 
non-governmental organisations designed to alleviate and or stem the advance in the 
child soldier problem.  Like the formal legal instruments to which reference has 
already been made, they are predicated upon the premise that children are vulnerable 
17 See also E. Carr, The 20 Years Crisis, 1919-1939, An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations, Macmillan, 1970,  Ch. 2, Utopia and Reality, pp. 11-21; Ch. 12, The Judicial Settlement of 
International Disputes, pp.193-207. 
18 T. White Lynn, Politics of Chaos: The Organizational Causes of Violence in China’s Cultural 
Revolution, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, pp. 280-281. 
19 S. Jones, op cit, p. 63. 
20 M. Swamy, Inside an Elusive Mind, Yapa Publications, Colombo,  2004, p. 27.  
21 A. Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006, Philadelphia,  p. 74. 
22 ‘The Lived in Experience of Girl Child Soldiers’, research project: Keairns 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 
2003c. 
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and in special need of protection.  Whilst this is the case within the context of 
domestic law, the need to protect children who become embroiled within conflict and 
violence as a consequence of war is all the more marked.  Organisations such as 
‘Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict’23, the ‘Coalition to stop the use of child 
soldiers’, ‘The United Nation’s Children’s Fund’, and ‘Amnesty International’; have 
as their major objectives, not only the issue of abolition but also the abolition of the 
death penalty in respect of children who are perceived to be offenders.  It is worthy of 
note that since 2004 only China, Iran, Pakistan and the Sudan are the only countries 
that have put to death child soldiers following capture.24 
 
It is perhaps inevitable that the child soldier problem is viewed in the west from a 
western perspective, imbued with a respect for law and human rights, at least in broad 
terms.  The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (1950) (Cmd. 8969) (ECHR) was adopted by the Member 
States of the Council of Europe in 1950 and ratified by the United Kingdom in 1951.  
The Human Rights Act 1998 gives further effect in domestic law to the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed under ECHR.  Under the Act it is unlawful for any public 
authority, including a court or tribunal at any level, to act in a manner which is 
incompatible with a Convention right (s.6). Constitutional human rights legislation is 
sui generis, calling for principles of interpretation of its own and suitable to its 
character.25 Many of its articles have a particular application to the issue of children 
and how they are regarded both as individuals and in their own right as children.  In 
particular Article 2 (Right to Life); Article 4 (Prohibition of Slavery and Forced 
Labour); Article 5 (Right to Liberty and Security); Article 8 (Right to Respect for 
Private and Family Life) and Article 14 (Prohibition of Discrimination) are relevant 
to our discussion. 
 
Human rights guarantees of the kind I have mentioned form part of what has been 
described as ‘…the universalization of culture.’26 This is in turn the result of a global 
system of information that depends upon recent developments in communications and 
23 Launched on 14th June 2010 in New York and Kabul, the organisation purports to provide the most 
up-to-date account of children in Afghanistan. 
24 Amnesty International, Children and Human Rts., http://www.amnesty.org/en/children. 
25 Ministry of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319 at 329 C-E. 
26 P. Bobbitt, op cit, p. 87. 
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transport and which threatens the power of the State to preserve the culture of the 
nation through law.27  Put another way, following what has been described as the 
‘short twentieth century’,28 the parliamentary democracies came to triumph over the 
alternative ideologies of communism and fascism.  The building of a vast 
international trading and financial system went hand in hand with the development of 
human rights and, more particularly, winning acceptance for their norms across the 
world.29  As a consequence the modern world is becoming more interdependent; 
whilst, at the same time, the western world seeks to deploy its own view of 
humanitarian law throughout the globe.  As we shall see such a view may conflict 
with nations and groups who neither share that view nor the precepts upon which it is 
based, and which may suggest that western norms are not as accepted as much as the 
west would wish to believe. 
 
At a lower level, the protection of children on the battlefield is reflected in a number 
of specific provisions, most particularly Art. 77(3) of the Additional Protocol and the 
Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2000) 39 ILM 
1285.  These well known measures are intended to prevent children who have not 
attained the age of 15 from being either recruited into armed forces or from taking 
part in direct hostilities.  In recruiting children aged 15 and over although under 18, 
the oldest are to be recruited first.30 In the event of capture, children are entitled to 
special protection over and above that afforded to them as prisoners of war.31 
 
Any legal system naturally depends upon the acceptance of its norms and principles in 
order to be effective.  If this is the case in the context of any domestic system, it is all 
the more so in relation to an international one, since enforceability necessarily 
presents a hurdle in relation to those who do not accept its precepts from the 
27 See D. Betz & T. Stevens, Cyberspace and the State: toward a Strategy for Cyber-Power, IISS, 2011, 
Ch. 2. Cyberspace and Sovereignty, pp.55-74. 
28 See E. Hobsbaum, Age of Extremes, The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, Penguin Books, 1994 
29 P. Bobbitt, op cit., p. 87. 
30 The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, UK Ministry of Defence, Oxford UP, 2005, para. 4.11, 
p.48. 
31 Note:  On signature of the Protocol the UK understands that Art. 1 of the Optional Protocol would 
not exclude the deployment of members of its armed forces  under the age of 18 to take part in 
hostilities where: 
 a). there is a genuine military need to deploy; and 
 b). by reason of the nature and urgency of the situation: 
  (i). it is not practicable to withdraw such persons before deployment; or 
 (ii).to do so would undermine operational effectiveness of any operation.   
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perspective of their own convenience when viewed from their own standpoint.  In 
such a case this may be dictated entirely by self interest. 
 
The Child as a Soldier – Does it matter, and if so, what should be done about it? 
 
It has been pointed out that although war creates many problems relevant to the 
nurturing of young people such as the destruction of the family and social support 
networks, the closure of schools and the destruction of a social and economic 
infrastructure, war may also create opportunities for young people.32  For those 
seeking an escape from difficulties at home, and whether real or perceived, or as an 
act of rebellion, recruitment into an armed group or an army provides an alternative. 
 
Poverty may be another factor why young people seek a military outlet to their own 
problems, particularly in societies where the access to education or employment is 
either restricted or non existent.  The point is made all the greater in nations where 
their societies are damaged by war and the fact that such persons invariably have only 
known conflict throughout their minorities.  As has been pointed out, ‘…few people 
go looking for a war to join: for many, war comes to them and becomes part of their 
normal environment.  With it, war brings insecurity.  It causes societies to rupture, 
schools to close, impoverishes families through deaths, injuries and displacement and 
leaves few avenues for employment.’33 
 
From a purely humanitarian perspective the work of charitable organisations attempts 
to relieve the suffering of children to which warfare and their involvement in conflict 
gives rise.  Yet from the point of view of western forces there is considerable 
evidence to suggest that the fighting ability and effectiveness of their forces is 
affected by confrontations which may include the use of children.  In recent years the 
problems to which engagements of this type give rise has been brought into focus by 
the writings of Romeo Dallaire, and may be refracted through his experience. 
 
Lt. General Dallaire, a Canadian officer of 35 years standing, served as force 
commander of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda from July 1993 to September 
32 R. Brett & I. Specht, Young Soldiers, Why they Choose to Fight, Lynne Rienner, London 2004, p. 13. 
33 Ibid., p. 123. 
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1994.  In 2003 he published a book which has been entered into evidence in war 
crimes tribunals trying the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide and entitled Shake 
Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda.34 In the book he records 
working with children who lived in the genocide and describes the conditions in 
which they are forced to survive.  In December 2001, as part of his duties as special 
adviser on war-affected children to the minister responsible, he conducted a field visit 
to Sierra Leone in order to get first-hand information on the demobilization and 
reintegration of child soldiers and bush wives – children who had been abducted from 
their families and had then fought for several years as part of the rebel force the 
Revolutionary United Front.  The reintegration process was due to last 3 months.  The 
point is made that in many cases neither their families nor their communities were 
willing to accept them back.  Abducted at the age of 9 or even younger, a number of 
the boys had become platoon commanders, and in terms of experience were ‘13 going 
on 25’.  The laying down of weapons meant that they had no future except to join 
thousands of others in displaced and refugee camps that dotted the countryside; 
indeed many of them were actually running the camps themselves.35  Even worse 
were the girls, many of whom were reported as being reluctant to seek help, but on the 
occasions when they were examined. it appeared that they experienced severe medical 
problems caused by rape, early child-bearing and unassisted births.36 
 
Dallaire asserts his own responsibility for the disaster that overtook Rwanda as his 
own leadership of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda  (UNAMIR) as 
an inability to persuade the international community  that Rwanda was worth saving 
from the horror of genocide, even when, in his judgment, the measures needed for 
success were relatively small.37 At its heart, however, it is maintained that 
fundamentally the Rwandan story is the failure of humanity to heed a call for help of 
an endangered people.38 
 
34 R. Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Arrow Books, 
London, 2003. 
35 Ibid., p. 511. 
36 Ibid., p. 512. 
37 Ibid., p. 515. 
38 Ibid., p. 516. 
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The same theme is explored in a further book by the same author entitled They Fight 
Like Soldiers, They Die Like Children, published in 2010.39  In this text the emphasis 
is more on resolution of the problem that gives rise to the incidence of child soldiers 
as opposed to setting down a record of its manifestation.  The starting point is the 
assertion that Child Soldiers are not weathered warriors who have consciously 
committed their adult life to the use of force against others, nor are they combatants in 
countries that consider the use of force as limited exclusively for protection and self-
interest.40  In short these children fight and die in circumstances where there are no 
rules save self-preservation.  Whilst this may be true in perhaps the majority of cases, 
it is surely an oversimplification of a complex definition, and fails to take into account 
many of the positive reasons why children are drawn to a fighting force, however 
crude or rudimentary.  It may further be argued that with such an approach, the 
analysis distorts the perception that many people have in the West that all children 
need protection, that their fighting potential is ignored from the perspective of its 
effectiveness, and, conversely, that the fighting potential of Western forces comes to 
be damaged.  The latter is particularly the case when the issue of morale is considered 
on the part of forces engaging with children. 
 
Dallaire continues the same theme by positing that ‘…in distant and disparate battle 
zones, we find the professional soldier, buoyed by years of experience and tradition in 
the most modern of technological instruments of war, coming face to face with the 
absolute opposite.  It would be nearly impossible to invent a more complete antithesis 
to the modern, mature warrior-cum-peacekeeper than the child rebel, the child fighter, 
the child soldier.’41 Again, this is a stark definition of the problem.  As Samuel Finer 
points out in The Man on Horseback, the Role of the Military in Politics42 there is a 
distinct class  of countries where governments have been repeatedly subjected to the 
interference of their armed forces, and the military as an independent political force 
constitutes a distinct and peculiar political phenomenon.43  It is in such states, 
commonly referred to as either failed or failing states hat there is found weak civil 
administration and ineffective legal institutions and an absence of the rule of law. 
39 R. Dallaire, They Fight Like Soldiers, They Die Like Children, Hutchinson, London. 2010. 
40 Ibid., p.13. 
41 Ibid., p. 15. 
42 S. Finer, The Man on Horseback, the Role of the Military in Politics, Penguin Books, 1975. 
43 Ibid., p. 3. 
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Whilst acknowledging the weaknesses of the military from the point of view of 
administering a modern state in terms of an innate technical inability,44 Finer 
demonstrates that a military machine is marked by the superior quality of its 
organization unrivalled by any other civilian group.  When coupled with the 
attractions associated with military virtues such as discipline, self-abnegation, 
obedience and the like it is not difficult to see how the military offers an attraction to 
young persons and even children.  It even provides an expectation for an adult 
population tired of successive corrupt civilian governments.  Within this broad 
context, as we have seen45 war can provide the opportunity young people seek, 
however distasteful it may seem to western perceptions; and it is a misunderstanding 
to view the problem upon the footing that all children are forced through the barrel of 
a gun to participate in conflict and any attendant excesses that invariably coincide 
with it: this is simply not the case. 
 
Dallaire poses the following questions:- 
‘Can we actually eradicate from the minds of evil adults the very idea of using 
children as weapons of war? Is there room for innovative research and training 
to counter and prevent their use? Is there a way by which we free citizens can 
engage with political leaders to stop the massive abuses of children in conflict-
riddled and imploding nations where poverty drives desperately corrupt and 
ill-begotten power?46   
 
Naturally, the thesis of the book is that the questions posed may be answered in the 
affirmative.  However, when the details of the answers to the questions he poses are 
considered, they suffer from their generality and, to a very large extent their 
impracticality.  For example, the author identifies what he describes as ‘reintegration’ 
as being the most important part of the entire process leading to peace,47 by which he 
means providing support for all war-affected children in their own communities, but 
which is in so many cases underfunded.  Given the scale of the problem which 
Dallaire identifies, is it really practical for the West, particularly in its present position 
of financial retrenchment, to underwrite what are essentially large scale aid 
44 Ibid., see Ch. 3, ‘The Political Weaknesses of the Military’, pp. 12-19. 
45 R. Brett & I. Specht, op cit., p.7. 
46 R. Dallaire, op cit., p.15. 
47 Ibid., p.171. 
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programmes across the world in many failed or failing states in order to address the 
issues he defines?  There is surely no issue about the desirability of providing 
infrastructure reconstruction and employment generation, the criticism of the thesis 
remains that the recommendation is uncosted and unrealistic.  For example, in the 
chapter entitled ‘The Child Soldiers Initiative’48the issue of fund raising is addressed.  
It is clear that, notwithstanding the donation of monies made by the author to the 
enterprise, there is no coherent plan to fund the enormous task that would be required 
to eradicate the child soldier problem in Africa. The reality is that such nations who 
resort to the use of child soldiers commonly experience indebtedness, poor trading 
conditions, a reliance on primary production, economic and political failure, the 
incidence of one-party or military dictatorship and a failure of political will. 
Initiatives of the kind described by Dallaire are well intentioned, but they do not take 
into account the structural nature of the problem and the realities it poses for western 
forces. 
 
The latter is exemplified by the treatment that the author gives to the use of lethal 
force against child soldiers.  Reference is made with approval to the text Killing in 
War by a J. McMahan,49 and to the observation that ‘… just combatants may be 
morally required to fight with restraint, even at greater risk to themselves … when 
child soldiers are conspicuously young … just combatants should show them mercy, 
even at the cost of additional risk to themselves, in order to try to allow these greatly 
wronged children a chance at life.’  To this view Dallaire appears to subscribe by 
asserting that in extremis soldiers have to look at the most horrible option of actually 
using force against some of the children in order to stop the killings, mutilation and 
horror of the many.50 
 
Although the author declares himself ‘a passionate humanist’, I question whether such 
an argument is a responsible one for a high ranking officer to take, and raises rather 
difficult moral and philosophical questions.  To what extent should Dallaire’s 
humanism, or any ranking officer’s personal convictions however passionately held, 
be a factor in his command?  Is it right that a personal conviction be placed above his 
48 Ibid., Ch. 9, pp. 207-233. 
49 J. McMahan, Killing in War, Oxford UP., 2009. 
50 R. Dallaire, op cit., p. 225. 
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own responsibility to the troops he commands and their welfare?  What influence do 
such sentiments have upon the importance of the military objective, and are they 
relevant?   We have seen that armed children can pose as much, if not more, of a 
threat to conventionally armed soldiers; how does the author square this fact with not 
only the military covenant, but operational demands?  Does Dallaire maintain his 
position in the event that he is called on to confront a child suicide bomber armed 
with a nuclear device, however crude?  When these questions are matched against the 
central thesis of his argument, his assertions about a ‘humanistic’ approach to these 
problems appear irrelevant at best, dangerous at worst and beside the point.  Surely a 
threat has to be confronted with all the available means at the disposal of the opposing 
side for the greater good and the wider public interest served by the military who are 
called upon to protect that interest. 
 
Such moral dilemmas are not uncommon in the history of warfare and armed conflict.  
In July 1944, during the debates that surrounded the possible use of the first atomic 
bomb, a physicist named Leo Szilard submitted a petition on behalf of sixty-nine 
fellow physicists insisting that the government had an ‘obligation of restraint’.51 The 
government had already resolved to use the atomic device ‘…at the earliest 
opportunity and without warning.’52  The Secretary of State for War, Henry Stimson, 
however, was able to strike from the list of targets the former capital of Japan, Kyoto, 
then the chief repository of Japan’s culture and traditions, upon the basis that the 
dropping of an atomic device on such a city would make the post-war task of 
reconstruction in a conquered Japan all the more difficult.  Of course the scale of the 
problem is very different when compared to the response of Dallaire to the use of 
child soldiers, but the principle is similar: a conscious decision to limit a known 
capability in war in the wider interests of humanity it may threaten.  Similar concerns 
were raised in objection to the aerial bombing campaign over Germany with the 
establishment of the Committee for the Abolition of Night Bombing in the spring of 
1942 and which was to become the Bombing Restriction Committee.  In her 
fortnightly ‘Letter’ written and published for the peace movement, Vera Brittain 
wrote: ‘We must decide whether we want the government to continue to carry out 
51 A. Grayling, Among the Dead Cities, Was the Allied Bombing of Civilians in WWII a Necessity or a 
Crime? Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, p. 153. 
52 G. De Groot, The Bomb, London, 2004, p.74. 
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through its Bomber Command a policy of murder and massacre in our name.  Has any 
nation the right to make its young men the instruments of such a policy?’53 
 
By inference, Dallaire suggests that no nation has the right to require its soldiers to 
shoot young people as part of a deliberate policy that may arise from a deployment 
where the risk of any such engagement is manifest. However, the difficulty with 
arguments such as these, as with all such arguments invariably deployed by persons of 
conscience, is an inability to distinguish between practical reality and theoretical 
utopia, or, put another way:  the world as it is, as opposed to the world they would 
like to see.   
 
Perhaps the most significant indictment of the Dallaire position is his desire to 
eradicate the child soldier problem by the development, through what he terms the 
‘Child Soldiers Initiative’.54  The thesis revolves around a suggestion that 
peacekeepers, by which is meant in broad terms UN Representatives, should develop 
ways to ‘…connect and talk with the people of the region, especially the kids.’55  It is 
also indicated that attempts should be made to impress upon commanders who may be 
inclined to utilise children that using children to fight their battles is to adopt ‘…a 
losing position’.56 
 
Much is made of the Winnipeg Conference of August 2006 of which Dallaire was a 
leading light, and which sought to emphasise to participating non-governmental 
organisations the importance of child protection, the development of military tactics 
to prevent recruitment, the need to respond to violations of the subsisting legal regime 
to prevent the usage of children, and the need to develop what is described as ‘serious 
fundraising’57 to develop research into the problem as the author defines it.   
 
Without in any way seeking to decry such a humanistic approach to our problem, little 
attempt is made to set the child soldier problem in an appropriate context, and in 
particular to recognise the global nature of its incidence as a product of failed or 
53 P. Berry & M. Bostridge, Vera Brittain: A Life, Boston, Mass., 2002, p. 431. 
54 R. Dallaire, op cit., Ch. 9, pp. 207- 233. 
55 Ibid., p. 209. 
56 Ibid., p. 215. 
57 Ibid., p. 222. 
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failing states, and the need for a global solution, rather than the series of surface 
scratching measures recommended by General Dallaire. 
 
An alternative, and it is suggested, a more realistic approach to defining the problem 
is to be found in the work of Mats Berdal and Achim Wennmann in a joint publication 
entitled ‘Ending Wars, Consolidating Peace: Economic Perspectives’, which arose 
out of a two-year research programme at the International Institute of Strategic 
Studies on the topic  ‘Economics and Conflict Resolution’.58  In short it is contended 
that in the post-Cold War era international attempts to assist countries emerging from 
war have been, what is describes as ‘uneven’.  Berdal puts the point thus: - 
‘A major reason for this (i.e. the ‘uneven’ approach) lies in the recurring 
failure of those charged with peace building and reconstruction activities – 
however benign and well-meaning their intentions – to treat societies 
emerging from violence and war on their own terms.  In part, this failure is 
linked to an all-too-common lack of understanding and sensitivity towards the 
cultural and historical specificities of war-torn societies.  At least as important, 
however, has been the failure of outsiders to recognise the dynamic and 
complex ways in which the conditions of war and violent conflict themselves 
affect and reshape societies, and, in doing so, how they generate distinctive 
political, economic and developmental challenges that do not lend themselves 
to ‘templated’ solutions …to economic recovery.’59 
 
What is not often appreciated in the West by those persons seeking to assist the work 
of reconstruction is the fact that in many such states there is a vested interest in the 
continuation of armed conflict, not just for the purposes of survival but also for the 
cover it provides for predatory and criminal activity.  In his essay entitled Crime, 
Corruption and Violent Economies60, J. Cockayne points out that in a globalised 
economy war can be increasingly difficult to distinguish from ordinary business.  For 
example, access to global markets has made it easier for a range of violent 
58 Eds. M. Berdal & A. Wennmann, Ending Wars, Consolidating Peace: Economic Perspectives, IISS, 
2010. 
59 M. Berdal & A. Wennmann, ibid., pp. 1-2; see also M. Berdal, Building Peace After War, IISS, 
2009, pp. 160-161. 
60 J. Cockayne, Ch. 10, in M. Berdal & A. Wennmann, ibid., pp. 189-218. 
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entrepreneurs to sell goods and services, and in turn raise money, arms and men.61  In 
such circumstances politics and ideology are invoked to sustain popular support amid 
violence, and it is often the case that armed groups and criminal organisations are 
embedded within political organisations. 
 
In a recent study of the politics of Yemen62, a country of the kind contemplated by 
Cockayne, it is well demonstrated that the subsisting regime under the control of 
President Ali Abdullah Saleh operates upon a neo-patrimonial system since it came to 
power some 33 years ago.  As the study indicates:- 
‘The Yemeni system is no stranger to crisis; in fact, crisis has kept the system 
running, and has been, to a significant degree, a deliberate choice by Yemen’s 
power elite.  The regime of President Saleh has chosen not to implement the 
rule of law despite its capacity to do so.  It has chosen not to plan for a post-oil 
economy despite the possibilities for an investment based model, and has 
instead mortgaged its future on its ability to bargain for external support.  
Finally it has chosen to reward those who reinforce the legitimacy of a system 
that endorses the criminalisation of the state.’63 
 
Given the multiple problems that Yemen faces including depleting oil and water 
reserves, an increasingly food-insecure population and costly subsidies on petroleum 
products, it is likely that the measures required to tackle such problems would prove 
so politically unpopular that that any government willing to implement them would 
almost certainly undermine their long term aspirations.64 
 
Somalia provides another such an example.  This state has been the subject of legal 
and other non-legal measures to prevent the use of child soldiers for a number of 
years.  Such measures include the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, a visit 
by a UN special representative, and the implementation in January 2003 of UN 
Resolution 1460 which calls for Somalia, and other named states to halt the practice.  
Post-war education programmes including teacher training and the distribution of 
workbooks and games designed to promote the rights and responsibilities of children 
61 J. Cockayne, Ibid., p. 189. 
62 S. Phillips, Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, IISS, 2011. 
63 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
64 Ibid., p. 135. 
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and the awareness of others, have all featured in reconstruction work alongside other 
efforts such as land-mine awareness, peace education and living and responding with 
HIV/AIDS65.  The latter now presents a particular problem since the problem of AIDS 
creates in the Third World a large number of orphans who are vulnerable to 
exploitation and radicalisation and who turn to crime and the membership of militias 
in order to maintain their existence in the face of inadequate support from their 
families and communities.66   These are all measures of which Dallaire would no 
doubt approve, and of the kind he suggests.  
 
However, concern about collapsed states and the threat they pose to international 
peace and security has been one of the most difficult problems in the post- Cold era, 
and, as has been pointed out, nowhere in so profound a form as in Somalia.67 In 
particular, and since January 1991, Somalia has had no functioning central 
government.  All external attempts to establish such a government have failed, but 
what is perhaps most striking is the fact that the country has not descended into 
anarchy, but there has arisen a series of ‘sub-state polities’68, that have assumed in 
some cases, the core functions of government.  In circumstances where warfare has 
undergone a transformation in addition, and which becomes more localised and intra-
clan in nature, the breeding ground for the recruitment of children is established.  Of 
special relevance to Somalia is the rise of radical Islamic movements and the option 
they provide of alternative systems of governance such as the organisation Al-Ittihad 
al Islami (‘AIAI’).  When coupled with the growth of Islamic schools, akin to the 
madrasses in Pakistan, it is likely that they are socialising an entire generation of 
young Somalis to an angry, anti-Western and conspiratorial views of world events. 
 
As Menkhaus asserts: 
65 See Global Information Networks in Education, ‘About Ginie-Programs’, August 1999, 
http://www.ginie.org/ginie-crises-links/pr/somalia.html; see also S. Elbe, Strategic Implications of 
HIV/AIDS, Adelphi Paper 357, IISS, 2003, especially ‘Youth Crime and Armed Bands, pp. 56-57. 
66 M. Schonteich, ‘Age and AIDS: South Africa’s Crime Time Bomb?’ cited in R. Shell, ‘Halfway to 
the Holocaust: The Economic, Demographic and Social Implications of the AIDS Pandemic to the 
Year 2010 in the South African Region’ in M. Lange (ed.) HIV/AIDS: A Threat to the African 
Renaissance?, Johannesburg, SA, pp.18-19. 
67 K. Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism, Adelphi Paper 364, IISS, March 
2004, p. 8. 
68 K. Menkhaus, ibid., p. 11. 
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‘Much of the conventional wisdom on the Somali crisis – the nature and scope 
of its lawlessness, the dynamics of its armed conflicts, the interests of its key 
political actors in rebuilding a functional state and reviving the rule of law, the 
agenda and strength of its radical Islamist groupings and the extent to which it 
is a safe haven for global terrorist networks – is a misreading.  This kind of 
misdiagnosis is not unique to Somalia….It can be partially attributed to 
residual thinking.  Policymakers in Western capitals, whose worldview has for 
decades been shaped by the notion that wars are fought to be won and that a 
state is essential for the existence of the rule of law, are slow to accept the 
radical implications of war as state of ‘durable disorder’.69 
 
Given such a conclusion which, for the purposes of this thesis I adopt, how can the 
remedies suggested by Dallaire have any realistic prospect of success?  The 
withdrawal of sponsorship at the end of the Cold War provided a further impetus to 
many belligerents to develop other sources of revenue.  In much of Sub-Saharan 
Africa the availability of natural resources permitted many local wars to be sustained.  
The RENAMO in Mozambique, well known for the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers benefitted from smuggling and protection rackets run on the flow of goods 
from neighbouring land locked countries,70 whereas UNITA, a similar organisation 
from the point of view of child recruitment, benefitted with cash obtained from 
diamonds and oil.  
 
There is of course another, and perhaps more unorthodox view, that suggests it is 
wrong to regard the use of children in warfare in terms of success or failure, but more 
in terms of regarding their usage as a normal part of such societies.  When it comes to 
confronting such societies, or perhaps more accurately, part or fractured societies in 
the event that Western security becomes an issue, and which may require intervention 
by force, then the engagement of their soldiers, who may happen to include children, 
is an inevitable fact.  This is in contra-distinction to Dallaire who predicates his thesis 
upon the basis that the ‘child soldier problem’ as he defines the same is a soluble 
69 K. Menkhaus, ibid., p. 77. 
70 P. Le Billon, Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict, Adelphi Paper 373, IISS, 2005, 
p. 43. 
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problem, as opposed as is the contention of this thesis, namely, a problem that can 
only ever be the subject of containment. 
 
When the problem is considered from a Western perspective there is a conclusion to 
be drawn.  Yes, the problem of children being used all over the world in different 
forms for the purposes of armed conflict, being deprived of their youth, being exposed 
to risk for uncertain and dubious causes at the hands of ruthless regimes does matter, 
but the cause to prevent such usage by suggestions, as Dallaire propagates, is not 
served by suggestions that the West should seek to supply money or to set up 
education programmes to deal with a truly global and entrenched problem.  More 
particularly, the phenomenon is perhaps a small, although disturbing from the point of 
view of Western perceptions, part of modern politics in the Third World and should 
be viewed as such.  It is easy to argue that the solution is to stifle the roots by which 
the problem is created: to build democratic states; to implement the rule of law; to 
educate populations in concepts of human rights; to fund welfare programmes 
throughout the Third World and elsewhere; to aid development and so on, but the 
disappointing fact remains that such approaches remain a pipe dream of impossibility, 
so great is the task. Children may be the victims of conflict, but their existence 
remains a fact and must be confronted in much the same manner in which 
conventional soldiers are engaged. 
  
Are there instances where the Child Soldier problem has been eradicated, and, if 
so, in what circumstances? 
 
Leaving aside the factor of obliteration as a consequence of direct military defeat, as 
was the experience of the Hitler Youth at the end of the Second World War71, there is 
no special formula that can be applied in a general sense and across all political 
spectrums.  The thesis deployed in this chapter is that ‘templated’ solutions will 
inevitably fail.  Whilst it is possible to define the factors that may give rise to the 
employment of the young, it is impossible to define a remedy. 
 
71 See H. Koch, op cit., Ch. XI, pp.228-252. 
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Northern Ireland is an example which does, however, call for comment.  There are 
500,000 people under the age of nineteen in Northern Ireland, a country which has 
experienced the longest period of civil disturbance in modern times.72  In the struggle 
for ‘hearts an minds’, identity, justice, territory and truth, the minds of children have 
been as valuable in the endeavour as the minds of adults.73 
 
It has been pointed out that ‘the sectarian divide’, the subject of much comment 
within the press, has permitted not only the division of communities, but also the 
politicization of those communities which may include schools, youth organisations 
and families.74 Of course the story of ‘the troubles’ has been told many times75, and to 
some extent ‘the troubles’ continue in a variety of forms.76  This is not the place in 
which to explore them.  What is more significant, however, is to note that the 
experience of Northern Ireland is one where the active employment of children by 
both sides of the sectarian divide was well established and, in recent years, save for a 
few notable examples, the incidence has diminished.  Why is this the case, and are 
there any lessons to be drawn from the experience of Northern Ireland? 
 
From a strict historical perspective, Brocklehurst points to the arrival of the ‘English’ 
onto ‘Irish’ soil from the fifteenth century onwards as marking the beginning of a 
hierarchy in terms of bestowed identity and socio-economic opportunity.77  This 
hierarchy became more and more entrenched in subsequent years leading to the 
commencement of the Irish War of Independence in 1919 waged by those in the 
southern counties of Ireland.  Children became an inevitable part of this struggle, 
whilst the battle for children’s minds was influenced by the segregation of education 
and, as a consequence to the kind of education children received, particularly in the 
teaching of history. 
 
72 E. Cairns, Caught in the Crossfire: Children and the Northern Ireland Conflict, Appletree, London, 
1987, p. 11. 
73 H. Brocklehurst, op cit., p. 83. 
74 H. Brocklehurst, ibid., p.83. 
75 See for e.g. J. Darby, ‘Conflict in Northern Ireland: A Background Essay’, in S. Dunn (ed.) Facets of 
the Conflict in Northern Ireland, Houndmills: Macmillan, 1995. 
76 The Real IRA, a coalition of dissident former IRA members began to recruit boys in the 14-16 year 
age group in the late 1990’s, see ‘Teenage Boys Trained by Paramilitary Group, Guardian Weekly 
(London), 29th November 2000. 
77 H. Brocklehurst, op cit., p. 85. 
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Against this historical backcloth, the recruitment of children by terrorist groups 
followed a familiar pattern to other terrorist groups.  Children could be used to lure 
British Army patrols into ambushes more easily where women and children are the 
bait; children can be used as human shields, and their deaths can be employed to 
portray martyrs’ deaths for the cause of a united Ireland, and as heroes rather than 
victims.  Of particular relevance is recent research which appears to demonstrate that 
children as young as five can explain the difference between violent crime and 
political violence.78  Youth, and the susceptibility of young people to manipulation 
and exploitation, particularly by the unscrupulous, and the utility that young people 
may have for the terrorist cause present a deadly combination.  Ironically, the 
perceived weakness of children represents as their greatest strength. 
 
It seems clear that the reduction in the use of children in the context of Northern 
Ireland, can only be seen as a product of a wider political settlement of the ‘troubles’, 
and the lessening of political tensions,  as opposed to any particular formula relating 
to children.  Of course with the building of a political settlement and the building of 
trust between communities, other, perhaps more direct measures become possible, 
such as the merger of Protestant and Catholic education. 
 
In one sense, from the point of view of the child soldier question, the story of 
Northern Ireland represents a success story.  In another sense no direct lessons may be 
drawn since, as we have seen, once a political settlement is achieved other problems, 
social, political and military may be tackled.  In short, there is no such thing as a 









78 E. Cairns, Children and Political Violence, Blackwell, Oxford, 1996. 
79 See footnote 58. 
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Do cultural issues influence the way in which children are regarded as soldiers, 
and if so, how? 
 
When questions of deployment against children arise, and, in particular in relation to 
children in the Third, or underdeveloped world, the West inevitably sees the problem 
from the perspective of the human rights of the children concerned, and 
understandably sees such children in the terms as defined by the West.  Is this 
accurate?  In the event that it is not, as is the contention here, it may well follow that 
any decision to engage with children in the context of a battle or conflict zone may be 
based upon totally false assumptions. The same point arises as to the manner in which 
any engagement takes place. Put another way, the West and its soldiers need to 
understand the enemy that they are called upon to fight.  I have no doubt that the 
current command structure in the British Army would reject any suggestion that they 
‘…do not understand the enemy they are called upon to fight’, but given that no 
specific training regime exists in the context of the British Army; one may surely 
question the extent of the knowledge the command purports to have in this particular 
area of conflict. 
 
For many years anthropologists have observed how different culture patterns have 
influenced the manner in which children are reared. Within the study of psychology 
there exists a tension between biological theories of development; the theory that 
development of children is derived from the human ‘genotype’; and the position taken 
by some anthropologists.  In the work of Benedict and Mead in 1934, it is asserted 
that ‘…from the moment of birth the customs into which (a child) is born shape his 
experience and behaviour.’80  Whilst some influence on behaviour is admitted by the 
anthropologist school to the fact of genetic development, most indicate that biology 
has little to say about development within a culture.81 
 
Some theorists have chosen to consider the fact of childhood as being a social 
construction, which has little to do with genetic factors and a closer affinity to a 
sociological definition.  In other words attitudes to children are conditioned by 
80 R. Benedict, Patterns of Culture, Boston, 1934, p.2. 
81 See P. Smith et al., Understanding Children’s Development, 4th Edition, Blackwell, Oxford, 2003, p. 
54. 
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dominant belief systems that may prevail in any given society, and can only be 
properly understood within the context of social, political and cultural factors.82  Put 
another way, this is merely an extension of the ‘nature/nurture’ debate within a 
different context, or a struggle between those who believe that the concept of 
childhood arises from a form of social construction that childhood is specific to 
particular social or cultural conditions; as opposed to those who believe that 
childhood has natural or universal features. 
 
From the perspective of sociology the work of James and Prout in 1990,83 is of 
interest to the debate in that they argue for a new paradigm in the thinking about child 
development.  The following main features emerge at pp.8-9: - 
 
(i). Childhood is understood as a social construction and provides an 
interpretative frame for contextualising the early years of human life.  
Childhood is neither a natural nor a universal feature of human groups but 
appears as a specific structural and cultural component of many societies. 
 This point is in accord with a social constructionist belief. 
 
(ii). Childhood is a variable of social analysis.  It can never be entirely 
divorced from other variable such as class, gender and ethnicity.  Comparative 
and cross-cultural analysis reveals a variety of childhoods rather than a single 
or universal phenomenon. 
 This point is again in accord with a social constructionist belief. 
 
(iii). Children’s social relationships and cultures are worthy of study in their 
own right, independent of the perspective and concern of adults. 
 
(iv). Children are, and must be seen as, active in the construction and 
determination of their own social lives, the lives of those around them and the 
societies in which they live. 
 
82 P. Smith et al., ibid., p. 57. 
83 A. James & A. Prout, Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood, Basingstoke, 1990, pp. 8-9 
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(v). Ethnography is a particularly useful methodology for the study of 
childhood.  It allows children a more direct voice and participation in the 
production of sociological data than is possible through experimental or 
survey styles of research. 
 
(vi). Childhood is a phenomenon in relation to which the double hermeneutic 
of the social science is present.  That is to say, to set out a new paradigm of 
childhood sociology is also to engage in and respond to the process of 
reconstructing childhood. 
One of the problems which arise from an attempt to define childhood and its possible 
cultural context in the manner described is the fact that the orientation derives from a 
Western perspective which may be inapplicable when considered in nations where the 
use of the child soldier may be more likely.  For example, as Alcinda Honwana points 
out in Child Soldiers in Africa84, in Mozambique and Angola, any international 
interventions to prevent or to assist in the prevention of the use of Child Soldiers must 
be compatible with and supportive of local knowledge about trauma and healing.  
This is in part a consequence of the fact that African societies are based upon forms of 
‘common sense’ that differ from those prevailing in the West.  Such cultures have 
their own routes to understanding and healing war-related afflictions based upon 
ancient forms of religious belief, spiritual expression and healing practices.  Persons 
are constituted by their relationships with kin and community and local government is 
not just a set of regularized, formal legal and political arrangements. 
 
It would seem, therefore, that attempts to construct cultural models in order to assist 
with an understanding of childhood in general and the child soldier in particular, are 
in danger of being drawn according to a European-American order which so often 
misunderstands how organisation of life, and their regard for children and their place 
in society, is conducted within African cultures according to visible relationships and 
persons rather than as defined and mediated by legal structures and state systems. 
 
African cultures are of course examples, and care should be taken not to over 
generalise any conclusion based upon too narrow a sample or set of examples, but the 
84 A. Honwana, op cit., p. 153.  
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essential truth which may be derived from this short analysis is that the Child Soldier 
problem is defined  from western perspectives and in terms of law, culture and 
attitude.  Perhaps it is not surprising that military solutions and the manner in which 
western soldiers are trained, the perceptions of their own governments suffer as a 




























CHAPTER 3: THE CURRENT EXPERIENCE OF THE UK ARMED FORCES 





The main thesis of this chapter is concerned with the experience of the United 
Kingdom in having to contend with the incidence of children who are engaged by 
nations, as well as terrorist or other armed groupings, for their own strategic purposes 
against the interests of the United Kingdom and her allies.  Its focus is the modern 
world, and questions both the ethos of the British Armed Forces, their structure and 
current training programmes as to whether the present regime is adequately geared to 
deal with the problem as I have defined it.1 
 
During the recent and ongoing conflict in Iraq, British soldiers were obliged to engage 
children.  Richard Holmes in his recent examination of that conflict, ‘Dusty Warriors’ 
poses the problem thus: - 
‘Most soldiers in contact killed to stay alive, and some went further, gaining 
professional satisfaction from outmanoeuvring or outshooting their 
adversaries, even if the consequence of this success was the death of another 
human being.  Some found it impossible to shoot youngsters…. Trooper Ken 
Boon (observes): ‘Then a young lad in his early teens threw a grenade at me, I 
could have shot him easily but instead I took cover because I can’t kill a child 
that had probably been told to throw it.’2 
 
Brigadier David Meyer had experience of the problem of boy soldiers from his own 
active service in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and was aware of the 
problem in the context of Iraq and Afghanistan3.  In his opinion, there was no special 
or particular problem that arose from the point of view of regular forces engaging 
children.  He drew attention to the current Rules of Engagement (‘ROE’) that permits 
any soldier to use lethal force if that soldier believes that his life is in danger, 
irrespective of the age of the assailant, perceived or not perceived. 
1 See Chapter 1. 
2 R. Holmes, op cit., p. 317. 
3 Interview with Anthony Callaway at the MOD, London on the 29th October 2008. 
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Brigadier Meyer further asserted that the chain of command from corporal to 
company commander was attuned to the problem of a modern force encountering 
child soldiers.  In particular, he stressed the relevance of intelligence led strategy 
identifying the existence of child soldiers, and the consideration of the employment of 
what has come to be known as ‘effects based warfare’.  In so far as small 
engagements are concerned, of which Sierra Leone and that in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo are examples, the existence of a child soldier may, in his 
opinion, present a tactical problem in respect of which British armed forces, as 
presently configured, are well able to deal.  Yet in the context of larger strategic 
deployments, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, Meyer was of the opinion that the 
child soldier did not pose a specific strategic threat and hence did not require any 
adjustment in current training regimes. 
 
This view is not an isolated one.  During early April 2008 I conducted another 
interview with Commodore (now Rear Admiral) Lionel Jarvis shortly to become the 
Surgeon General.4 Jarvis was keen to emphasise the stress that the UK placed upon 
the need to care for, and properly treat personnel that came within the purview of 
British forces who appeared to be children or otherwise underage.  He was 
particularly considering the context of Iraq and Afghanistan, in circumstances where 
children had been taken prisoner and the advice that UK forces had received to 
separate such persons from the conventional soldier, and was eager to rebut any 
suggestion that the UK was unaware of the problem presented by the child soldier.  
One of the roles of the Surgeon General was to deal with press and media enquiries 
into tasks that were being undertaken by the military.  He was are of the nature of this 
research and would not wish it to be thought that the MOD had given any support to 
any project which suggested directly or indirectly that it was in some way acceptable 
to shoot children in whatever context or setting.  To do so would create a significant 
political backlash which he would be obliged to field.  His approach was to stress the 
importance that the MOD places upon the application of the law, and international 
law in particular; that children whom the military may come across in a combat role 
are properly treated in accordance with that law and convention, and from his 
perspective, saw no exceptions that would apply. 
4 Interview with Anthony Callaway at the MOD, London on the 15th April 2008. 
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 What emerges in terms of training specifically and derived from another interview 
with the Engineer in Chief of the Army, Brigadier Barry Le Grys.5 He confirmed that 
the Army had no specific policies for dealing with the problem presented by child 
soldiers.  He spoke of his own personal experience from deployments in Afghanistan, 
Iraq and Sierra Leone as an officer in the Royal Engineers acting under the auspices 
of the UN.  Le Grys was eager to stress the importance that the Army places upon the 
‘education’ of soldiers prior to any deployment, but pointed out that such ‘education’ 
was limited to the geographical and political context of the deployment coupled with 
existing training techniques. Brigadier Le Grys indicated that the British Army 
approaches the problem of the child soldier from the perspective that the very idea of 
a child being used as a combatant is both legally and morally unacceptable. Where 
such manifestations exist in the world, it is more likely to be a product of weak states 
that are unable to prevent such occurrences.  The bias in the British Army is, 
therefore, to centre any response upon the footing that prevention is better than cure, 
and to build the infrastructure in countries regarded as weak, so as to prevent the 
likelihood that children are made he subject of recruitment.  I question whether such a 
response is a realistic one given that the resources available to the West or any nation 
are necessarily finite, and are unlikely to scratch the surface of the scale of Third 
World debt and the struggle for resources in underdeveloped nations.  It seemed to me 
that the approach of this interviewee was to disseminate a politically acceptable 
solution partly as a consequence of his rank and partly in justification of his position 
that there was no need for change. 
 
This raises the question as to whether UK armed forces are best organised to face the 
threat posed by child soldiers. It has already been observed that current British 
Military Doctrine makes no mention of child combatants.6  It is unclear whether this 
apparent lacuna is because the child soldier is considered to pose no strategic or 
tactical threat or because the training of UK armed forces is in fact adequately 
organised to counter the problem.  
 
5 Interview with Anthony Callaway at the In and Out Club, London on the 3rd September 2008. 
6 Chapter 1. 
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I further question whether it is realistic to adopt a response upon the basis that no 
account is taken of the psychological consequences to soldiers whether by the 
existence of training programmes and/or treatment centres.  The latter is partly 
answered by posing another question as to whether of not a psychological 
consequence emanates from such encounters.  It is argued that this omission 
potentially represents a double failure on the part of those charged with committing 
men to battle in pursuit of a defined political objective, and in ensuring their welfare 
and survival as effectively as can be devised. 
 




Throughout history strategists have endeavoured to define the battlefield of the future 
drawing upon the lessons of the past.  The modern world has seen in recent years a 
decline in the threat posed by a traditional militaries and a corresponding rise in the 
threat from terrorist groups, some having the benefit of state sponsorship and others 
without.7  It has been pointed out that there is nothing new in ‘irregular’ or guerrilla 
attacks being carried out by religious fanatics and which predates the development of 
modern armed forces and even the nation state itself.8  What makes such attacks more 
significant is the incidence of technological advance making such attacks more potent.  
It is likely that the battlefield of the future will consist of a series of hit-and-run 
attacks rather than the more conventional ‘force-on-force’ engagement.9 
 
There is a wide range of competing definitions of what a revolution in Military 
Affairs is.10 Lawrence Freedman adopts the approach that ‘revolution involves more 
than change, and certainly more than simply change of an incremental variety.  It 
represents a moment of transformation.’11  It is not suggested that the use of children 
in modern war represents a revolution in the narrow sense of the term as defined by 
Freedman, yet it is argued that their deployment when allied to technical advances in 
7 M. Boot, op cit., pp. 432-433. 
8 Ibid. p. 433. 
9 Ibid. p. 473. 
10 T. Benbow, op cit, p. 194. 
11 L. Freedman, ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs’, Adelphi Paper 318, IISS, 1998, p. 7. 
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weaponry coupled with a readiness on the part of nation states and others to deploy 
them represents a significant change in the manner in which modern war is fought and 
is likely to be conducted in the future. Whether such developments can be properly 
described as ‘revolutionary’ is a separate issue. 
 
Philip Bobbitt in his book Terror and Consent points out that both terrorism and 
warfare are undergoing a radical transformation to the extent that large scale industrial 
warfare of nation states is being replaced by the targeting of civilian populations as a 
direct objective rather than as a collateral cost.12  The ultimate objective is not to 
occupy territory, but rather to terrorise populations in order to secure acquiescence.  It 
has already been noted that this distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ wars has not been 
sufficiently grasped, and nations appear to be embarked upon a course to extinguish 
the threat from the new by reference to methods of the old.13 
 
As already mentioned Brigadier Le Grys points to the whole idea of a child combatant 
as being ‘legally and politically unacceptable’ to the thinking within the British Army.  
However, the world is moving from an international order dominated by law and legal 
institutions towards one that is reliant upon the market and informal institutions and 
supplements afforded to UN peacekeeping operations.  Indeed, the opinion of Le Grys 
fails to take account of the fact that legal provisions have little currency within those 
states most likely to employ children as combatants let alone by armed groups over 
which the state has no control.  Further, the most powerful and developed states are 
those who are empowered by law having the influence to write rules that are most 
favourable to their circumstances and values;14 whilst international law is ‘often 
perceived as a vehicle for anti-American resentments’.15  Law and adherence to the 
law cannot be relied on to protect regular forces on the modern battlefield.  Nor can it 
be assumed that state against state warfare will be the norm in the future, as will be 
seen there is evidence that such conflict is likely to be the exception. 
 
12 P. Bobbitt, op cit.,  p. 132. 
13 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford University Press, 
1999. 
14 P. Bobbitt, op cit., p. 502. 
15 J. Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders, The Wilson Quarterly, Autumn 2003 
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Professor Eyal Ben-Ari in an essay entitled ‘Facing Child Soldiers, Moral Issues, and 
‘’Real Soldiering’’: Anthropological Perspectives on Professional Armed 
Forces’16seeks to contextualise the nature of the child soldier problem.  In particular 
he asserts that the combination of threatening youngsters and assumptions about their 
inexperience and immaturity coupled with global images of children as innocent and 
vulnerable creates a cultural anomaly that poses a set of problems for soldiers who 
confront them.17  Such images are given further credence by the activities, worthy by 
nature, of charitable organisations such as UNICEF, the Save the Children Fund, the 
International Labour Organisation (the ‘ILO’) and Oxfam.  Further, it is an accepted 
wisdom within biological and psychological structures prevalent within the West, that 
the effects of war are overwhelmingly negative.18  But how true is such an 
assumption?  In a study published by the ILO, of 53 boys and girls who had been 
involved with armed groups before they had reached the age of 18, drawn from a 
variety of situations including Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Sierra Leone and the United Kingdom, it is striking the extent to which the young 
people interviewed defined themselves as having ‘volunteered’ rather than having 
been forced to join.19  Moreover, many joined for what may be described as ‘positive’ 
factors such as to gain access to education, the relief of poverty, the provision of 
friends and community, the desire to overturn a regime perceived as being oppressive, 
an economic motivation or a desire for an identity20.  It is asserted that in order to 
confront any problem, it is necessary to understand its nature, and by equating 
children and vulnerability, is to misconstrue not only the threat they pose, their utility 
as soldiers, and the motivations behind their recruitment. 
 
If one of the revolutionary new factors which confronted the world when the Second 
World War ended was the emergence of the bipolar concentration of power which 
replaced the multipower system.21 One of the difficulties in defining the parameters of 
the modern battlefield is a consequence of the blurring of the traditional distinctions 
between regular and irregular force, with non state actors being able to gain access to 
16 E. Ben-Ari, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Unpublished, 2007 
17 Ibid., p. 17 
18 Ibid., p. 4 
19 R. Brett & I. Specht, op cit., p. 4 
20 Ibid., pp. 39-62 
21 J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, Columbia UP, 1962, p. 111; and M. Howard, War 
in European History, Oxford UP, 1976, p. 136 
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a variety of weapons, including chemical weapons and nuclear arms that were at one 
time the preserve of states.  This in turn represents a revolution in itself.  Indeed, the 
use of the child soldier has to be seen in the context of other forms of developing 
conflict such as the subversion of the financial system, the damaging of the fabric of 
society by flooding it with drugs, resource warfare by seizing control of vital natural 
resources, ecological warfare by the creation of man-made disasters and even what is 
described as ‘international law warfare’ by blocking enemy action by the use of 
multinational organisations.22 
 
Since the end of the Cold War UK military establishments have been reduced by 
about 30 percent,23 yet, as Dandeker points out, the range of missions to which they 
are expected to contribute has widened to encompass new forms of peace support 
operations as well as more traditional roles and war fighting missions.  There are three 
broad defence roles.  Firstly the protection of the UK in the absence of external threat 
and in support of the civil power (defence role 1); secondly, the insuring against any 
external major threat to the UK and her allies (defence role 2); and thirdly, the 
promoting of wider security interests of the UK.  The latter includes committing UK 
forces to the maintenance of international peace under the auspices of the UN 
(defence role 3).24  The UK, amongst other nations, has no longer any need to buttress 
armed forces that are distinctive from the social values of the wider society.25  It is 
this transition, arising principally from the collapse of communism and the Cold War, 
that has ironically made the world a more unstable and dangerous place.  It has been 
pointed out that one of the distinguishing features of this post modern world is the 
decline of inter-state wars, and the rise of intra-state warfare arising from state 
collapse26.  This in turn gives rise to the familiar problems of the resettlement of 
refugees, the problem of providing security for humanitarian organisations, and the 
creation of a new set of demands on a larger scale that the military has traditionally 
contended27.  There are those who now positively assert that the very ‘tools of war are 
22 M. Boot, op cit., p. 473. 
23 C. Dandeker, ‘The United Kingdom: the Overstretched Military’, in  The Postmodern Military, 
Armed Forces after the Cold War, Oxford UP, ed. C. Moskos et al., 2000, p. 32. 
24 Statement on Defence Estimates, 1995, Cmd. 2800. HMSO, p. 107, quoted in Dandeker, ibid., p. 46. 
25 C. Moskos et al., ‘Armed Forces after the Cold War’, in the Postmodern Military, Armed Forces 
after the Cold War, op cit., p. 2. 
26 C. Moskos et al., ibid., p. 3. 
27 M. Mandelbaum, ‘Foreign Policy as Social Work’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1, Jan. 1996,  pp. 
16-32. 
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slipping beyond the grasp of the state and conventionally organised armed forces and 
into the hands of armed bands, terrorists and gangsters’.  An example of such thinking 
is given by Van Creveld who suggests that war is no longer a rational act in 
Clauswetzian terms in the sense that it reflects a national interest, but, on the contrary, 
asserts that there is a blurring of the distinction between civilian and soldier and 
between individual crime and organised violence,28 that makes rationality hard to 
discern. 
 
(ii). Inland Security (UK Defence Role 1: Support of Civil Power) 
 
The UK government has recognised the extent to which the problem of Islamist 
extremism is present in the UK.  In a speech in November 2007, the Director General 
of MI5 estimated that some 2000 people have been identified as a threat, although it is 
suspected that there are as many again who are yet to be identified.  This estimate had 
increased from the figure of 1600 individuals suggested by his predecessor who were 
said to be part of Islamist militant structures within the UK.29  It was observed during 
the course of the same presentation that terrorist attacks were not random acts by 
disparate, fragmented groups, but were part of a deliberate campaign by al-Quaeda.  
Young people and children are particular targets for radicalisation, and in the opinion 
of the director general ‘…this problem has yet (to) reach its peak.30  The current 
strategy of the UK government officially recognises that changing technology means 
that the prospect of a chemical or biological terrorist attack in Britain is more likely as 
a consequence.31  This is perhaps a belated and official recognition of the fact that the 
liberal, as well as old-style authoritarian regimes, many of which are characteristic 
within the third world, prove most susceptible to terror.32  In an interview conducted 
in early 2009, Jonathan Evans has stated that the main threats to the UK originate 
from al-Qaeda’s core in Pakistan and its assets in the UK.  He was to observe that in 
the years before 2001, al-Qaeda had been ‘able to establish terrorist training facilities 
28 M. Van Creveld, op cit. 
29 Speech by E. Manningham Buller, Director General of the Security Service, November 2006 at 
Queen Mary College, London. 
30 Speech by Jonathan Evans, Director General of the Security Service, November 2007, quoted in 
Strategic Survey 2008, IISS, Routledge, 2008, pp. 159-160. 
31 Contest 2: Counter-terrorism strategy, 24th March 2009. 
32 A. Gat, War in Human Civilization, Oxford UP, 2008, pp.  638-639. 
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[in Afghanistan] and to draw hardened extremists and vulnerable recruits to 
indoctrinate and teach techniques in pursuit of their defined aims.’33 
 
It has been pointed out that the question of how individuals move from political 
extremism to being actively engaged in violent and/or terrorist groups is one of the 
least understood issues in the debate about terrorism and counter-terrorism.34  It is 
even less understood how children become members of groups that support and 
engage in violence with consequences for the manner in which regular forces develop 
a response. 
 
It is poignant to consider the position from the point of view of Islamist extremism 
influencing the mind of the young in the first instance, simply because it represents 
probably the most potent threat to the UK at home and is recognised by the UK 
government as such as I have already identified.  It may be argued that the problem of 
such extremism is not a matter for the military at all, and is more appropriately dealt 
with as either police matters or matters for the civil power.  I consider this to be a 
mistaken view given the number of persons who are potentially involved: in effect a 
small army; and the form of weaponry at the disposal of such groups.  Inevitably, in 
the modern world there is a blurring of the line between law enforcement and military 
missions. Military forces are invariably called upon to provide law and order and 
public safety in situations where there may be a lack of adequate policing and in 
contexts where police standards and practices apply.35   
 
How do we define the battlefield in which such extremism is deployed?  Cities of the 
world, including those in the UK, are swollen; they attract what has been described as 
‘bad actors’36 from extortionists to extremists, the use of easily impressionable 
children is attractive, and peacekeepers are often interposed between warring parties 
in heavily populated centres.  It is becoming clear that a new form of battlefield is 
33 Duncan Gardham, ‘MI5 Chief Warns of Threat from Global Recession’, Daily Telegraph, 7th January 
2009, quoted in H. Synnott, Transforming Pakistan, Ways out of Instability, IISS, Routledge, 2009, p. 
35 
34 P. Neumann, Joining Al Quaeda, Jihadist Recruitment in Europe, Adelphi Paper 399, IISS, 
Routledge, 2008, p.  5 
35 D. Gompert, ‘Underkill’: Fighting Extremists amid Populations in Survival, IISS, Routledge, April-
May 2009, p. 162 
36 Ibid., p. 161 
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emerging where humanitarian operations may place regular forces in contact with 
unruly crowds, whilst the use of lethal force, the conventional option of regular 
forces, and whether implicit or explicit, becomes a less viable option.  The ultimate 
question may be how do regular forces prevail over an enemy without harming 
persons of similar appearance that happen to surround them? 
 
The French academic Olivier Roy contends that one of the main explanations for 
radicalisation in Europe where the young are the subject of recruitment arises from 
the conflict of identity experienced by descendants of Muslim immigrants that makes 
them susceptible to political extremism and a militant ideology.37  It is also suggested 
that the historical links between the UK with its significant Muslim community, and 
Pakistan, which currently experiences its own political instability, is responsible for 
the importation of terrorism to the UK.38 
 
The method by which the young may be subjected to brainwashing in the broadest 
sense of that term, and subsequent recruitment to extremist causes has been made the 
subject of a number of studies.39  In ‘The Suicide Factory, Abu Hamza and the 
Finsbury Park Mosque’, the authors point out how there was an exodus of idealistic 
young men from Arab countries to the Afghan war that has been compared to the 
formation of the International Brigades that fought Franco in the Spanish Civil War in 
the 1930’s.40  The analogy is apposite.  The formation of the International Brigades 
may have been the main work of the Comintern,41 yet the cause attracted many 
different kinds of individual drawn from many walks of life including intellectuals, 
the unemployed, trade unionists,42 idealists, scientists, mercenaries and adventurers.  
37 O. Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a new Ummah, New York: Columbia University Press, 
2004, p. 303 
38 P. Neumann, op cit., p. 13 
39 See: S. O’Neill & D. McCrory, The Suicide Factory, Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque, 
Harper Perenial, 2006; The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law, Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law, Vol. 1, no. 1, 2005. pp. 1-23; P. Nesser, Jihadist Cell Structures in the UK and Europe, 
Presentation at a conference organised by KCL ‘The Changing Faces of Jihadism’ on the 27th April 
2006;  E. Husain, The Islamist,Why I joined radical Islam in Britain, what I saw inside, and why I left, 
Penguin Books, 2007. 
40 S. O’Neill & D. McCrory, ibid., p. 15 
41 H. Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1977, p. 454 
42 See for example: M. Arthur, The Real Band of Brothers, First-hand accounts from the last British 
survivors of the Spanish Civil War, Collins, 2009, interview with Jack Jones, pp. 117-145 
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Indeed, as the numbers grew, it reached the point when any clear-cut analysis of 
motive became very difficult.43 
 
Today the message propagated by the likes of Abu Hamza that it would be a privilege 
to kill and be killed remain at the core of Al Qaeda ideology.  Indeed, teenagers in the 
audience of the mosque that had been the subject of infiltration by extremists, were 
lectured upon the footing that even although they lived in the UK, they were on the 
front line of the war against unbelievers who stood in the way of their aim of 
imposing Sharia law, and they were fighters every bit the same as those on the ground 
in Chechnya and Afghanistan.44 
 
It is not difficult to comprehend why the message appeared so attractive to young 
people who chose to listen to this message.  In the words of the study: ‘The mosque 
was secure.  It offered money, tickets and the names of people in Pakistan who would 
escort them safely across the border to Afghanistan…boys could come back from the 
jihad and find a place to stay, to talk about war, to be with their own kind of people, to 
make plans and to recruit other people.’45  Was their a common denominator in those 
who were recruited?  There is little doubt that the congregation was a mixture of 
social dropouts and petty criminals and those asylum seekers who had run away from 
their own conflicts, but all shared a feeling of alienation and anger.46  Ed Husain in 
his recent book concerning his own radicalisation in the East London mosque entitled 
‘The Islamist’ makes the point that the mosque was more than a place of worship, it 
housed the infrastructures of activist organisations, as well as offering facilities for the 
local community.47 He reports, in particular, the fact that he was taught how Islamists 
believed that history was a struggle between good and evil, with the West 
representing the latter, and the perverted belief that ‘…true Islam had to be in 
perennial conflict with kufr – the disbelief of the kuffar.’48  The point can justifiably 
be made that where the mosque provides material support and comradeship to young 
people of the kind I have described; it is easy to see how this may provide a fertile 
43 V. Brome, The International Brigades, Spain 1936-1939, Mayflower-Dell, London, 1965, p. 33. 
44 S. O’Neill & D. McCrory, op cit., p. 49. 
45 Ibid., p. 86. 
46 Ibid., p.79. 
47 E. Husain, op cit., p. 29. 
48 Ibid. p. 48. 
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base for the dissemination of an ideology by those in whom young people place their 
trust. 
 
It may be said that the term ‘ideology’ represents too stronger a word for the rag-bag 
of ideas that are propagated by preachers and so-called ‘scholars of Islam’.  As the 
Israeli Ambassador to London indicated in October 2005, the term ‘jihad’ may 
literally be translated as ‘striving’.  Indeed the waging of war against the West is not a 
means to an end but the end itself.49   The next stage, by those who are so motivated, 
is to seek the recruitment of young persons to a perverted, if undefined cause. 
 
It is worth reflecting on the fact that Britain has a tradition of herself recruiting boy 
soldiers, but never in so great a number as in the Great War.  There were cases of 
boys as young as thirteen or even twelve serving in France.50  There is even an 
example of an officer commissioned into the 11th East Lancashire Regiment (‘the 
Accrington Pals’) aged fifteen51.  I do not seek to equate boys who decide to join 
Islamic jihad in the modern world to fight on the UK mainland and elsewhere with 
those young people who joined the colours in the Great War, but there are significant 
parallels.  Young people under eighteen are susceptible to propaganda.  Many have a 
belief in their own indestructibility, incomprehension of risk or danger and the desire 
to seek adventure without perhaps considering in any detail the reasons for the 
conflict upon which they embarked, or the consequences to themselves.  To others a 
regiment provided comradeship and a home never previously enjoyed.52  
 
There is no evidence to support any assertion that the enlisting of young people 
formed any part of official policy unlike the recruitment of young people by armies in 
the postmodern world.  At the beginning of the Great War the minimum age for 
enlistment in the Territorial Army was seventeen, compared with that of nineteen for 
the New Armies then being raised.  It was therefore inevitable that the Territorial 
Force would contain a significant proportion of youths.53  In addition to the fact that 
fraudulent enlistment carried with it the risk of prosecution, there is evidence that the 
49 Zvi Heifetz, The Spectator, 2nd April 2005, p. 15. 
50 R. Van Emden, Boy Soldiers of the Great War, Headline, London, 2005, p.5. 
51 Second Lieutenant Reginald Battersby. 
52 See: J. Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage: the Second Scottish Rifles at the Battle of 
Neuve Chapelle, 1915, Cassell, 1967. 
53 C. Messenger, Call to Arms, The British Army 1914-18, Cassell, 2005, p. 75. 
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government was sufficiently concerned about inefficiencies that resulted from poor 
standards of training that the age of enlistment was altered in May 1915 from an age 
bracket of seventeen to thirty five and nineteen to thirty eight in order to counter the 
problem as it was then perceived.54  In this regard the historical parallel ceases to 
apply, since such evidence indicates that official policy regarded the enlistment of 
young people as more of a hindrance than assistance in the war prosecution effort.  
Whether it can be said that the enlistment of young people to Islamic jihad will prove 
‘inefficient’ to promoting the cause it espouses remains to be seen. 
 
(iii). External Threats and the Wider Perspective (Defence Role 2: Insuring against 
External Threat) 
 
Although the main threat to UK security in the postmodern world is likely to come 
from militant Islam recruited on the British mainland, consideration must be given to 
matters of wider international concern.  It has been observed that the events of the 11th 
September 2001 brought about a watershed in the manner in which collapsed states 
came to be regarded as threats to the international community.  Islamic terrorism in 
general had been waging a war against the west for at least twenty years commencing 
with the attack on US Marines in Beirut in 1982, against US troops in Mogadishu in 
October 1993, and an attack on the USS Cole in October 2000.  Before the 11th 
September 2001 attacks on the US mainland the West regarded these outrages as 
examples of terrorist-criminal activity, but after 11th September 2001 regarded them 
for what they were: acts of asymmetric warfare.55 
 
Collapsed and/or fragile states have routinely been characterised as a threat to 
international peace and security, particularly in UN Security Council resolutions 
authorising peace keeping missions,56 in particular since they provide safe havens for 
transnational terrorist groups.  A study by the Association of the US Army and the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies puts the matter thus: 
 
54 C. Messenger, ibid., p.76. 
55 A. Roberts, A History of the English Speaking Peoples, Harper Collins, 2007, p. 601. 
56 The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001. 
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‘One of the principal lessons of the events of September 11 is that failed states 
matter – not just for humanitarian reasons but also for national security as 
well.  If left unattended, such states can become sanctuaries for terrorist 
networks with a global reach, not to mention international organized crime and 
drug traffickers who also exploit the dysfunctional environment.  As such, 
failed states can pose a direct threat to the national interests of the United 
States and to the stability of entire regions.’57 
 
The UK government subscribes to this view, and concern about collapsed states 
represents a particular feature of the post-Cold War era of which UK deployment in 
Iraq and Afghanistan are examples.  In the case of Iraq, the military operation was 
intended as an attack on terrorism as part of what has come to be described as ‘the 
global war on terror’, to eliminate weapons of mass destruction pursuant to the widely 
held, although erroneous belief that Iraq harboured such weapons, and to establish a 
pro-American state within the Arab world.58  In this context the UK experienced the 
incidence of child soldiers recruited by the Iraqi regime as a matter of state policy. 
 
It is argued that the trauma of collapsed states and the interconnections of 
globalisation require our generation to recognise anew the nexus between governance, 
economics and security.59  Afghanistan is an example of such a state.  Collapsed 
states are likely to consist of poor populations, and it is clear that poorer children are 
more likely to be enmeshed in conflict than children living in well off societies.  It has 
been pointed out that not only is their desperation typically higher, but there is a 
correlation between family dysfunction and lower socio-economic status.60  In such 
cases children may never have known running water or basic amenity, and by the age 
of 10 many have no education and turn to the military or other armed groups as a 
means of supporting themselves.  It is likely that future deployments will involve 
interventions in such states at the behest of the UN or otherwise and engagement with 
this new form of soldiery, at both a conventional and asymmetric level. 
57 J. Hamre & G. Sullivan, ‘Toward Postconflict Reconstruction’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 4, 
Autumn 2002, p. 85. 
58 M. Gordon & B. Trainor, Cobra II, The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, Atlantic 
Books, London, 2006, p. 497. 
59 R. Zoelick, Fragile States: Securing Development, in Survival, Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 50, 
No. 6, December 2008- January 2009, IISS, Routledge, p.68.  
60 E. Cairns, Children and Political Violence, Cambridge, MA, 1996, p. 114-115. 
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 Somalia is another such example, and one notorious as a haven for terrorist camps.  It 
also represents an example of how radicalised individuals import terror to the UK, 
thus demonstrating the interrelationship between internal security challenges and 
external threats.  It has been recently reported that up to a thousand foreign fighters, 
including Britons, have answered the call to jihad and are leading street fighting in 
Mogadishu.61  What is especially a matter of concern is the fact that one of the 
insurgent groups operating within the country, al-Shabaab, has recently released a 
propaganda video by a British suicide bomber that ‘…welcomes and calls foreign 
fighters for jihad.’  The Times reports that foreign fighters bring religious fervour to 
this conflict and which helps radicalise many al-Shabaab militants, many of whom 
fight either under duress or for money.  
 
Somalia, as a country, has often been dismissed in the past as marginal in the sense 
that little intelligence has been devoted to the country, and as a consequence reliable 
intelligence is scarce upon the subject of widely divergent interpretations of the threat 
of Islam.62  Young, radicalised individuals, are at the centre of the threats posed to the 
incumbent government and the West, particularly in the context of Islamic schools 
that, in Mogadishu, may well play a future radical recruiting role in much the same 
way as the madrasses in Pakistan.  Such institutions are undoubtedly socialising 
whole generations of young Somalis with conspiratorial views of world events, and 
although it is suggested that the real Islamic threat in Somalia may be at a stage of 
‘incubation’, it is likely to manifest itself within ten or twenty years time.63 
 
It may be the case that religious indoctrination and its ability to influence children to 
fight is a function of the immaturity of children in the first place.  During the Iran-Iraq 
war, the Iranian regime employed such immaturity to the advantage of its army by 
sending thousands of children into battle.  The Minister of Education reportedly stated 
in 1987 that ‘… 150,000 children or 60% of its ranks volunteered to fight.’64  It is 
61 The Times, 23rd May 2009 
62 K. Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism, IISS, Adelphi Paper 364, Oxford 
UP, 2004, p. 69 
63 K. Menkhaus, ibid., p. 64 
64 G. Kent, Children in the Political Economy, London/New York: Macmillan/St. Martin’s, 1995, p. 85; 
quoted in H. Brocklehurst, op cit., p. 39 
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clear that this was only possible because children were manipulated into believing that 
this was a worthwhile exercise. 
 
The use of children as soldiers in the developing world, and whether from the 
perspective of those the subject of formal enlistment into regular armed forces, or 
within the context of terrorist or quasi terrorist-recruitment, has changed the 
dimension of the battlefield.  The end of the Cold War brought many of the problems 
of the Developing World much closer to the UK and the west, as rogue states 
continued to support unconventional wars and terrorist attacks that tended to 
undermine regional security.65  Where UK forces have been deployed to deal with 




It has been observed that a British soldier’s job today is much more difficult and 
dangerous than it was in the last decades of the twentieth century.66  If the context of 
this description was in the case of deployment in Afghanistan by the 3rd Battalion of 
the Parachute Regiment, it equally applies across the entire range of fighting tasks 
with which he must deal.  Recent experience has demonstrated in the examples of 
deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan that they are more akin to counter insurgency 
operations, or at least in so far as they have developed, following the initial US led 
invasions to depose the incumbent regimes. 
 
  With regard to the position on the UK mainland, questions of engagement are more 
difficult.  In the first place such forms of engagement that may be appropriate to meet 
any given threat can only be in support of the civil power.  Whilst the modern army 
may enjoy an overwhelming superiority in terms of the application of force,67 soldiers 
cannot rule, and in states where they do, they must do so either through civilian 
cabinets or else pretend to be something other than they are.68 The UK has experience 
in the context of Northern Ireland with a long standing military deployment that, in 
65 T. Hoyt, Security and Conflict in the Developing World, in Grave New World, Security Challenges 
in the 21st Century, ed. M. Brown, Georgetown UP, 2003, p. 217. 
66 P. Bishop, op cit., p. xxv. 
67 ‘Non est potestas super terram quae comparetur’ (‘may we not think likewise of  the modern army’): 
title page of Hobbes’s Leviathan. 
68 S. Finer, op cit., p. 12. 
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legal terms, was expressly designed to aid the civil power.  For obvious political 
reasons, this is not state of affairs any future UK government would wish to replicate 
on the UK mainland.   
 
It may be suggested that the current training regime is sufficiently well based in order 
to cope with the phenomenon or as the phenomenon may develop in future conflicts, 
yet there are particular aspects of confrontation with children that are, by their nature, 
unique.  As part of the research for this thesis and as part of the interviews of 
members of UK armed forces the soldiers were asked the following: - 
 2.1 ‘During the course of your training had it ever been suggested that you 
 may be obliged to engage, as part of your operational duties, children or 
 young  persons?’69  
 
 2.2 ‘If the answer is yes, how did it feature as part of any training programme 
 of which you were part?70 
 
The same questions were put to representatives of the US military71 
 
I have summarised the results of the interviews within a schedule at Appendix E.72  It 
is clear that in no UK case was any soldier ever subjected to a formal training regime 
in relation to this issue.  At its highest, one soldier indicated that the prospect had 
featured in discussion only.  In direct contrast to the UK position is the fact that in 
each US case, save one, the soldiers had been part of a formalised training regime on 
this issue.  What conclusions are to be drawn? In the first place the field interviews 
confirm the information obtained from the interviews with Meyer, Jarvis and Le Grys: 
there are no formalised training programmes about engaging with children.  Secondly, 
the US may be regarded differently since its size and deployment potential is very 
much larger than in the case of the UK, and as a consequence are more likely to 
encounter children than UK forces, and it is therefore easier to justify the existence of 
a training programme in cost terms. 
 
69 See Draft Questionnaire at Appendix C, Question 2.1. 
70 See Draft Questionnaire at Appendix C, Question 2.2. 
71 See Draft Questionnaire at Appendix D, Questions 2.1 &2.2. 
72 See Schedule of Interviewees at Appendix E. 
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Interviews at the International Defence Training & Land Warfare Centre 
Warminster: 14th-15th March 201073 
 
Of the three interviews I conducted each separately from the other on Day 1 and on 
Day 2 I held a plenary session comprising all three.  It is to be noted that each officer 
was legally qualified and considered the problem of engagement from that 
perspective.  Lt. Col. Klein was an American officer. 
 
It was generally agreed that the problem of child soldiers was a feature of modern 
engagement, particularly in recent years in Iraq and Afghanistan and in relation to 
isolated examples on the African continent and in Northern Ireland.  Stress was placed 
on the utility of the child in intelligence gathering exercises, albeit at a somewhat 
crude and basic level, their utility in the planting of IED’s and their ability to move 
within a population relatively undetected. 
 
From the UK perspective the incidence of her soldiers coming into contact with 
children recruited for the purpose of asymmetric or other warfare, it was still regarded 
as rare although a growing problem.  Lt. Col. Klein, from the US perspective 
suggested that the problem was rather more entrenched and of relevance for US forces 
because of their wider deployment potential. 
 
It was acknowledged that from the perspective of engagement and the law there was a 
potential for conflict, but, like other interviewees, neither the US nor the UK could 
afford to disregard international obligations whatever the exigencies of the situation 
for fear of the political fallout that may result.  As to the issue of self- preservation 
and the right of a soldier to protect himself; the preference was to justify any action, 
be it retaliatory or otherwise, under the broad heading of Rules of Engagement as 
distinct from the law. 
 
In the British case, no justification was recognised for implementing any modification 
to current training regimes in order to introduce any programmed specifically directed 
around child engagement. 
73 Col. Juliet Bartlett (Col. Op. Law), Lt. Col. L Klein US Officer (SO1 Coordination Op. Law), Lt. 
Col. Davies (SO1 Op. Law). 
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 Summary 
 
It is probably fair to observe that the military well recognise how warfare, its nature 
and future, is undergoing rapid change.  It is also recognised that children are 
becoming part of that developing scene particularly from the perspective of militant 
Islam. The more difficult question is to consider when a tipping point is reached that 
calls on the military to reconsider and to recast its modus operandi.  At present that 









































CHAPTER 5:  ENGAGING WITH CHILDREN:  PSYCHOLOGICAL 





Soldier’s Fear and the Child Dimension 
 
Writing during the middle of the 19th century, Tolstoy, in acknowledging his 
fascination with the subject of war expressed his particular interest thus: 
‘… (an interest) in the reality of war, the actual killing.  I was more interested 
to know in what way and under the influence of what feeling one soldier kills 
another than to know how the armies were arranged at Austerlitz and 
Borodino.’1 
In this regard he is not alone, and over the past 100 years or so there have been 
numerous attempts to consider the soldiers’ role, the perception he may have of what 
his duty may entail, the fact of killing from various psychological perspectives, and 
the fact that fear and unwanted emotion invariably present obstacles to a soldiers 
fulfilling that duty.   
 
Fear may become manifest in any number of ways and have different characteristics.  
Notwithstanding the oft quoted phrase that ‘Combat is the end toward which all the 
manifold activities of the army are oriented, however indirectly’2, and most soldiers 
conscripted or otherwise enlist with this truth in mind, being frightened of the 
uncertainty of being killed is common, and a normal and natural human response to 
the strain and horror of battle,3 or the thought of what battle may be like by the 
uninitiated. There may be a fear of a failure to fulfil a soldiers’ duty; to let comrades 
or his family down, to fail in a military objective, the fear of being seen to be afraid4 
or a fear about how a soldier feels about his own abilities when put to the extreme test 
of battle.  Much research has been conducted over the past century into this aspect of 
warfare, but one point emerges from the literature, and that is, perhaps for obvious 
reasons, that the research has been predicated upon the premise that one soldier will 
engage another soldier; one army will engage another army in the conventional sense, 
1 Quoted in E. Greenwood, Tolstoy: the Comprehensive Vision, London, 1975, p. 29. 
2 S. Stouffer, The American Soldier, Vol. II Combat and its Aftermath, Princeton, 1965. 
3 B. Shephard, op cit., p. 234. 
4 N. Copeland, Psychology and the Soldier, London, 1942, p. 75. 
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whilst circumstances which do not fit the cognitive schemes of conventional forces 
are, to a greater or lesser extent ignored.  This is not some arcane academic point, 
since it follows that training regimes are universally designed around the same 
premise.  The question that I pose is this:  if it is demonstrated that a psychological 
reaction is a possible consequence arising from child engagement, does not a training 
regime avoid such a confrontation at its peril?  It can be further argued that troops 
thus exposed to such a novel form of warfare are ill equipped to conduct themselves 
in the most effective manner without, at least, awareness of the problem. 
 
Historically, the army has not always been sympathetic to those who openly express 
or manifest fear, even to the extent of causing or inducing what was once termed 
‘shell shock’, or ‘neurasthenia’.  The army had a tendency to equate fear with 
cowardice.5  Indeed, the battlefields of the Great War became a testing ground for the 
previous century’s social and technological advances as larger and healthier 
populations fought with larger and more destructive weapons.6  The result, according 
to the Official History was that from September 1914 until December 1917 a total of 
28,533 cases of shell shock were reported as battle casualties in France.7  Awareness 
and development of psychological science depended necessarily upon doctors and 
scientists responsible for advising the military.  Yet the difficulties that beset the 
professional quite apart from the dissemination of a complex and controversial 
discipline presented other and more practical problems.  In the first instance pre-war 
doctors had no training in the kind of trauma war could cause.8  Treatment of 
psychiatric casualties was haphazard, and relied upon volunteers in order to fill a gap 
in the availability of appropriate skill.9 There also existed a great suspicion amongst 
the military hierarchy of mental trauma; a suspicion shared by many medical officers 
themselves.  Dr. Harold Dearden relates that most doctors were out to prove that there 
was nothing wrong with men who reported sick, especially when their units were in or 
5 See for e.g. the comment by George S. Patton (1943): ‘Cowards are those who let their timidity get 
the better of their manhood’. 
6 P. Leese, Shell Shock, Traumatic Neurosis and the British soldiers of the First World War, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002, p.25. 
7 W. MacPherson, Official History of the War – Medical Services, Diseases of the War, Vol. 2, HMSO, 
1923, p. 7. 
8 I. Whitehead, Doctors in the Great War, Leo Cooper, 1999, p. 169. 
9 E. Jones, Doctors and trauma in World War One: the response of British Military Psychiatrists, 
Manchester UP, 2004, p. 92. 
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near the trenches,10 whilst the suspicion was fuelled by pre-war conceptions of trauma 
or shell shock as it later became known, being a metaphor for unmanly behaviour and 
the image of the incomplete man.11 
 
Even the fact of being admitted to psychiatric treatment risked bringing shame on a 
family.  Barham, in his book Forgotten Lunatics of the Great War, points to the 
example of the reaction of a Lance Corporal Morris’s father, a former NCO with 30 
years service which captures the meaning that ‘unmanly behaviour’ had for the 
military establishment, who on learning that his son had been admitted as an inmate 
of D Ward (Imbecile) Netley Hospital disclosed to the commanding officer that he 
had been ‘painfully surprised’ to find his son as a such an inmate, and ‘…had 
questioned his son very closely to try and arrive at some solution concerning his 
present state of mind.’12  
 
Attempts at considering problems of fear that may incapacitate a soldier had an 
inauspicious beginning.  Writing in 1910, Dr. Thomas Glynn, Professor of Medicine 
at the University of Liverpool commented: ‘When I was a student, neurasthenia was 
not recognized, and hospital patients who exhibited no signs of organic disease … 
were usually set down as malingerers.’13  Over the course of the last century, it is 
possible to trace the development of our understanding of nervous disease from this 
position to modern medical responses to trauma and to war.14  Indeed in his now 
classic work The Face of Battle, John Keegan points out that ‘… it is only since the 
beginning of this century (20th) that armies have been taught to accept that courage 
and cowardice are not alternative free choices that come to every man, overriding all 
emotional stress, that a man cannot simply choose which he prefers… it was only 
with the greatest difficulty that even an army so comparatively humane in spirit as the 
British was led to think differently.15 
 
The motivations behind such attempts have varied.  It is well established that fear, 
which is a normal human emotion designed to protect the individual from danger, 
10 H. Dearden, Medicine & Duty, Heinemann, London, 1928, p. 47 
11 G. Mosse, Shell Shock as a social disease, Journal of Contemporary History, 35, 2000, pp. 101-8. 
12 P. Barham, Forgotten Lunatics of the Great War, Yale UP, 2004, p. 49. 
13 T. Glynn, The Traumatic Neuroses, The Lancet, 1910, Vol. 2, p. 1332. 
14 B. Shephard, op cit., p. 396. 
15 J. Keegan, The Face of Battle, Pimlico Military Classics, 2004, p. 327. 
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may have dangerous inhibiting consequences for the fighting man, notwithstanding 
the fact that most soldiers experience fear during or before battle, what vary are its 
physical manifestations, its nature and intensity, the threat which induces it and the 
manner in which it is managed.16   
 
What is striking about these various attempts is the stress which is laid upon the 
effects on soldiers who have cause to engage other soldiers, particularly at the 
conventional level.  In terms of prevention and control, the favoured method, not 
unsurprisingly, is set within a typical framework of training, self discipline and 
morale.  It has been pointed out that at a human level; armies resemble the 
authoritarian family group.  Just as the ethos of an upper class Victorian family 
forbade aggression by a child towards its parents, it encouraged organized aggression 
in the context of organized pursuits.  Similarly, the Army is at pains to punish 
insubordination towards a superior, but seeks to reward aggression against an 
enemy.17 
 
The function of training is various.  What is common, however, to all armies is that 
military success will depend upon training and its quality.  Martin van Creveld points 
out that ‘… in any military education, the first indispensable step is to physically 
isolate youngsters from ordinary society, its customs, its temptations and the myriad 
ties by which its members are held together.’18 Sometimes it is said that the purpose is 
to stifle individuality and to inculcate the habit of automatic obedience.19  Of course 
in a modern society such as that which pertains in the UK, and which has a small 
professional army based upon volunteers, all of whom, to a greater or lesser extent 
have some education and all are exposed to external influences such as are to be 
found in the media, the problem arises as to what extent, if at all, it is possible to 
inculcate a doctrine based upon automatic obedience and to what extent that is even 
desirable in a modern fighting force.  Indeed, it is unlikely to be possible to eradicate 
a respect for human rights to which we are all exposed, and which forms part of a 
soldiers’ training, and probably impossible to eradicate such a respect embedded as it 
is within a western culture.  Of course, it is not suggested that military training invites 
16 R. Holmes, Acts of War, the Behaviour of Men in Battle, Cassell, London 1985, p. 204. 
17 N. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, Jonathan Cape, London, 1976, p. 143. 
18 M. van Creveld, op cit., p. 47. 
19 See J. MacCurdy, The Structure of Morale, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1943, p. 56. 
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trainee soldiers to disregard the law or respect for the rights of others; indeed the 
contrary is the case as Brigadier Le Grys was at pains to stress, but there is an 
inevitable tension between a soldier being taught the virtue of automatic obedience to 
the military endeavour, with soldiers who may be educated in the virtues of exercising 
a discretion subject to the structure of command.  It has been pointed out that there is 
a major problem with the idea of automatic response, since there are, in fact, only a 
limited number of routine actions that can be taught.20 As Samuel Stouffer points out 
in his book on the attitudes to servicemen in the Second World War:  
‘Most types of danger situations in combat require varying responses, 
depending upon the particular mission the man was assigned to carry out, the 
protective resources which happen to be available in his immediate vicinity, 
and other highly specific characteristics of the particular situation in which the 
danger occurs.’21 
As Joanna Bourke observes, it was for this reason that what she describes as 
‘automatic training’ was less important than training men to obey orders immediately 
and even, if necessary to make their own judgment.22 
 
 All soldiers are obliged to apply the law of armed conflict when the armed forces of a 
state are in conflict with those of another state or are in occupation of territory.23  It 
follows, therefore, that a genuine question arises when troops are either asked to 
engage children or become confronted with such a phenomena, the extent to which 
current and conventional training equips a soldier to fulfil his military duty in such 
circumstances given that such engagements are outside the cognitive framework of 
not only regular forces but also their training and current legal regimes. 
 
There are historical parallels which may illustrate the point. Holmes points to the fact 
that the death or wounding of a woman in battle may have a disproportionately large 
20 J. Bourke, Fear, A Cultural History, Virago, 2005, p. 213. 
21 S. Stouffer, op cit., p. 222. 
22 J. Bourke. op cit., p. 213. 
23 See The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, UK Ministry of Defence, Oxford UP, Oxford, 2005, 
Ch. 3, The Applicability of the Law of Armed Conflict, para.  3.1, p.27.  Note, if an armed conflict 
exists between the armed forces of a state and dissident or anti-government or between factions within 
a state, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention applies.  If the dissident force occupies sufficient 
territorial control as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations then 
Additional Protocol II applies in addition to Common Article 3, see para, 3.5, p. 31. 
 5 
                                                 
effect upon male soldiers.24  He cites the widespread feeling of regret when a Viet 
Cong nurse was shot and mortally wounded;25 and the belief, held by many women, 
that armies deprive women of their individuality and assigns them to what are often 
humble duties.26  If such is the consequence of the involvement of women, the point 
is all the greater when it comes to children who happen to become involved in 
conflict.  A moving account of such a phenomenon is given by Michael Witowich of 
the US Marine Corps who was present during the landings at Saipan in June 1944.  
He records that significantly it was not just Japanese soldiers and sailors who killed 
themselves but civilians as well, including thousands of women and children: ‘They 
would get the child in their arms and they’d bend over and jump off the cliff … you 
could hear the screaming of the children on the coral … seeing the children leap to 
their deaths he shot the children as they went down so they wouldn’t suffer when they 
hit the coral.  I used to think in my dreams if it was right for me to do that.27 
 
There exists within the specialist literature, a wealth of material from varying 
perspectives about the effects of battle and conflict upon soldiers and indeed upon 
civilians who come within the purview of conflict, and methods of dealing with 
and/or confining the problem.  Many of the ideas were developed after the Great War 
and those of  Fuller became influential suggesting that slow indoctrination was the 
key to successful training based upon what he termed ‘crowd theory’ and ‘instinct 
theory’.28 Indeed, the classic study Psychology for the Fighting Man (1943) was 
instrumental in promoting the place of psychology within the military.29  What is, 
however, less developed, and what is suggested to be a significant lacuna in current 
training and doctrine is the lack of material which exists in order to equip soldiers for 
the child enemy which are not only features of modern fighting in the post Cold War 
24 R. Holmes, op cit., p. 104. 
25 R. Holmes, ibid, p.104, citing T. O’Brien, If I Die in a Combat Zone,  London, 1973. 
26 R. Holmes, ibid, p.105, citing C. Enloe, Does Khaki Become You? The Militarisation of Women’s 
Lives, London, 1983. 
27 L. Rees, Horror in the East, The Brutal Struggle in Asia and the Pacific in WWII, BBC Books, 2001, 
pp. 179-180. 
28 J. Fuller, ‘The Foundations of the Science of War’, Army Quarterly, Vol. 1, October 1920-January  
1921. 
29 E. Boring & M. Van de Water, Psychology for the Fighting Man, Washington, 1943. 
 6 
                                                 
era, but which increasingly form part of a fighting force on the ground where the 
distinction between civilians and combatants is anything but obvious.30 
 
The problem, as I define it, is that whilst the Army may be adept to a greater or lesser 
extent in training its troops to meet the practical demands of war in terms of weapons 
training and military ethos, it is perhaps less adept in training forces for conflict 
against an unconventional enemy.  In this regard, it is the fighting of a child which 
presents the real challenge.  Whilst this may be an unpopular view in military terms, 
and is not to suggest that the Army is anything other than skilled and trained in many 
forms of sub conventional warfare and counter insurgency operations, it is suggested 
that the absence of a formal training programme provides some evidence to suggest 
the contrary. 
 
The Objective of a Soldier 
 
This thesis has considered the perspective of the soldier who suffers from fear 
engendered by the dangers which are incidental to his being involved in conflict.  
There is, however, an altogether more complex set of psychological characteristics 
which may arise from a soldier being involved in fighting a cause with which he 
either has reason to question; or, alternatively, a cause which may not command 
support from a general public upon whose behalf he is purportedly fighting, or, as the 
case may be, both.  In this instance, the problem becomes more complex, since the 
considerations are less do with a threat to the soldiers life, but involve the soldier 
questioning the role he is obliged to perform in terms of its ethical or legal legitimacy. 
 
The point may be illustrated by example.  An important question said to emerge from 
the Falklands Campaign arises from the contrast between the small number of 
psychiatric casualties initially reported and the substantial numbers later alleged.31 
Very few cases of battle shock were reported with the initial figure for psychiatric 
30 See P. Castano, ‘The Categorization of People as Targets of Violence’, in Anthropology and Global 
Insurgency, eds. J. Kelly et al., Ch. 3, p. 53. 
31 L. Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. II, War and Diplomacy, 
Routledge, London, 2005, Ch. 48, Lessons – Long-term effects, p.731. 
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casualties being put at 2% of all wounded, although later to be suggested at 8%.32 
There may be a number of factors instrumental in this result, but morale may have 
been high as a consequence of involvement in a successful campaign involving short 
battles conducted by elite units and enjoying public support.33  During the course of 
my research upon an earlier topic,34 I had occasion to conduct a series of interviews 
with representatives of the Royal Marines at CTCRM Lympstone over the period 
10th-11th May 2007, and the issue I have just defined arose with particular reference as 
to how morale can be maintained and how fear can be controlled through the medium 
of training.  During one such interview with Lt. Col. Richard Walker,35 a veteran of 
the Falklands conflict, he was eager to stress the significance of having fought a 
successful campaign, having a clearly defined aim was of immense benefit to 
assisting the recovery of many of those adversely influenced by the effects of battle, 
and, in his judgment was the decisive factor in the suppression and/or the 
management of fear.  In making this judgment, the officer does not seek to devalue 
the relevance of other factors, including the significance of a close bonding formed 
during the long sea voyage home which gave combatants time to readjust and the 
importance of high quality training, but the low level of psychiatric casualty must 
surely be as a consequence of more significant factors which he was able to identify. 
 
In classical terms concepts which have underlain military strategy have remained 
constant for 2,500 years conditioned by what commanders are able to accomplish 
through tactical and logistical conditions.36  In short, most commanders had the option 
of attacking each other or indirectly attacking each other’s supplies; or of defending 
or pursuing the offensive by raids or by risking battle and following a persisting 
strategy to protect their own or engross their adversary’s territory.  Whilst it is easy to 
state the conceptual drawn in classical terms and to observe that they may be true 
today as they were true throughout history, such definitions pay no regard to 
developments in our understanding of the psychology of warfare, how attitudes to 
32 J. Price, ‘The Falklands: rate of British psychiatric casualties compared to recent American wars’.  
Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps, 1984; 130:109-113, quoted in L. Freedman ibid. 
33 L. Freedman, ibid. 
34 M.Sc. in War and Psychiatry (Institute of Psychiatry – 2007). Dissertation entitled:  How has the 
awareness and development of psychological science influenced the manner in which men are 
conditioned for battle over the period 1900-1990? 
35 OC Officer training at Lympstone 
36 A. Jones, The Art of War in the Western World, Illinois UP, 2001, p. 662 
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participation in conflict may alter in relation to social change, how soldiers come to 
be influenced by the societies and their education systems from whence they are 
drawn and particularly in the context of all volunteer armies of which the UK is an 
example. 
 
It may be argued that the individual understanding of any soldier is irrelevant to the 
military contract: soldiers are obliged to fulfil that contract pursuant and subject to the 
receiving of lawful military orders.  I would contend that this is a short sighted view 
which fails to take into account the impact of social change, the psychological impact 
of conflict on the human frame, the emergence of now enemies deployed in different 
forms and the reality of the modern world in which they are obliged to operate. 
 
This chapter thus far has considered the question of objective from the narrow 
perspective of engagement in the strict and classical sense of that term.  There is, 
however, a broader context in which the issue may be considered, and that is in 
relation to a soldier questioning the basis of the cause upon which he is engaged; a 
matter that has a special relevance to the child soldier question, since it is suggested 
that there may be a causal connection between the engagement of such an enemy and 
an adverse psychological reaction. 
 
The point at issue has a long historical pedigree.  At the conclusion of the Great War, 
and at home, morale was shored up by the belief in the value of sacrifice and has been 
described as ‘the reflected pride’ which it bestowed on those who survived.  The 
Foreign Secretary at the wars’ outbreak, Sir Edward Grey, was to remark: ‘None of us 
who give our sons in this war are so much to be pitied as those who have no sons to 
give.’37 On Armistice Day, Lloyd George at a speech in the Guildhall spoke of ‘…the 
unity of effort, sorrow, and sacrifice …we have a brotherhood of joy.  Let it not end 
there.  We sank all our sectional interests, all partisan claims, all class and creed 
differences, in the pursuit of one common purpose’.  Such patriotism, it was hoped 
would continue to unify the nation throughout the challenges of future years.38  The 
37 Quoted in J. Nicholson, The Great Silence 1918-1920, Living in the Shadow of the Great War, John 
Murray, London 2009, p. 25. 
38 Quoted in J. Nicholson, ibid. p. 40.  See also R. Van Emden, The Quick and the Dead, Fallen 
Soldiers and their Families in the Great War, Bloomsbury, London, 2011, esp. Ch. 3, ‘Home and 
Away’, pp. 81-88. 
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point here is that representatives of the government were seeking to explain the 
sacrifice which the nation had just endured, not so much as a means of justification of 
slaughter, but more in terms of praying in aid the righteousness of the cause and the 
means employed for achieving it. If this is the position in relation to a nation at war, 
then this is not so very different from an individual soldier being content with the 
cause for which he is fighting and the means by which it is brought about.  Paul 
Fussell makes the point that a vast literature has been produced in the attempt to bring 
the Great War into line with other wars by highlighting its so-called battles by such 
impressive names as Verdun, Somme and Passchendaele.  This is a vain attempt to 
place a structure and meaning to what was, at best, a stalemate over the period four 
years and three months.39   
 
During 1925 the University of London sponsored a series of lectures with the title The 
Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens, the purpose of which was to indicate to the 
general public the extent to which war had become a matter, not for military 
specialists, but for society as a whole.40  Howard makes the point that the Second 
World War that was soon to follow awoke an interest in the relationship between war 
and social change and which brought social involvement in belligerent activity to a 
new level of intensity by eliminating the distinction between ‘front line’ and ‘base’.41  
Even in the context of the Great War the distinction was established as with the 
European wars of the seventeenth century, yet different pressures upon social change 
were brought about by a front that was characterised by the fact of occupation in 
continental Europe and the Soviet Union and the realities of aerial bombardment in 
which the totality of society became involved.  If such is the case, it must follow that 
an obligation is placed upon any government to mobilise and carry any given 
population in pursuit of an objective or wider war aim.  Notwithstanding the Soviet 
Union was a totalitarian state, it is arguably the case that the campaign in Soviet 
Russia in WW II  is the best example of how the ordinary Red Army soldier came to 
be motivated and to be ‘psyched-up’ for the break in into Germany.  Bellamy notes: 
‘Liberating the motherland was no longer an issue. This was, at its best and most 
39 P. Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory, Oxford UP, Oxford, 1975, p. 9. 
40 Sir George Aston (ed.), The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens, 1927, quoted in M. Howard, 
‘Total War in the Twentieth Century: Participation and Consensus in the Second World War’, in B. 
Bond & I. Roy (eds.), War and Society, A Yearbook of Military History, Croom Helm, 1975, p. 216. 
41 M. Howard, ibid., p. 216. 
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dignified, conquest.  However to motivate the ordinary soldier, who, it was believed 
did not think much beyond the next meal and sleep that would not do… Vengeance 
became the theme, stressed over and over again, with lurid tales of what the Germans 
had done to their people, and encouraged by the political officers backed up by 
Russia’s writers … ‘the soldier’s rage in battle must be terrible.  He does not merely 
seek to fight; he must also be the embodiment of the court of his people’s justice.’42 
 
What lessons are therefore to be drawn? Fundamentally, whilst objective can be 
viewed in the narrow sense of the term as the means by which soldiers are brought to 
battle in the most effective manner in order to defeat an enemy; the means by which a 
soldier and, for that matter, a nation state can be motivated in order to sustain an 
objective is altogether a more difficult and wider question. The definition of a 
righteous cause supported by a populous may be important; the means employed to 
fight; the perception of an individual or collective threat; the legality of the enterprise 
upon which a soldier is engaged; the quality of the training undertaken; the nature of 
an enemy and how that enemy comes to be defined are factors which undoubtedly 
influence morale, and ultimately outcome in terms of a successful operation with 
minimal casualties and psychological fallout.   It is suggested that psychological 
questions are to be found at their very core, factors which may have been ignored in 
terms of rather more obvious factors such as operational readiness and physical 
capability. 
 
UK and US Forces – Research 
 
(i). Method  
 
In order to test this question in the context of child soldiers and issues arising from 
their engagement by regular forces, I conducted a series of 7 targeted interviews with 
members of the armed forces in the US and the UK.  Some were serving and others 
had retired. 4 were commissioned and serving whilst 3 were non-commissioned and 
retired.   Each person selected had significant military service: the longest 30 years 
and the shortest 6 years; all had experience of combat, and 2 had engaged and shot a 
42 C. Bellamy, Absolute War, Soviet Russia in the Second World War, Pan Books, 2008, pp. 638-639, 
citing Bundesarchiv, RH-2-2467,82. 
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child in combat. Each soldier was and remains anonymous, and are referred to as 
Soldiers A-G respectively. The research was necessarily qualitative, and is intended to 
gauge, with the assistance of admittedly limited samples, the extent to which, if at all 
the presence of children on a battle field influences the manner in which a soldier 
carries out the tasks he is assigned.  It is not suggested, nor could it be suggested that 
the survey is necessarily representative of the Army as a whole, but it is contended 
that the attitude and approach of long serving members of the military can be assessed 
upon rather more than mere anecdotal evidence.  An attempt was also made to detect 
whether the topic has a profile in any relevant training regimes, and to what extent.  
This has been made the subject of comment in an earlier chapter. 
 
It is further suggested that a comparison with US military is useful having regard to 
the fact that the training of the US is similar to that which pertains in the UK; and that 
its personnel are drawn from an all volunteer base in order to form a professional 
armed forces.  Of greater significance is the reality that the US, like the UK, is a 
democratic nation having similar cultural backgrounds and legal conventions.  The 
latter point is of special relevance in the context of utilising young people to fight 
adult wars.  Both nations have well developed child welfare programmes within their 
own domestic legislation and are both signatories at an international level to the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child,43 and the Optional Protocol44. 
 
As I have already made comment upon in this thesis,45 there is little that is new in the 
very concept of ‘a child soldier’, and there exists many examples throughout his 
history of children who have been involved directly or indirectly in armed conflict.    
In order to provide an historical perspective I have had occasion to examine examples 
contained in the Oral History Archives of the Imperial War Museum (‘IWM’) 
considering the topic of Members of the Hitler Youth who became involved in many 
engagements at the conclusion of the Second World War46.  The historical context is 
of course, very different.  In the first instance the cause for which allied soldiers were 
fighting, particularly at the end of the War was defined to the extent that the Hitler 
43 Article 1, para. 2/2 of the First report to the UN Committee on the Rts. of the Child, HMSO, 
February 1994, p. 14 
44 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rts. of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict, 2000, ILM 1286, 1287 (2000) (Article 2). 
45 Ch. 1, Introduction 
46 Research Dates (Visits to the IWM): 1st – 3rd August 2012 
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regime, in most people’s eyes, was the embodiment of evil and in respect of which no 
compromise could be countenanced; whilst the employment of children in pursuit of 
the Hitlerite cause was merely another example of a brutal regime employing brutal 
and unacceptable methods in the prosecution of a war which it created.  In the second 
instance, it may be argued that the employment of children represents, amongst a 
catalogue of many diverse criminal acts of which Hitler was the architect since 1933, 
a relatively benign turn of events ( for example the use of children) in comparison 
with other matters, and not least the destruction of European Jewry, and which was to 
sear the mind of humanity and history. 
 
An analysis of the Hitler Youth contributes to an understanding of the child soldier 
issue in the following ways: -  
(1). It extends the data base across a significant part of the 20th century, and 
covering the Second World War; 
(2). Members of the Hitler Youth were examples of enlisted soldiers, in other 
words not part of a terrorist or other non enlisted grouping, which had as their 
essential purpose that of engaging with allied troops, particularly in the closing 
stages of the War; 
(3). Engagement with the Hitler Youth presents a modern example of enlisted 
soldiers experiencing a form of combat, or more particularly, opposition in 
combat, which was unusual or otherwise outside their ordinary experience, 
contemplation and/or training; 
(4). It is generally accepted by historians47 and those who have engaged such 
unusual soldiers48, that the performance of the Hitler Youth in battle was 
exceptional, and marked by a ferocity and effectiveness beyond either the 
experience of regular forces or their expectations.  There may be a special set 
47 See R. Evans, op cit., p. 721; W. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Arrow Books, 1998, p. 
1130; I. Kershaw, op cit., pp. 310-311. 
48 See C. Wilmot, op cit., p.616; N. Hamilton, The Full Monty, Montgomery of Alamein 1887-1942, 
Allen Lane, London, 2001, p.653; J. Toland, Adolf Hitler, Doubleday, 1976, p.404; H. Trevor-Roper, 
The Last Days of Hitler, Papermac, London, 1995, p. 193; H. Koch, op cit., p.249; C. Whiting, The 
Battle of the Ruhrpocket, New York, 1970, p.86; I. Kershaw,Hitler1936-1945, Nemesis ,Penguin, 
London, pp.790-791. 
 From the perspective of how the Reich leadership viewed the Hitler Youth and their fighting qualities 
see The Goebbels Diaries, (ed. H. Trevor-Roper), Bookclub Associates, London, 1978, especially the 
diary entry for 3rd April 1945, pp.304-305.  For a more sceptical view of the use of children  in guerrilla 
style or ‘Werewolf’ tactics see A. Speer, Inside the Third Reich, Sphere Books, London, 1971, pp. 626-
627. 
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of reasons and/or context which produces this result, but it nevertheless is 
illustrative of the kind of result that may be achieved given appropriate 
motivation and or training. 
(5). The extent to which the advent of the Hitler Youth was responsible for 
altering the strategic direction of the war is more debatable.  It is undoubtedly 
the case that their deployment in strength towards the end of the war was at a 
time when the war was already lost having regard to Allied gains and the 
irreversible strategic reverses of the Reich.  It is also suggested that 
remarkable although some of their engagements were in a tactical sense, they 
were unlikely to have made a difference whether on their own account or in 
conjunction with regular soldiers.  Of interest are the views of General Elfeldt 
in discussion with Liddell Hart when asked to compare discipline in the two 
wars in which Germany had been involved.  He was of the opinion that 
National Socialism made the troops more fanatical, which was both good and 
bad for discipline. National Socialism made so strong an appeal to the herd 
instinct, the natural assumption was that the generation which grew up under it 
would show less, not more, individual initiative on the battlefield than their 
fathers.  When asked for an explanation Elfeldt added: ‘I think it may have 
been due to the kind of scout training these young soldiers had received in the 
‘Hitler Youth’ organisation.49 
 
The material is presented by way of a commentary cross-referenced against selected 




The interviews are summarised in this section from each interview.  Each soldier is 
referred to by way of letter as opposed to name and the completed questionnaires are 
attached at Appendix E.50 
 
49 B. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill. Germany’s Generals Their Rise and Fall, With Their 
Account of Military Events 1939-1945, Cassell, London, 1951, pp. 425-426.  See also R. Overy, The 
Dictators, Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia, Konecky & Konecky, 2004, p. 463, esp. passage on 
preliminary military training, emphasis upon discipline and labour service. 
50 Appendix E. 
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 (1). Soldier A. 
 
UK Commando NCO with 11 years experience in a Combat role now retired.  This 
soldier has served on a variety of operations including those in Afghanistan 
(Operation Jacana), Iraq (Operations Telic 1 and Telic 2) and Northern Ireland 
(Operation Banner).  He had not engaged a child/children and had not undertaken any 
formalised training programmes, although was aware that the subject had been 
discussed in informal arrangements. 
 
As to the fact of any engagement, this soldier did not consider that it made any 
difference to his role as a soldier from a psychological perspective, in that he would 
engage a child on the same basis as any other engagement, although agrees that a 
child is more vulnerable than an adult (and therefore requires protection in a manner 
that an adult would not).  As a consequence, this soldier would feel worse about 
shooting a child than an adult, but believes that a child when armed presents more of a 
threat than a similarly adult. 
 
It is noted that Soldier A is a family man with 2 children.  The significance of this fact 
and whether or not there is a correlation between attitudes to engaging children is 
influenced by the fact that an individual soldier has a family of his own is dealth with 
by way of a separate analysis. 
 
(2). Soldier B. 
 
UK senior NCO of 26 years experience in a combat role now retired.  This soldier has 
served in Afghanistan (Operation Herrick 8), Iraq (Operations Telic 3 and Telic 7), 
Bosnia and Kosovo (Operation Oculus), the Gulf (Operations Granby and Calash), 
Kosovo (Operation Agricola) and Northern Ireland (Operation Banner).  He has 
experience of engaging a child in combat in the context of Iraq (assessed as about 14-
15).  The child was operating with 2 other adults and was engaged in firing at an 
infantry patrol.  The child was shot and killed as he ran from a building with the other 
2 individuals.  It is noted that no training programme was provided as part of this 
soldier’s service 
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 As to the fact of engagement, this interviewee recognises that, as part of his service, 
he may experience a conflict between what he describes as his ‘natural instincts and 
moral codes’ and what he may be required to perform as part of his military contract.  
This is rationalised by the importance of ‘attachment’ to fellow soldiers and the safety 
of those under his command.  In other words, this soldier provides evidence of the 
fact that the military contract and the importance of comradeship may diminish the 
importance of convention.  He agrees that children are vulnerable although strongly 
asserts that an armed child presents more of a threat than a similarly armed adult, and 
should be met in the same manner as any other threat. 
 
This soldier has no children. 
 
(3). Soldier C 
 
UK senior NCO of 30 years experience in an engineering role now retired.  He had 
served in Afghanistan (Operation Herrick 7), Iraq (Operation Telic 1), Bosnia 
(Operation Resolute), the Gulf (Operation Granby), Northern Ireland (Operation 
Banner) and Oman (Saif Sareea).  He has had no experience of engaging a child and 
has received no training in issues which may arise as a consequence of engaging with 
children, nor indeed has it ever been suggested that he may have to so engage as part 
of any operational deployment.  This assertion perhaps requires a qualification, since I 
conducted an oral interview with Soldier C who explained that in the context of 
Northern Ireland he had confronted children who were suspected of acting as decoys 
and cover for others who had planted bombs of various kinds to which regular troops 
were drawn. 
 
As to issues of engagement, Soldier C strongly agrees that children are vulnerable and 
need to be protected, although strongly disagrees that that they present more of a 
threat than a similarly armed adult.  He perceives that any engagement with a child 
would make no difference as to how he perceives his military role. 
 
This soldier has no children. 
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(4). Soldier D. 
 
Regular Officer in the US Army of 13 years experience in a combat role presently 
attached to the US Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 
and in the rank of Major.  He had served in Iraq (Operation Enduring Freedom), and 
in Latin America.  Whilst this officer had no direct experience of engaging a child, the 
fact of child engagement had featured in a training programme. 
 
As to issues of engagement, the officer did no consider that it would make any 
material difference as to how he perceives his military role, on the footing that any 
threat needs to be treated as a threat from whatever source that threat may emanate.  
He is of the view that armed children present more of a threat than an armed adult 
simply because many people may hesitate to engage a child if threatened, although 
tends to agree with the suggestion that children are vulnerable and need to be 
protected. 
 
This soldier has 2 children. 
 
(5). Soldier E. 
 
Regular Officer in the US Army of 16 years experience presently attached to the 
Naval Postgraduate School in the Rank of Major.  He had served in Afghanistan and 
in Iraq as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.  This officer had no direct experience 
of engaging a child and had been part of no training programme in which child 
engagement had ever been made the subject of discussion. 
 
Similar to the statement of Soldier D this officer would respond to a threat in any such 
way as the threat needs to be met and whether or not the threat came from a child, 
although it is noted that he merely ‘agrees’ that this would be the case as opposed to 
‘strongly’ agreeing.  Unlike Soldier D, this officer strongly agrees that children are 
vulnerable and need to be protected, although agrees that children when armed 
present more of a threat than a similarly armed adult. 
 
This soldier has 4 children. 
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 (6). Soldier F. 
 
Regular Officer in the US Army of 16 years experience in a combat role and presently 
attached to Seal Team 8, Little Creek, Virginia.  He had been deployed in Iraq 
(Operation Enduring Freedom) and in counter terrorist operations.  This officer had 
direct experience of engaging a child in Iraq when he engaged, shot and killed a 12-14 
year old boy manoeuvring with two older men. 
 
This officer had specific knowledge about the possibility that he may be required to 
engage a child as part of combat duties, it being so suggested as part of his training. 
The upshot of that training was to inculcate a disregard for the fact of youth when 
children are engaged in combat.  This soldier ‘strongly agrees’ that children are 
vulnerable and need to be protected, although disagrees that the child presents more of 
a threat than a similarly armed adult.  Given the background of this officer it may be 
the case that in the event of a person’s age, or the fact of youth, are totally ignored, as 
is suggested by his answers, it is predictable that he concludes that children do not 
present more of a threat than an adult.  Accordingly, the significance of a threat from 
a child may only be of significance where age and youth are taken into account in the 
mind of the combatant. 
 
This soldier had 3 children. 
 
(7). Soldier G. 
 
Regular Officer in the US Navy of 6 years experience in an Intelligence role attached 
to the US 5th Fleet (Operational Staff) in the rank of Lieutenant.  He had been 
deployed in Iraq (Operation Enduring Freedom).  This officer had not been invited to 
take part in any training programme centred upon child engagement, although is 
aware of training programmes in which the subject has featured, and has not been in 
any engagement which involved children. 
 
Similar to other colleagues, this soldier regards a child as a threat irrespective of the 
fact that the child is a child, although whilst he agrees that children are vulnerable and 
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need to be protected, he disagrees that, when armed, they present more of a threat than 
a similarly armed adult.  Any attack from a child soldier would be responded to in the 
same manner as any other soldier. 
 




Bu way of summary, and to aid comparison, the results of the survey are set out 
within the following table: - 
 
Upon a comparative basis, there is much which is common to all the soldiers’ who 
were the subject of interview, and which, it is suggested arises from their common 
cultural backgrounds, most particularly the fact that in broad terms children are 
vulnerable and require protection.  This is probably no more than a statement of what 
most people would perceive as a product of common humanity across Western 
populations. 
 
It is worthy of comment, however, that in relation to those 2 soldiers who have 
engaged and shot a child (Soldier B and Soldier F), they suggest, in contrast to other 
interviewees, that they would not feel worse about shooting a child than a similarly 
armed adult.  From this limited sample, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that 
their own experiences in actually shooting a child have shaped that opinion as a form 
of justification for that act; indeed it would be difficult to believe otherwise.  Equally, 
as to the remainder, the fact that they have not been so engaged, has shaped their 
opinions to the contrary.  Does it however mean that that the 2 soldiers who have 
engaged children, have experienced a psychological reaction to this fact?  It is of 
course difficult to say, but it should not necessarily be thought that for a psychological 
reaction to be manifest, the reaction needs to be adverse to the person concerned.  
This is clearly not the case, and it may equally be argued that the 2 soldiers who have 
shot children, have legitimised their actions in their own minds and regard the 
children as proper targets in pursuit of the role the soldiers concerned were seeking to 
fulfil, and which may explain why, and in striking form, these particular soldiers do 
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not feel worse about shooting a child in contrast to other soldiers interviewed who 
have not so engaged. 
 
Earlier in this thesis I made reference to some of the work of the late Richard Holmes 
and his recording of the experience of soldiers who were recently engaged in the Iraq 
War.51  He records, and I repeat for the sake of convenience: - 
‘Some (i.e. soldiers) found it impossible to shoot youngsters … Trooper Ken   
Boon (observes): ‘Then a young lad in his early teens threw a grenade at me, I 
could have shot him easily but instead I took cover because I can’t kill a child 
that had probably been told to throw it.’ 
At first blush, and from the perspective of the informed layman, the reaction of Boon 
is one we all like to believe is the typical reaction of the average soldier, if such a 
person exists, since to believe otherwise is counter-intuitive to our understanding of 
common decency.  It is suggested, however, on the basis of this research, that the 
Boon reaction is by no means typical and is probably at odds with the vast majority of 
soldiers, serving or otherwise.  The same criticism may be made of the work of 
Romeo Dallaire, already examined in this thesis,52 and to his suggestion that serving 
soldiers should tailor, in other words limit, their response to the child soldier problem 
in the light of our understanding as to how they came to be soldiers in the first place, 
namely that they are not weathered warriors who have consciously committed their 
adult life to the use of force against others. 
 
It is clear that in respect of each of the soldiers interviewed each, without exception, 
was eager to stress in terms their respective attitudes to child engagement the 
importance of the following: - 
(i). the imperative of preserving their own life and the lives of others under 
their command or with whom they are serving; 
(ii). the recognition of a threat from whatever source that threat may come; 
(iii). the need to counteract that threat irrespective of moral considerations 
which may arise from any personal view each may have as to issues 
appertaining to child welfare; 
51 See Chapter 3, p. 1: R. Holmes, Dusty Warriors, Modern Soldiers at War, Harper Perenial, 2007, p. 
317 
52 See Chapter 2 
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(iv). a recognition that a distinction needs to be drawn between a soldier’s duty 
and personal considerations. 
 
In terms of differences between those interviewed, there was a manifest contrast 
between those who believe that children present more of a threat to regular forces than 
a similarly armed adult (Soldier’s A, B, D and E), and those who do not (Soldier’s C, 
F and G).  It should be remembered that each of the soldiers interviewed were 
experienced, and had each been involved to a very considerable extent in active 
combat.  It is suggested that no particular pattern arises from the spread of answers 
received, and the opinions expressed must be regarded as being no more than 
personal. 
 
As to the question of training; a stark difference emerges between the UK and US 
soldiers the subject of interview.  I have already observed that in respect of published 
data, the UK does not have any formalised training in order to equip its soldiers to 
confront armed children. This appears to be borne out by the UK interviews in 
contrast to the UK interviewees.  I have already suggested that this is a consequence 
of the global role which the US military sees for itself, coupled with a realisation of 







A Comparison from History: The Hitler Youth 
 
The Imperial War Museum Archive, London (Selected Examples) 
 
(1). Ian Hammerton (Officer attached to the 22nd Dragoon Guards).53 
 
53 Recording Reference: IWM 8939 (1st August 1985) 
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Soldier fighting in NW Europe and advancing in support of the Highlanders on its 
approach to the Siegfried Line came against an SS Hitler Youth Division.  His unit 
was met by an intense attack from the Division, more severe than anything he had 
originally experienced on the march from the landings in Normandy, and eventually 
found himself in a slit trench and in the company of a member of the Hitler Youth.  
Hammerton approximates the age of the soldier as about 14 years.  The youth had 
been seriously injured in the leg.  Whilst tending to the boy’s injury as he would any 
other soldier, friend or foe, members of Hammerton’s unit cooked some food for 
them. A debate then arose as to whether they should offer the boy any food.  Up until 
this point he had not sought to converse with either Hammerton or other unit 
members, but the savage manner in which the boy had fought clearly was a factor in 
any decision as to whether the unit should extend the aid already offered.  In the event 
bread and bully beef were offered and accepted by the youth and he was taken into 
captivity. 
 
This example provides some evidence as to how Allied soldiers regarded members of 
the Hitler Youth differently to other enemy soldiers with which they were more 
familiar.  The savage intensity by which they fought is noted, but more particularly 
the fact that such savagery was remarkable as a consequence of the age of the youth 
concerned.  As to psychological perspectives, it is troubling that the Allied soldiers, 
notwithstanding their decision to treat an injury on a fellow soldier, albeit an enemy, 
felt reluctant to offer food as a consequence of the manner in which he fought.  Would 
there have been a difference in the sharing of food if the boy had been a mature 
soldier who had fought savagely?  It is submitted that this example provides strong 
evidence to support the assertion that the Hitler Youth was regarded differently to 
other enemies; the bond which may link soldiers in arms, even on opposite sides, was 
not present; and there was manifest a fear by Allied soldiers of youths fighting so 
savagely and who do not fit their own cognitive schemes as to what a soldier is, and 
still less how he is expected to behave.  The latter may appear a curious observation 
since a soldier can scarcely despise another soldier for fighting savagely. 
 
(2). Reginald Osgerby (Sgt. Attached to the 24th Lancers 1942-1944).54 
54 Recording Reference: IWM 17967 (30th March 1998) 
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 This soldier notes that the quality of German opposition was generally very good, and 
as the Allied advance closed on Germany resistance stiffened as the lines of 
communication became shorter and the threat to the Germany all the greater.  As to 
the biggest threat to the Allied advance he singles out the Hitler Youth occupying slit 
trenches, and their snipers ensconced in trees.  He asserts that the Hitler Youth were 
‘fearless’, and this in turn created fear in the Allied soldier. 
 
It is suggested that it is difficult to escape the conclusion that a psychological reaction 
is brought about in Allied soldiers as a consequence, not so much as a result of the 
fact that the Hitler Youth were ‘hard’ opponents, but more because children are not 
expected to behave in such away. 
 
(3). Clifford Pember (Trooper attached to the 2nd Fife and Forfar Yeomanry 1944-
1945).55 
 
Soldier approaching Belsen Concentration Camp, part of which was guarded by 
members of an SS Hitler Youth Division, who are estimated to be approximately 14-
16 years of age. No member, without exception wished to be taken prisoner.  Whilst 
this was a common tendency for members of the SS not to be taken prisoner, it was 
beyond his experience to witness Youths, albeit SS members, adopting the same 
attitude. 
 
This is perhaps another example of an Allied soldier encountering violent and 
unpredictable youths outside his ordinary experience.  It is submitted that it is this 
feature which provides the Hitler Youth with its strength. 
 
(4). Phil Loffman (Pte. 2/28th Australian Imperial Forces: POW in Italy and Germany, 
1942-1945).56 
 
This soldier complains how, after a substantial period in captivity following being 
taken prisoner in North Africa, and to being held captive in both Italy and then latterly 
55 Recording Reference: IWM 21278 (18th April 2001) 
56 Recording Reference: IWM 21614 (8th May 2001) 
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Germany, without warning the camp in which he was held was taken over by Hitler 
Youth members and members of the Volksturm57.  The latter were no difficulty: old 
and decrepit men and the standard of his confinement until the take over had been 
reasonably acceptable.  As to the Hitler Youth, he describes them as ‘… little 
mongrels’, and many as young as 12-13: overbearing, self important, vicious and 
cruel to prisoners in their charge. 
 
Although not judged in a combat role as with the other examples, this case is of value 
since it draws into focus the intrinsic unpleasantness of members of the Jugend: 
young boys trained into an ideology which, by its nature had little respect for the 
disadvantaged, and prisoners in particular.  It is also worthy of comment that the 
example focuses on the contrast between what a soldier expects from other men in 
arms and the counter-intuitive behaviour of 12-13 year old children. 
 
(5). James Hibbert (Officer attached to the 1st Parachute Bde: Arnhem 1944).58 
 
Encountered members of the Hitler Youth on the outskirts of Arnhem.  Such was the 
ferocity of the engagement that the tactics had to be changed in order to meet the 
unusual nature of the challenge. 
 
Again, apart from the individual fighting abilities of the Jugend which was striking in 
itself and the psychological impact of regular forces engaging such an unusual enemy, 
it appears clear that this officer regarded the threat in much the same way as the 
soldiers interviewed in more recent history viewed child engagement: a threat which 
had to be confronted.  Certainly there is absolutely no suggestion that the response 
was reduced or circumscribed as a consequence of the fact that the threat emanated 
from children; indeed, if anything the response was made stronger. 
 
(6). James O’Sullivan (Pte. Attached to 2/5 Notts. & Derbyshire Regiment (Sherwood 
Forresters): POW in Italy and Germany 1943-1945.59 
 
57 In effect a form of German Home Guard 
58 Recording Reference: IWM 14926 (6th February 1995) 
59 Recording Reference: IWM 20789 (29th March 1998) 
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The most frightening period of this soldier’s captivity was when he was a prisoner of 
war in Germany and in the custody of members of the Hitler Youth: frightening in the 
sense of their ruthlessness and their attitude towards those in their charge.   
 
This soldier reports to conversations with them, and to their pathological fear of being 




The foregoing, along with other published material represents reasonable evidence to 
support the proposition that members of the Jugend were ruthless fighters.  It may be 
a matter of speculation as to why this is so, but the most likely answer is derived from 
the nature of the indoctrination they had received throughout their short lives, coupled 
with the fact that they subscribed to a belief system which contemplated no other life 
other than that which they knew.  This may be the case with most people, but in the 
context of the Hitler Youth, the point is all the more profound. 
 
As to the nature of the fighting in a strategic context; this was the subject of 
consideration at the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, and in particular, in 
the case of Baldur Von Schirach.60  It was found following due consideration that the 
organisation’s military training was ‘…marginal and insignificant …’61  It was clear 
that Von Schirach’s chief function was to create an enthusiasm amongst youth, and 
Schirach had dubiously planted in the minds of young people an enthusiasm for war 
and conquest, later to be described as ‘the German Problem for the next 25 years’.62 It 
is not difficult to see how the examples derived from the recordings exemplify this 
phenomenon.  What is perhaps more striking is the fact that young persons were able 
to be mobilised in pursuit of the cause for which they fought: it is a matter for 
historical reflection that there part in the fighting was strategically inconsequential. 
 
As to any psychological reaction on the part of those included in the examples, it is 
difficult to detect any adverse reactions from their encounters with Hitler Youth.  In 
60 Leader of the Hitler Youth from 1931. Sentenced to20 year’s imprisonment upon conviction of 
Count 4 (Crimes against Humanity).  He died on 8th August 1974 
61 B. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg, Andre Deutsch, 1977, p. 236 
62 See ‘Notes on Judgment’, 3rd September 1946, p.28, Folder 3, Box 14, F.B. Papers 
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truth, the Jugend, and its members are only remarkable as a consequence of the fact 
that they were youths trained and indoctrinated to partake in the war effort in its 
various forms as the examples have shown, and in particular during the latter stages of 
the conflict, a conflict which at this stage was a lost cause. 
 
Whilst it is right to draw the historical distinction between the examples of the 7 
soldiers who have fought in modern wars and those who have fought the Hitler 
Youth, there is no evidence to suggest that any soldier interviewed would in some 
way modify or soften their approach or their tactics merely because they were 
engaging children.  Upon the evidence produced, it is suggested that the contrary is 
more likely to be true, and that such modifications would result in soldiers being more 
aggressive to take into the child threat than otherwise. 
 
 



















































The Political Context 
 
In our examination of the child soldier problem, the experience of the Israeli state 
represents a useful case study since its historical and geographical circumstances 
gives rise to a number of problems which it has been forced to confront and arising 
from the almost routine deployment of children against their own security forces.  It is 
suggested that an examination of the aetiology of these circumstances is capable of 
shedding new light on how the west has come to regard the problem 
 
Although the state of Israel was declared on the 14th May 1948, with the 
establishment of the Israeli Defence Force (‘Zvah Haganah LeIsrael’) (‘Haganah’)   
12 days later, the emergence of Palestinian militancy of which the use of children 
forms part, can be traced back to the opposition against Zionism brought about by the 
influx of Jews to Palestine towards the end of the nineteenth century and to the 
development of organised resistance by the Palestinian elite.  It is a fact that most 
Jewish immigrants chose to settle in urban areas but the purchase of agricultural land 
became a high priority within their number.1 When coupled with a growing 
impoverishment of the Palestinian peasantry, the seeds of future conflict came to be 
sown in Arab consciousness since the sale of land, alienation of the peasantry and the 
evergreen problem of attempting to earn a living from smaller and smaller parcels of 
cultivable land gave rise to conflict and directed against the new settlers. 
 
The upshot of these problems found a focus in Palestinian youth militancy.  Young 
people displaced from the land and their traditional roots moved to urban areas and 
became part of the urban poor.  Against this background ideas began to ferment and 
which was to develop into organised youth militancy; the earliest recorded being the 
Nablus Youth Society and the Jaffa Youth Society.2  Aside from the bald historical 
facts and origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the altogether more profound question 
of how children are regarded in the context of the Palestinian struggle, and which 
1 B. Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001, New York, 
Random House, 2001, p. 123 
2 S. Farsoun, Palestine and the Palestinians, Westview Press, 1997, p.59 
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stands in contrast to the way in which children and young persons are regarded in the 
West.3 
 
Rosen points out that from the very beginnings of the conflict, the conviction that 
young people have a duty to sacrifice themselves for the Palestinian cause has held a 
prominent place in militant forms of Palestinian political consciousness.4  The point 
was put thus: ‘No child’s death is meaningless.  Every dead child is a hero, a victim, 
and a martyr.’5 
 
As we have already seen, in the context of western perceptions, the child is a figure 
who is generally regarded to be a vulnerable personality and who requires nurturing 
and protection.  The Palestinian experience is apparently the opposite and counter- 
intuitive. To see the image of a child, and in particular a dead child, as a symbol of 
sacrifice and political utility is perhaps surprising, and which calls for an explanation. 
It has already been observed6 that the use of child soldiers should not be regarded as a 
matter of success or failure, but more in terms of regarding their usage as a normal 
part of societies which, for whatever reason, have been the subject of fracture 
whereby the use of children as participants in conflict becomes an inevitable fact, 
whatever the exigencies of international law may state.  It is suggested that the 
Palestinian experience represents such an example.  With the gradual increase in 
Jewish migration to Palestine and the assertion by the Zionist movement of their 
ancient biblical right to Palestinian lands, the Arab Palestinian movement saw a threat 
to their existence extant.  It is against this general background and the development of 
specific political developments perceived to be adverse to Arab and Palestinian 
interests7 that the seeds of the modern problem came to be sown.  It is not suggested 
that Palestinian were or are indifferent to the usage of children in the armed struggle 
to rid their lands of ‘criminal usurpers’, but more the case that the political dimension 
3 It is also worth noting that the Government of Israel set up  at this time a new organisation known as 
‘Nahal’ (Pioneer Fighting Youth), the aim of which was to  provide a combination of military and 
agricultural training for members of youth movements and for members of the Youth Aliyah (young 
immigrants) villages.  See M. Gilbert, Israel, A History, Doubleday, 1998, p.223 
4 D. Rosen, ‘Fighting for the Apocalypse: Palestinian Child Soldiers’, Armies of the Young: Child 
Soldiers in War and Terrorism, Rutgers UP, 2005, pp. 91-92 
5 D. Rosen, op cit., p. 92 
6 See Chapter 2: The Influence of Law, Culture and Literature on the Child Soldier Question, p. … 
7 See for e.g. the San Remo Peace Conference of 1920 (Assigning the mandate over Palestine to the 
British); the 1937 proposal that Palestine be divided into Jewish and Arab states; the emergence of the 
Israeli state itself, and the Palestinian refugee crisis as a consequence. 
 2 
                                                 
and the armed struggle itself, came to be regarded as being more important in the 
order of priorities. 
 
As youth violence began to spread, along with the appointment in 1921 of Haji Amin 
al-Hussaini as Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and head of the Supreme Muslim Council, 
with control over the major resources of the Muslim community8, the Muslim 
community, including its youth came to be organised socially and politically.  Rosen 
asserts that the political challenge of Zionism came to be defined as a civilizational 
and religious struggle9 against the Judaization of Palestine, and which was able to 
bring youth from all backgrounds into the nationalist struggle and against a common 
enemy. 
 
During the 1930’s and as head of the Association of Muslim Youth in Haifa, a man by 
the name of Sheik ‘Iss al-Din al Quassam became the first person to advocate armed 
resistance amongst its youth members and which tapped into a strain of militancy 
which can be identified within Islam or what has been described as ‘… the fusion of 
apocalyptic visions with political movements.’10 Upon the death of Al-Quassam in 
1935 he became a martyr and became more important in death than in life as part of 
the armed struggle.  That memory was utilised to promote the recruitment of armed 
guerrilla youths to the cause; whilst in 1988 during the first intifada the link was 
stressed between ‘al Quassam the martyr’, and what are described as his ‘political 
grandchildren’.11 Perhaps the most striking example of the recruitment of such youths 
lies in the modelling of youth groups along the lines of Nazi youth and those in fascist 
Italy. 
 
Following World War II and the departure of the British at the end of the Mandate, 
the Palestinian struggle for autonomy became internationalised with the intervention 
of neighbouring Arab states to their cause, although it was not until the founding of 
the Palestinian Liberation Organisation by the Arab League in 196412 and having the 
8 J. Hilterman, Behind the Intifada, Princeton UP, 1991, p. 51 
9 D. Rosen, op cit., p. 98 
10 S. Arjomand, ‘Islamic Apocalyptism in the Classic Period’, in The Encyclopaedia of Apocalyptism, 
ed. B. McGinn, New York Continuum, 1998, pp. 238-283 
11 Z. Lochman & J. Beinin, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising against Israeli Occupation, Boston: 
South End Press, 1989, p. 329 
12 F. Barnaby, The Future of Terror, A 21st Century Handbook, Granta Books, 2007, p. 173 
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destruction of the state of Israel that the Palestinian people had a political focus.  
However, following the 1967 War and the occupation by Israel of the West Bank, 
Sinai and the Gaza Strip in the form of what has been described as ‘a classic colonial 
power’,13 Palestinian youth again emerged as a radical and energized force operating 
as part of an armed underground and in basic institutions set up to provide minimalist 
government in the occupied territories dealing with medical services, education and 
social services.  Although tolerated by the Israelis, it was this latter category which 
provided a recruiting structure and training ground for militant youth.14 
 
The net result of all this had its broad effect in the spread of Palestinian terrorism 
across the globe, the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood and the emergence of Hamas 
and Islamic Jihad spreading a harsh and apocalyptic anti-Semitic form of rhetoric.15  
Most significantly is the fact that these groups have recruited children as young as 13 
to be suicide bombers and as young as 11 to smuggle weapons and explosives.  Since 
2000 at least 29 suicide bombing attacks have been carried out in the name of the 
Palestinian cause and against Israel,16 utilising such methods and young people as its 
vehicle. 
 
The term ‘Child Soldiers’ is perhaps an inapposite form of description when dealing 
with the subject of Palestinian terrorism and child suicide bombers in particular.  It 
may be the case that such persons are the very antithesis of what a soldier is, and how 
he may choose to define himself.  Yet the facts demonstrate that children, and very 
young children at that, are used to devastating effect and as part of a military strategy.  
This Chapter does not suggest that children are necessarily the main means by which 
the Palestinian cause is advanced and whether from a political or military perspective, 
but it is argued that youth takes a central role in the Palestinian movement and in 
many respects is the means by which it defines itself.  The importance of the point is 
well recognised by Israel who, in demonstrating that childhood as a concept can be 
13 T. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, On War in the 21st Century, Zenith Press, 2006, p. 94 
14 T. Hammes, ibid., p. 95 
15 D. Rosen, op cit., p. 113 
16 J. Kelley, ‘The Sickening World of Suicide Terrorists’, USA Today, 26th June 2001 
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made and unmade, has through its Military Orders, has reclassified Palestinians as 




The Military Context 
 
The use of force by young persons in the history of the Palestinian conflict is well 
established from the spread of communal violence in the neighbourhoods of Tel Aviv 
in the summer of 1929 to March 2002 when Ayat al-Akhras, a Palestinian teenager, 
blew herself up outside an Israeli supermarket in Jerusalem.  Prior to the suicide she 
pre-recorded a so called ‘martyrs’ video’ proclaiming: 
 
‘I am the living martyr Ayat al-Akhras.  I do this operation for the sake of God 
and fulfilling the cry of the martyrs and orphans, the mothers who have buried 
their children, and those who are weak on earth.  I tell the Arab leaders, don’t 
shirk from your duty.  Shame on the Arab armies who are sitting and watching 
the girls of Palestine fighting while they are asleep.  I say this as a cry, a plea.  
Oh al-Aqsa Mosque, Oh Palestine.  It will be intifada until victory’18 
 
There are many other examples of children being used in the furtherance of what 
purport to be military adventures.  The attack on the El Al Airlines office in Brussels 
in the late summer of 1969, the preponderance of children in mass demonstrations 
against Israeli occupation of the West Bank in the 1970’s19, participation in the al-
Aqsa intifada, joining the al-Aqsa Martyr’s brigade, Hamas and Islamic Jihad are but 
a few.  They represent practical examples of how, as has been earlier observed, 
children are not only regarded, but utilised in the wider context of the Palestinian 
struggle itself. 
 
Thus far, this study has looked at the use of children in conflict from the perspective 
of how they may be utilised from the perspective of the regular soldier: their 
17 H. Brocklehurst, Who’s Afraid of Children, Children, Conflict and International Relations, Ashgate, 
1974, p. 2; and Introduction. p.13 
18 J. Hammer, A Season in Bethlehem, New York, 2003, p.160 
19 D. Rosen, op cit., p. 92 
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deployment as soldiers and whether in their own right or as adjuncts to regular 
soldiers; their use as guerrilla fighters or as adjuncts to such fighters such as 
intelligence gatherers or transporters of equipment.  The examples identified in the 
Palestinian context above are altogether different.  I have raised the question as to 
whether such persons can be regarded as soldiers at all.  Many of their actions lack 
organisation, discipline or controls which are the keystones of any army, modern or 
otherwise. Many of the actions are random and indiscriminate; many are no more than 
mere rioters throwing stones and many of their collective actions are directed to no 
defined purpose or objective.  However, what is clear is that they all come within 
accepted definitions of the term ‘insurgent actors’, namely: ‘any non-state entity that 
seeks to transform the political status quo through the use, and the threat of use, of 
violence;’20 what is different is the means that they employ to bring about that 
transformation. 
 
If the acts of child insurgents in the Palestinian cause are considered across the broad 
sweep of the last century it is difficult to argue that their net effect has been remotely 
instrumental in bringing about their oft stated aim: the destruction of Israel.  That is 
not to deny that certain individual acts have caused carnage and devastation to those 
immediately affected by their consequence, and many live in fear of the threat that 
such activity can cause.  The focus of such acts, which may be broadly regarded as 
‘military’, surely lies in their power to disseminate ideas.  There is no doubt that upon 
the declaration of the state of Israel world sympathy was to be found in a small and 
newly created state being made the subject of attack by her larger and more powerful 
Arab neighbours.  A more modern view is of Israel as a strong regional power 
preventing the Palestinian wish for nationhood.  It is in this context that the image of 
the child soldier becomes so powerful in the dissemination of their cause. 
 
Take the example of the child female suicide bomber, an image which in its own way 
is powerful, irrespective of any examination of the cause it propounded.  The accepted 
image of a child, and in particular a female child, is one of vulnerability and weakness 
and deserving of protection and nurturing.  For such a person to take their own life in 
20 C. Crouch, Managing Terrorism and Insurgency, Regeneration, recruitment and attrition, 
Contemporary Terrorism Studies, Routledge, 2010, p. 2; A. Back, ‘Thinking Clearly About Violence’, 
Philosophical Studies 117, no. 1-2, 2004, 219-230 
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the cause of martyrdom, and in so doing hold herself against the collective power of 
Arab armies as she states in the video, is not only powerful, but powerful when 
judged against as the widely perceived image of the child.  Put another way: the 
perceived weakness of the child is her strength. 
 
It may be argued that isolated suicide attacks of the kind described are not a direct 
concern of the military and are more of a concern of the civil power and police 
enforcement issues.  In any case, as it may be pointed out, the structure of the Israeli 
military is no different from the broad organisation of other western style forces and 
conceived with the engagement of other similarly armed forces in mind.  It has been 
argued already, and in a different context that this may be a mistake and for the same 
reasons. 
 
When considering the structure and philosophy of the Haganah, literally translated as 
‘defence’, it is important to recognise that it emerged from strong pacifist traditions 
and is based upon principles of self-defence.  It came into being as a direct result of 
attacks against Jewish settlers perpetrated by the Palestinian community and came to 
reflect Jewish life in general based upon humanistic principles and socialistic ideals.  
As to its strategic imperative, it came to develop a deterrent posture against 
surrounding and aggressive Arab states; an intelligence service designed to counteract 
its lack of strategic depth, and short warning period and the need to attack first in 
order to avoid penetration of the nation’s own space. 
 
Practical applications of the effectiveness of Israeli doctrines came in the Sinai 
campaign of 1956, the Six Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973.  As 
has been stated: ‘… the war’s outcome validated most of the doctrines and ethos that 
the IDF believed in and according to which it had prepared itself.  Above all, the war 
verified the Israeli advantage in command and leadership at all levels.’21 What is less 
clear is how Israeli military doctrine is organised in order to deal with the child enemy 
of the kind earlier described, and in a modern context. 
 
21 R. Gal, A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier, Greenwood Press, 1986, p. 17 
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During the occupation of Lebanon between 1982 and 1985 the IDF became 
transformed from a highly mobile force organised around conflict against other 
armies to a force, static in nature and performing quasi-police functions.  During their 
time in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank, the IDF was forced into friction with the 
local population, whilst long years of occupation and control came to erode their 
motivation and morale but also their traditional sense of ethics and morality.22  This 
problem highlights in many ways the changing nature of warfare.  I have already 
drawn attention to the work of Philip Bobbitt who, in his book Terror and Consent 
argues that industrial warfare between states is being replaced by the targeting of 
civilians as a direct objective rather than as a collateral cost.23  It is in this context 
where the Child Soldier problem arises, since the use of children in perpetration of the 
Palestinian cause may have a particular application. 
 
If the historical position is considered, it may be truly argued that a revolution in 
warfare thus emerges .Commencing with the use of children and young people as we 
have seen, in opposition to Israeli settlement in Palestine, and the development by 
Jewish settlers for their own means of protection, albeit in a basic form (the seeds of 
the Haganah) the latter became part of the defence of the Israeli state upon its 
formation.  With the passing of the 3 conventional wars to which have been referred, 
there again comes into being a need to fight within areas of population and a 
willingness on the part of the Palestinian movement to use young people drawing 
upon the philosophies of the past.   
 
To this observation must be added modern developments in the art of what has come 
to be known as asymmetric warfare; a concept which has come to greater prominence 
since the end of the Cold War.24 The term ‘asymmetric warfare’ has come to mean the 
antithesis of a Western orientated style of warfare which relies on state based and/or a 
regular form of conflict utilising conventional tactics and methods.  In this regard the 
application of ‘laws of war’ are more easily understood and applied.  The 
‘asymmetric’ approach seeks to exploit advantages he holds in other fields to the 
22 R. Gal, ibid., p. 251 
23 See Chapter 4 herein and P. Bobbitt, ibid.,  p. 132 
24 T. Benbow, The Magic Bullet, Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs, Brassey’s, 2004, p. 
160 
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conventional25. Types of asymmetric warfare vary across a broad spectrum 
encompassing strategy, tactics or type of force.  He may be a terrorist group, an 
irregular militia, or even a criminal enterprise in so far as a distinction may be drawn 
between the two, yet the asymmetric experience is well adjusted to the Palestinian 
cause as against the Israeli state and her defence structure based upon a Western 
model.  What emerges is that various features of the international system have come 
to benefit terrorists26, and no more so than the manner in which globalisation has 
come to develop27.  The free movement of people in an open society, the free 
movement of ideas via the means of mass communication are but examples of 
developments which may be the subject of exploitation by groups which are shadowy 
and elusive by the nature of their structure, and thereby difficult to penetrate by a 
conventional security apparatus. 
 
Perhaps one of the more significant problems facing the Israeli state is the gradual 
recognition in the West of the changing cultural outlook on warfare which stands in 
juxtaposition to its own, and which is apposite to the manner in which the child 
soldier issue may be defined. To many groups, such as the Palestinian example the 
subject of this chapter, the sacrifice of a child in the suicide example already quoted is 
not a matter of regret; it is an eventuality which is to be encouraged, and to be held up 
as an example to encourage other participants.  Given such a disparity between this 
example and the approach of a Western model of defence with an emphasis on human 
rights and the rule of law, the emphasis of the desire for military action as a last 
resort, then military interventions are made all the more complex given this disparity., 
and in particular in case where war becomes more a way of life than as an instrument 
of politics.28 
 
25 See for e.g. The War of the Flea, A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice, Paladin, 1974, 
esp. Ch. 1 ‘The Confrontation of the haves and have- nots, Guerrilla Warfare as an extension of 
Politics’, pp. 14-26 
26 T.Benbow, op cit., p. 162 
27 D. Held and A. McGrew define ‘Globalisation’ as a process which projects social, political and 
economic activities across frontiers  and from one region to another, spreading the transmission of 
ideas, goods, information etc. so that the lives of isolated communities are altered by distant events.  
See ‘Global Governance’ Vol. 5, no. 4, 1999, pp. 483-496 
28 C, Coker, Waging War Without Warriors? The Changing Culture of Military Conflict, Boulder, L. 
Rienner, 2002, p.177.   
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The cultural approach to violence and the willingness of many who form part of the 
Palestinian cause should never be underestimated.  Few would argue that Israel lacks 
democratic legitimacy in so far as its incumbent government is concerned, yet whilst 
such legitimacy promotes internal cohesion, this has to be complimented by secure 
national borders and cooperative neighbouring states.29  Israel may be militarily 
strong in the narrow sense of that term, yet it is surrounded by hostile Arab states 
sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, and in some cases, to their means of achieving 
their objectives.  In this context being strong conventionally becomes diluted.  It also 
follows that hasty intervention, or an ill-judged military response to a perceived threat 
risks being exploited for propaganda purposes.  Thus, over-reactions to suicide 
bombers by a strong regional power, such as Israel, potentially provide the Palestinian 
cause with a propaganda tool, made all the more potent by the advent of globalisation, 
and which may provoke a backlash against the Israeli cause, as indeed is the essential 
aim of the perpetrators. 
 
How equipped is Israel to fight Child Soldiers? 
 
It would be a mistake to consider this issue in isolation to a wider strategic context.  It 
is not suggested, nor could it be said, that children are used either on their own or 
even as a weapon of choice.  The incidence of child deployment may be rare in 
relation to other military acts against the Israeli state, but it is suggested that there use 
provides a powerful tool at the disposal of an insurgency for the following reasons.  
As has been pointed out, the Palestinian is well aware that it cannot fight Israel in a 
war based upon weapons alone.  To do so would provide Israel with a mandate to 
utilise lethal force.30  Yet the image of young Palestinians armed with stones and 
bricks pitted against highly armed forces which Israel is able to deploy, is not only 
powerful in itself, it removes the need to use sophisticated weapons on the part of the 
Palestinians, since to do so would eliminate the image as their most powerful 
weapon.31 
 
29 J. Mackinlay, Globalisation and Insurgency, IISS, Adelphi Paper 352, 2002, p. 31 
30 T. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, On War in the 21st Century, Zenith Press, 2006, p. 99 
31 T. Hammes, ibid. p. 99 
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By the commencement of the Intifada on the 8th December 1987 (Intifada 1), Israel 
had sustained an occupation for more than 20 years. The Palestinian leadership 
organised a United National Command in order to coordinate the uprising.  One of 
their first steps was to circulate a series of leaflets which had as their main thrust 
political demands based upon their own relative military weakness and emphasising 
their own strength through the exploitation of youth as their psychological spearhead: 
 
 ‘All roads must be closed to the occupation forces.  Its cowardly soldiers must 
 be prevented from entering refugee camps and large population centres by 
 barricades and burning tyres.  Stones must land on the heads of the occupying 
 soldiers and those who collaborate with them.  We must set the ground 
 burning under the feet of the occupiers.  Let the whole world know that the 
 volcanic uprising that has united the Palestinian people will not cease until 
 the achievement of independence in a Palestinian state whose capital is 
 Jerusalem.32 
 
By a skilful manipulation of the world’s media, the uprising was able to maximise the 
impact upon, not only world opinion, but also Israeli opinion, and the Israeli army 
itself.  As to world opinion, constant images of young people possessing little or no 
weaponry save stones and bottles, being fired upon by Israeli rubber bullets conveyed 
a powerful image if imbalance and injustice.  As to the Israeli army, we have seen that 
by tradition it sees its role as a defensive force conceived in circumstances to protect 
the weak and the borders of a fledgling state.  There is some evidence that the role it 
was now being asked to play in crushing the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and 
which found expression in the intifada, had a demoralizing effect on the troops 
themselves, and which was fed back to families of the troops involved in the 
fighting.33  Of particular significance to this Chapter is the fact that the troops had no 
direct training in responding to wave after wave of women and children as 
opponents34 and which may have contributed to their ‘disjointed’ approach: they were 
losing the psychological war, which in the context of an insurgency is arguably more 
important than the physical. 
32 Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ri, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising – Israel’s Third Front, Simon and Schuster, 
1989, p.192 
33 T. Hammes, op cit., p. 105 
34 T. Hammes, ibid., p.105 
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 Following the signing of the Oslo Accords of the 13th September 1993 Israel was 
forced to concede territory that it had come to occupy.  It is of remark that this 
concession was brought about as a consequence of the uprising itself to which the use 
of children and young persons played a significant part.  It is worth observing that, 
notwithstanding previous conventional wars between neighbouring Arab states 
possessing professional armies, the uprising achieved what the latter could not, over a 
much shorter period of time.  One may well conclude that the Israeli response was 
defective as a consequence of their inability to fight the uprising based as it was on 
child input.  It remains a matter of debate whether such failure is a result of an 
incorrect reading of the hostilities from a political perspective; or a failure in the 
military response.   
 
Following the collapse of the Oslo process in or about September 2000 the al-Iqsa 
intifada commenced (Intifada 2), and which has been described as ‘…the bloodiest 
conflict in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict…,35 and which lasted until it 
petered out towards the end of 2005. It has been estimated that as early as August 
2003 more than 2,500 Palestinians and 900 Israelis had come to be killed.36  By 2002 
there had been an escalation to the most violent confrontation since the partition of the 
territory west of the Jordan River in 1947.37  The Israeli response through the medium 
of Operation Determined Path and Operation Defensive Shield was to commit to a 
programme of targeted killings of commanders or would-be commanders.  During this 
period the Palestinian approach was to deploy suicide bombers as the weapon of 
choice.38 Many of the persons engaged were women and children.  It appears that the 
supply of persons willing to subject themselves to such an endeavour were plentiful, 
munitions were ample and the political effect and fallout were the main targets.  In 
August 2003 a bus bombing in Jerusalem killed 23 people and lead to the resignation 
of the Palestinian Prime Minister, Mahmoud Abbas. Unorganised popular unrest 
gradually converged into organised popular resistance involving guerrilla tactics led 
by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and PLO affiliated militias Fatah-Tamzim and 
35 So named after the decision by Netanyahu to open a new tourist gate from an ancient tunnel near 
Jerusalem’s holiest Muslim shrine, the Al Aqsa mosque, and which led to an emotional Palestinian 
response. 
36 Washington Post, August 2003 
37 IISS Strategic Survey 2002/3, Oxford UP, 2003, p. 179 
38 IISS Strategic Survey 2003/4, Oxford UP, 2004, p. 173 
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Force 17.39  It soon became apparent that a policy of containment was insufficient to 
neutralise the threat and the IDF were obliged to resort to live firing the subject of 
significant media exploitation by the Palestinian cause.   
 
When an analysis is made of the foregoing it is suggested that the respective 
approaches of both sides are not very different to that which pertained prior to Oslo.  
The Israeli IDF adopting a conventional military response to what, as they perceived 
it, an insurgency, and the Palestinians seeking to exploit what they regarded as their 
strength, the deployment of suicide bombers, for political ends and maximum 
publicity amongst other methods.  It has been suggested that Intifada 2 has reversed 
the international perception of Israeli and Palestinian roles of Intifada 1,40 whereby 
the latter restated their aim of the destruction of Israel in addition to the establishment 
of a Palestinian state.  The cycle of violence appears unending and is a matter of 
current international concern.  In short the IDF was accustomed to conducting major 
conventional warfare and counterterrorist operations using Special Forces, but was 
unprepared to confront a civilian based uprising.41 
 
During the course of my research for the purposes of this Chapter I had cause to 
interview Yossi Mecklenberg, Reader in Middle Eastern Affairs at Chatham House, 
and also an Israeli veteran in the context of his own National Service in the IDF.42 
What emerged from the discussion was the fact that, to the best of the interviewee’s 
knowledge and belief, the IDF had no specific training in order to deal with child 
soldiers and whether from the point of view of their incidence or how they 
specifically may be regarded as a threat to the IDF.  These observations are supported 
by a series of interviews conducted for the B’Tselem organisation.43 One such 
interviewee complains thus: 
 
39 See S. Catignani, Ch. 11, ‘The IDF and the Al Aqsa Intifada’ in Counterinsurgency in Modern 
Warfare, eds. D. Marston and C. Malkasian, Osprey Publishing, 2008, p. 205  
40 T. Hammes, op cit., p. 122 
41 See S. Catignani, op cit., p. 204 
42 Interview with Anthony Callaway on the 15th December 2012 at Regents Park College, Regents 
Park, London 
43 ‘Breaking the Silence’ is a NGO established in Jerusalem in 2004 by IDF veterans in order to 
document the testimonies of Israeli soldiers who have served in the Occupied Territories in Hebron and 
the West Bank.  The interviews themselves are designed to shed light on Israel’s operational methods 
since the Second Intifada and to encourage debate about the nature of the occupation.  All interviewees 
are anonymous. 
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 ‘One of the things, its something that really shook me…because they didn’t 
 train us for going into the Territories, so they gave us a very quick overview.  
 So they explained to us a bit about, I don’t know what they’re called, riot 
 control agents.’44 
 
Similarly, the attitude to Rules of Engagement (‘ROE’) appears somewhat cavalier.  
Another interviewee explains: 
 
 ‘If an Arab boy picked up a rock against a Jewish boy, then we’d probably 
 have to handcuff him, blindfold him, send him wherever, follow the orders’ 
  
 Those are the orders? 
 ‘It’s in the rules of engagement, situations and responses’ 
 
 The suspect arrest procedure? 
 Right procedure for arresting a suspect.  If a boy picks up a rock.  Forget 
 it…I’d have to start shooting in the air, then at his feet, all kinds of things like 
 that.  There was some kind of crazy boy, a bit retarded, he didn’t understand 
 what they were screaming at him.  In the end he got a bullet in his leg.  It was 
 the 931st Nahal Battalion.45 
  
 
  There may be a number of explanations for the lack of training and a failure to apply 
the ROE.  In the first instance, it may be asserted that children do not pose a specific 
threat, and which therefore does not require training in order to deal with it. 
Conversely, it may be stated, moreover, that a child threat needs to be considered as 
with any other threat to the safety of conventional forces, and a conventional response 
is sufficient to meet it, irrespective of the age of those who constitute the threat; or it 
may be argued that the threat is too small in scale to give rise to a need to amend 
training programmes and which are adequate to prepare forces for their intended 
deployment.  It is, however, more difficult to explain a failure to apply ROE in any 
44 Unit of Interviewee: Artillery. Location: Quaqilya. Year: 2000. Reference: ‘Breaking the Silence’ 
Our Harsh Logic: Testimonies from the Occupied Territories, Metropolitan Books, 2012, p. 102 
45 Unit of Interviewee: Nahal Brigade.  Location: Hebron.  Year: 2005. Reference : Breaking the 
Silence, ibid., pp. 142-143  
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given case, and what is undeniably clear is that the Palestinian cause has been able to 
garner significant political capital on the international stage for the child threat to be 
regarded as a threat in its own right, as opposed to some minor uprising involving 
children who do not matter in the grand scheme.  Judged against the standards of 
intifada ‘1’ and intifada ‘2’, it is difficult to conclude that children and young people 
are anything other than an important part of the military processes by which these 
insurrections were orchestrated.  Of special significance is the fact that targeted 
killings mounted by the IDF undercover hit squads (Mistar’aravim) seemed to 
encourage, rather than deter the recruitment of new volunteers and martyrs.46 
 
I would not wish to overstate the significance of youth participation in the Palestinian 
uprisings which have been the subject of discussion in this Chapter.  Successes there 
have undoubtedly been based upon their deployment, but that is not to suggest that 
they are a substitute for professional forces in the conventional sense.  Perhaps the 
biggest problem facing Israel and the IDF in particular, is the fact that her forces are 
being deployed in various parts of the Occupied Territories in order to fulfil a policing 
role the nature of which a conventionally structured force is not designed to deal with.  
It is suggested that the combination of Palestinian militancy, spearheaded by youth 
and within the context of the Occupied Territories represents the real challenge to be 
confronted by the IDF in future conflict absent a political settlement. 
 
How do Israeli Soldiers react to a Confrontation with Children? 
 
The chief function of all military training is to convert civilians into effective 
combatants. Whilst the essential aim can be easily stated, the incidence of training is 
now recognised to be more complex than was once thought.  Indeed, the experience of 
history is that however thorough the training, most combatants proved unable to 
fight,47 and by the Second World War the science of psychology gradually came to 
dominate military journals and the debate generally, influenced by important 
46 See E. Kaplan, ‘What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a Terror Stock Model’ 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 28, No. 3, (May 2005), pp. 225-235 
47 J. Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, Face to Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare, 
Granta Books, 1999, p. 13 
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contributions from instinct theorists such as William Mc Dougall,48 Stopford A. 
Brooke,49 and Jules Coleman,50 in order to explain why this may be so. 
 
Whilst such work was distinguished in its own way and made important contributions 
to the historic debate concerning, however enlightened that training may be, it is 
always a mistake to regard the problems of an insurgency as soluble by well trained 
conventional forces deployed against a civil population, and regarding that population 
as an enemy to be defeated in the strict sense.  General Sir Frank Kitson51 points out 
that ‘…there can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is 
not primarily a military activity …’52 But the question arises can military training in 
the conventional sense instil the qualities in a soldier which are suitable for fighting a 
long insurgency campaign such as Israel has embarked upon in the Occupied 
Territories and which requires her forces to live amongst a hostile population?  It is 
suggested that this is where the power of the child soldier comes into its own: not only 
from a symbolic perspective, but also from a practical one as well.  Symbolic in the 
eyes of the world viewing the conflict with the aid of mass media; and practical in the 
sense of presenting as an elusive enemy, one that most soldiers are reluctant to target 
for fear of political fallout, one in respect of which there is a plentiful supply and one 
that can prove deadly, particularly in the context of the suicide bomber. 
 
The work of the B’Tselem organisation provides significant data and other material 
which supports the thesis that engagement by regular forces of children and young 
persons in the Occupied Territories has a deleterious effect upon Israeli forces, 
particularly from a psychological perspective.  It is a matter for debate as to how such 
consequence influences the overall effectiveness of the military effort.  The point is 
put thus: - 
 ‘Early in (Intifada 2) the IDF established the principle behind its methods, 
 calling it ‘a searing of consciousness.’  The assumption is that resistance will 
48 W. McDougall, Introduction to Social Psychology, 1908 
49 S. Brooke, Discourse on War, 1905 
50 J. Coleman, ‘The Group Factor in Military Psychiatry’, American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, xvi, 
1946, pp.224-25 
51 Officer In the British Army who published the classic work ‘Low Intensity Operations’ in 1971 
based upon his experiences in the Mau-Mau campaign, the Malayan Emergency, Oman, Cyprus and 
Northern Ireland. 
52 F. Kitson, Bunch of Five, Faber and Faber, 1977, p.283 
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 fade once Palestinians as a whole see that opposition is useless.  In practice, 
 as testimonies show, ‘searing of consciousness’ translates into intimidation 
 and indiscriminate punishment.  In other words, violence against a civilian 
 population and collective punishment are justified by such a policy, and have 
 become cornerstones of IDF strategy.’53 
 
Israeli Forces – Research 
 
(i). Method (Detail) 
 
What, however, of the troops themselves?  Through the B’Tselem organisation a 
series of targeted interviews were conducted of soldiers who had served in the 
Occupied Territories and had engaged children in a variety of forms.  Each soldier 
was and remains anonymous.  Unlike the work with UK and US soldiers I neither 
designed any questionnaire nor conducted the interviews themselves.  Nonetheless the 
material provides a practical insight into attitudes of the soldiers themselves, their 
motivation, their training and the extent to which such experiences have come to 
shape their mindset. 
 
(ii). Interviews (Summaries) 
 






‘It affects some one way and some another.  Some people are like … ‘Okay, I killed a 
kid, Okay.’  They laugh … ‘Yeah, now I can draw a balloon on my weapon. A 
balloon instead of a smiley face.’55 I remember I was in Jenin during squad 
commander training … and they tell us whoever climbs on the APC’s or armoured 
53 See ‘Prevention: Intimidating the Palestinian Population: An Overview’ in Our Harsh Logic, op cot., 
p. 9 
54 Breaking the Silence, op cit., p.39 
55 Soldiers often put a mark on their weapons for every person they kill. 
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vehicles – shoot to kill.  And the whole point was that people would climb up, 
because there are APC’s under the house the whole time.  Of course they tell us that 
the aim is to bring out the wanted men.  And then a friend of mine came with his 
M24, a sniper’s weapon, and just then a kid climbed up.  He shot him, all happy – ‘I 
took someone down 
 
He was happy he killed someone? Why? 
 
Because you’ve proved yourself. You’re a man. 
 
Do they know he’s not armed? 
 
Of course he’s not armed and he climbs on the APC.  No one asks you why you’ve 
got two X’s, and whether they were armed, and if it was by the rules.  It could have 
been two guys throwing Molotov cocktails. 
 
(2). Israeli Soldier B: ‘Any kid you see with a stone, you can shoot’.56 
 
Unit: Paratroopers 
Location: Etzion Brigade 
Year: 2002 
 
What finished it all – the brigade commander is there facing us during the briefing, 
we’re in a hudna,57it’s a fragile situation, he talks about that, and then a minute later 
he briefs us, ‘Any kid with a stone, you can shoot at him.’  Like, shoot to kill. A 
stone! 
 
-  gave an order that you can shoot at a child who’s throwing a stone? 
 
Yes, because it’s a deadly weapon, because they throw them in the road.  It was 
during the hudna. 
 
56 Breaking the Silence, op cit., p. 55 
57 Cease-fire 
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(3). Israeli Soldier C: ‘Slapping, shoving, all kinds of stuff like that.  Every day’.58 
 
Unit: Lavi Battalion 
Location: Hebron District 
Year: 2002-2003 
 
There was something that happened with a retarded kid, really retarded, who threw 
stones from some hill near Kvasim junction.  In the end they arrested him, with that 
same deputy company commander, and he said to one of my soldiers, ‘Okay, take him 
to the jeep.’  The guy started struggling with him, and it was really hard for a little 
soldier to control this, like sixteen year old boy.  So I threw him to the ground.  
During this scrap my weapon hit him in the mouth and it broke his tooth or 
something.  He started bleeding and going crazy.  All his uncles and family were 
there.  The deputy company commander threatened them, the next time he sees the 
kid there, he says: ‘I don’t care whether he throws a stone or not, I’m going to kill 
him’.  The parents were threatened. 
 






We were based at the regional brigade, and we’d go into the city for ambushes. 
 
How many X’s does the company have? 
 
Eleven armed, I think.  And something like for or five kids. 
 
58 Breaking the Silence, op cit., p. 63 
59 Breaking the Silence, ibid., p. 83 
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Four or Five kids? 
 
At some point they told us that since we’d only taken down four kids, they were 
giving our company missions because we were known for not hitting civilians.  There 
was one operation, Calm Waters, it lasted two and a half weeks and the whole brigade 
went into Balata.  We took down a lot of civilians.  An old man and four children 
were killed in Balata because they were in a battle zone. 
 
(5). Israeli Soldier E: ‘You want to kill him but he’s crying’.60 
 




Once we did an arrest.  They were throwing stones at Gross Square, so we were 
alerted and this boy suddenly appeared, so the lookout got on the radio and told us to 
stop, he was right near us. 
 
How old was the boy? 
 
Fifteen years old, called Daoud.  So we arrested him.  Stopped our vehicle, ran after 
him, and he was in total shock.  We took him to Gross, to the Jewish side and he 
began to cry, scream, all sweaty and crying.  Suddenly you’ve got a weeping kid on 
your hands who only a second ago at Gross hade been throwing tiles, and you’re 
dying to beat him to a pulp.  You want to kill him but he’s crying. 
 
What do you mean? Why? 
 
Because at some point they turn into such worms.  I remember we just hated them.  I 
was such a racist there, as well.  I was so angry at them for their filth, their misery.  
You threw a stone, why did you do it? Why do I have to be here and you here, don’t 
60 Breaking the Silence, ibid., p. 45 
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do this.  Eventually we untied his hands because he cried and begged.  You just don’t 




It is dangerous to draw conclusions from a limited pool of soldiers’ experiences, 
particularly those who are deployed in stressful situations about which they have had 
no formal training.  In short, the Israeli Army, similar to the experience of the UK 
Army has no formal training to deal with child engagement as has already been made 
the subject of comment.  Well trained and professional both may be; but training in 
the context of counterinsurgency is specialised, whilst engaging with children as part 
of a counterinsurgency calls for even greater specialisation.  It may even be argued 
that it should not be regarded as an insurgency at all. 
 
It is suggested that the latter observation in the context of the 2 Intifada uprisings is a 
mistake, since as we have seen, those orchestrating the intifada use children as what 
may be regarded as a weapon of choice.  It is suggested that the great strength of child 
usage lies not only in their propaganda value:  stone throwing children attempting, 
and in many instances as we have seen, succeeding in provoking a reaction on the part 
of well armed and professional forces; but also in the fact that children are rooted in 
the civilian population.  The civilian population has been described as ‘… the centre 
of gravity – the deciding factor in the struggle.’61  Indeed, killing the civilian is no 
longer just a feature of collateral damage and the harm caused cannot be easily 
dismissed as ‘unintended since civilian casualties tangibly undermine the goal’s of the 
counterinsurgent.  If this is the case in the general sense, the point is all the greater 
when it comes to dealing with and killing children as the case examples have shown. 
 
I also acknowledge another difficulty in drawing conclusions from the pool of 
interviewees summarised in this Chapter.  This arises from the nature of the 
organisation which is responsible for compiling them: B’Tselem.  The organisation 
points out that the testimonies depict the influence that the Israeli forces have on the 
lives of the Palestinian people in the Territories.  Israel portrays the occupation as ‘a 
61 See ‘Securing the Civilian’, US Army, Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual No. 3-24; 
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5. U.of Chicago Press, 2007, p. xxv  
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justifiable defensive measure’, and any harm sustained by people living under the 
occupation is considered reasonable and proportionate.62  It is, of course, difficult to 
see how such a conclusion may be supported given the examples; yet this is the 
governments’ stated position.  It is a matter of individual judgment, however, as to 
how successful or unsuccessful it has been throughout Intifada 1 and Intifada 2, yet 
the government have pointed out that the organisation was formed from a group of 
academics who originated from the Meretz and Labor Parties and is little more than a 
propaganda tool for the enemies of Israel.63  The point is also made that B’Tselem 
receives funding from overseas sources (amongst others, the EU to the extent of 
$135,000 per annum) and religious groups such as Christian Aid on the UK and 
Diakonia in Sweden.  It has also been criticised for numerous misrepresentations in 
International Law, inaccurate research and consistent underestimates of the threat that 
faces Israel and her ultimate survival from such threats. 
 
Those qualifications being made, for the purposes of this Chapter the interviews do 
provide support for the proposition that the use of children does have a significant 
effect on the occupation, even when pursuing what might be thought of as a minor 
stone throwing role, when brought to bear against regular forces in the glare of 
international media.  The following matters should also be taken into account: - 
 
 (i). The testimonies provide evidence of war crimes being perpetrated by 
 occupying forces against the Palestinian population.  The targeting of children 
 in pursuit of a military operation is nothing new.  Indeed, prior to the My Lai 
 massacre on the 16th March 1968 when 105 US soldiers entered the small 
 village  of Son My thought to be an enemy base under the command of a Lt. 
 Calley.  A Col. Henderson at a pre operation briefing taunted the officers for 
 their  lack of aggression and which  enabled women and children or other VC 
 soldiers to escape.’   Men left the briefing  feeling resentful and furious.  
 This had the effect of  soldiers ‘… talking about killing everything that 
 moved’.64  Is this so very different in kind to the example of Soldier (3) 
 above where soldiers are ‘taunted’ into behaving aggressively? The 
62 Breaking the Silence, op cit., p. 207 
63 www.ngo-monitor.org 
64 J. Bourke, op cit., p. 174 
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 consequences of My Lai irretrievably tarnished the reputation of the US in 
 Vietnam in the world  media; cannot the same be said in respect of Israel and 
 her approach in the Occupied Territories?  How can Israel ever hope to 
 continue to subjugate these areas with such an approach? 
 
 (ii). It is well recognised that one of the tools required to quell and/or defeat an 
 insurgency is an ability to influence recruitment or what is sometimes termed 
 ‘regenerative decay’.65  Put another way: an attempt to kill the recruitment 
 base of the insurgency by putting their political goals in a disadvantageous 
 light so they become less attractive to join.  One may ask how the IDF intend 
 to fulfil such an objective given the examples of Soldiers (2) – (5)?  It may 
 well be argued that such an approach is more likely to achieve the opposite, 
 and to widen the recruitment base which, as we have seen, is already plentiful 
 in terms of youth. 
 
 (iii). It is perhaps unhelpful to be over critical of the approach of the IDF in 
 the Occupied Territories without acknowledging that the IDF is effecting the 
 political will of a democratically elected government.  The occupation is a 
 political fact and it is manifestly not the fault of the IDF trained to fight 
 conventional wars against a conventional enemy that it is now called upon to 
 deal with subjugating a hostile population which has chosen to fight in the 
 manner described.  How the strategic position came to develop in this manner, 
 and what can be done to alleviate it are ultimately political questions, not 
 military ones. 
 
 (iv). It may be the case that where a political solution is obscure or otherwise 
 intractable, and a resort to military force is dictated, the use of overwhelming 
 force in order to crush resistance is either dictated or it becomes a solution to 
 which the military will gravitate.  In other words ‘realpolitik’ will dominate 
 over moral or other considerations.  It is suggested that this is the only 
 explanation for the approach of the IDF in the occupied territories exemplified 
 by the examples in this Chapter. 
65 C. Crouch, Managing Terrorism and Insurgency, Regeneration, recruitment and attrition, Routledge, 
2010, p.15 
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There is little doubt that the use of children in the context of the Palestinian problem 
and in latter years has been exemplified by the use of children and young people as 
one of its central tenets.  Children are plentiful, have allegiance to a cause and have 
shown themselves willing to risk themselves in battle in pursuit of that cause.  This 
has been the position historically and in the two uprisings of recent years. 
 
It cannot be suggested that the employment of such methods are capable of 
confronting, and still less defeating, a professional army in the conventional sense, 
and this has proved to be the case in other historical examples where children have 
been employed and which have been analysed in this thesis.  However, to regard the 
relevance of their deployment in terms of their ability to overcome professional 
armies is to miss the essential point.  Their purpose is to serve a political message and 
to create a media frenzy which is essentially borne of their own weakness and 
vulnerability.  Given the power of modern media communication: the point which 
arises from their message becomes all the stronger and the more compelling. 
 
What is all the more remarkable, it is suggested, is that the extensive deployment of 
children occurs notwithstanding an international and legal framework preventing their 
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CHAPTER 7:  THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD AND THE CHILD: 
TOWARDS A CONCLUSION. 
 
 
Child Soldiers: Enduring Problem or Historical Anachronism? 
 Hypothesis (i).1 
 
 
The Coalition to Stop Child Soldiers recently published a paper calling for the UK to 
raise the age of recruitment from the present 16 to 18 upon the ground that to so 
recruit is, as they describe it, ‘out of date’ in the context of the modern world.2  In the 
same week The Sunday Times published an article proclaiming the success of a 
Pakistani Army project to save what are referred to as ‘Pakistan’s brainwashed child 
jihadists’ and praising such efforts as ‘…achieving astonishing results.’3  The 2 
positions are illuminating since both speak to opposing sides of the same problem.  
Whilst both may agree that the recruitment of young people under the age of 18 is, in 
their eyes a scourge to be confronted, the basis upon which recruitment takes place 
and the means by which purported eradication is to be achieved are different.  
 
The argument of the Coalition is contentious.  It is suggested that from an academic 
perspective young people are more susceptible to bullying and harassment and, 
contrary to the views of the UK Government, far from providing children with 
educational opportunities they would not otherwise have; education is in fact set back, 
young people are exposed to a variety of social problems of a kind already identified 
as well as to other social disadvantages.  Of course the education of disadvantaged 
young people by the British Army has a long history.  In 1795 for example some 1400 
children whose soldier fathers had died in military service or were posted abroad and 
were found begging on the streets in Dublin.  The Hibernian Society, a philanthropic 
1 ‘That the use of children has been the subject of increase within the third world and within terrorist 
and armed groups.  Children are plentiful, easily indoctrinated and offer unquestioning obedience to 
their recruiters, whilst history demonstrates that they are potentially ruthless adversaries.  The targeting 
of children by regular forces has the potential to create damaging political fallout, particularly in a 
world of mass communication.’  (See Ch. 2). 
2 ‘Child Soldiers International’, Press release ‘One Step Forward’ 24th April 2013 and featured in an 
article on the ‘Today’ Programme, BBC Radio 4, 23rd April 2013. See also www.child-soldiers.org.  It 
is pointed out that the UK government spends £94 million per annum on training programmes in 
respect of 2700 personnel who are under age as a means to replace those who leave the armed forces 
every year and estimated to be 22,000 persons. 
3 C. Lamb, ‘100% pass rate at Boy Bomber Reform School’, The Sunday Times, 28th April 2013. 
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organisation, founded the Hibernian Asylum in Phoenix Park and which was later to 
become The Royal Hibernian Military School, the purpose of which was to provide 
shelter and education to the orphaned children of serving soldiers.   In London the 
Royal Military Asylum was established in 1892 and which was later to become The 
Duke of York’s’ Royal Military School, Dover and which was to merge in 1922 with 
The Royal Hibernian School.4  It is probably right to record that teaching standards 
were not high and NCOs not of the brightest,5 but at least it was better than the 
alternative 
 
Whatever the validity of such a contention may be, the Coalition opinion addresses a 
nation that has a formal legal recruitment structure set within a legal framework and, 
therefore, a policy which is capable of modification.  When it comes to ‘jihadists’ or 
those bodies who may have a terrorist dimension; the issue of legal niceties are likely 
to have little relevance. 
 
As to the Pakistani example, it is argued that the faltering education system 
throughout Pakistan is the major factor in the issue of recruitment by the Taliban.  The 
message is simple, ‘…the children (8-15) are dangerous but brainwashed.  They are 
told that their lives are meaningless and are promised a life in heaven and 72 virgins.  
A camp in Waziristan even had a ‘fake heaven’ – a cave plastered with heavenly 
scenes where would-be suicide bombers were well treated for a week.  Those who 
refused (to cooperate) were slaughtered.’  Many come from families of similarly 
deprived children: deprived of education, life chances and a lack of opportunity, 
whereas the Taliban offer a purpose, excitement and a religious education of sorts, 
albeit to Western eyes, of the wrong kind.  It may be an uncomfortable conclusion, 
but the historical parallel with the British case and how deprived children were 
assisted is all too stark notwithstanding the distinction that in the British case the 
intention was to assist such children, whilst in the Taliban example the intention to 
recruit for the purposes of suicide is surely a malign exercise. 
 
4 R. Holmes, Soldiers, Army Lives and Loyalties from Redcoats to Dusty Warriors, Harper Press, 
London, 2011, p.275. 
5 R. Holmes, ibid., p. 276. 
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It is suggested that to assert that the recruitment of young people is ‘… out of date’ is 
not only a sweeping statement, but it is also one that does not address the realities of 
the modern world and fails to appreciate why children are recruited in the first place.  
In terms of strict numbers the same Coalition report that as recently as 2008 the 
military recruitment of children ‘still takes place in one form or another in at least 86 
countries world wide.’6  Burma (Myanmar) is stated to be the largest state recruiter, 
although subject to various conditions persons under the age of 18 may enlist in a 
number of countries in the West including the US and the UK. 
 
Whether child recruitment can be said to be ‘the subject of increase’ is a rather more 
difficult issue.  It has been powerfully argued that ‘…it is quite ludicrous to talk about 
child soldiering as an ‘epidemic’ on the basis of speculative UN figures indicating 
that the world’s military arena contains 250,000 such combatants and support 
personnel under the age of 18,’ since in most places other than sub-Saharan Africa the 
number of child soldiers is indeed in decline.  This suggestion accords with recent UN 
figures that the incidence is in decline.7  That being noted it remains the case that 
Africa is still considered to be the epicentre of the phenomenon, with the areas of 
deployment reading like a master list of the worst zones of violence8  Honwana 
speaks of a ‘…massive instrumentalization of children in combat …,’9  and ‘…of a 
widening scale and deepening intensity of the participation of children in conflict 
…’10.  Upon this basis the fact that children have been the subject of deployment in 
the third world is well demonstrated.  What is more complex is to estimate the future 
increase of such deployment. 
 
In some ways I question the value of examining the problem as to prevalence and 
increase from the perspective of a numbers issue.  Whilst the numbers game is of 
importance, it is easy to place too much reliance upon them at any one point.  Of 
greater significance is to consider the political contexts of nations and areas of the 
world in which the circumstances exist in order to make the use of children in conflict 
6 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008 12 (2008). 
7 E. Ben-Ari, Facing Child Soldiers, Unpublished Paper, 2009, p. 2. 
8 P. Singer, op cit., p. 19. 
9 A. Honwana, op cit., p. 30. 
10 A. Honwana, ibid., p. 31. 
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more likely.   By this method it may be easier to estimate whether the use of children 
is likely to be the subject of increase or not. 
 
Following the end of the Cold War the concerns of the international community 
shifted from the fear of interstate warfare to that of intrastate conflict.  The decline of 
a bi polar world dominated by 2 superpowers and which maintained territorial 
cohesion, particularly in the Eastern Bloc, gave way to a series of regional rivalries 
and the rise of rogue states which threatened regional stability, global travel and 
communications.11  For the first time the human cost of failed and failing states 
became evident and which manifested itself in the form of refugee flows, civilian 
suffering and the displacement of political conflict across borders became all too 
evident.  It is this context which set the scene for the recruitment of children in all its 
various forms.  Somalia is a particular example.  Since the 11th September attacks, 
Somalia has attracted scrutiny in the study of terrorism since conventional wisdom 
dictates that such nations provide safe havens for terrorists given its lawless 
environment.  Other nations such as Pakistan, Yemen12, Kenya, the Philippines, 
Guinea and Indonesia are similar.  It has been pointed out that in general terrorist 
networks flourish better in poorly governed states than in those which are not 
governed at all.13 
 
The somewhat depressing conclusion is that the political context described above is 
one that is likely to remain and develop.  Internal conflict in the developing world has 
become increasingly bloody and which is marked by a fading distinction between 
combatant and non combatant, conflicts which are spurred by environmental and 
demographic pressures, arguments over natural resources and water rights in 
particular,14 expanded populations and a lack of economic opportunity all of which in 
themselves fuel political tensions erupting in sustained conflict.  The example of 
Charles Taylor in Liberia is a case in point whereby he was able to establish effective 
11 T. Hoyt, ‘Security and Conflict in the Developing World’, in Grave New World, op cit., Ch. 10,  p. 
217. 
12 See S. Phillips, Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, IISS, 2011, esp. the insurgency being 
led by the al-Houthi family and their supporters ‘The Believing Youth’ (Shabaab al-Mu’mimineen), pp. 
27-29. 
13 K. Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism, IISS Adelphi Paper 364, 2004, p. 
71. 
14 See P. Le Billon, Fuelling War: Natural Resources and armed conflict,  IISS Adelphi Paper 373, 
2005, esp. Ch. 2, pp.38-48. 
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control over ‘Greater Liberia’ and controlled lucrative resource sectors of the 
economy and smuggled them out of the country through Cote d’Ivoire.  As part of his 
network of control, Taylor was able to utilise children recruited into the military under 
his command and employ their services effectively. 
 
If this political position is likely to continue, and children are likely to be employed as 
an integral part of it, it is difficult to identify a strategy to counter such use other than 
to discover a political solution in each case: a point easier stated than affected.  We 
have seen that quite apart from the utility of children as soldiers in the strict sense, 
their use has been effectively employed against regular forces in order to create 
damaging political fallout.15  In the Israeli experience the use of a child was a central 
part of Palestinian thinking in their opposition to Israeli occupation.  The more 
modern and current example of the Syrian uprising is a further case in point.  As a 
central focus to the growing opposition to the Assad regime and motivated by the 
same set of economic, social and political grievances that drove recent Arab uprisings, 
ideological and organisational coherence was provided by groups of youth activists to 
which the professional middle class, urban and rural workers were to ally 
themselves.16 
 
It would be a happy conclusion in many ways to regard the long history of employing 
young people to fight adult wars as anachronistic and to believe that the world has 
moved towards more civilised and enlightened times.  The reality is different.  
Different kinds of conflict are emerging.  Children are seen as having a special utility 
in such conflicts in a variety of roles and their use is widespread in both a numeric 
and geographic sense.  It is rather difficult to see how such a manifestation can be 
described, as the Coalition has termed it, as being ‘out of date’: on the contrary, it is 





15 See Ch. 6, Engaging with Children – The Israeli Experience. 
16 E. Hokayem, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant, IISS, Routledge, 2013, Ch. 3, The 
Rise of the Opposition, p. 69. 
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Child Soldiers: Utility in Post modern Conflict?  
Hypothesis (ii)17 
 
One of the most important debates in strategic studies and defence policy since the 
end of the Cold War has been whether a Revolution in Military Affairs is underway 
and, if so, what its implications are for the future of warfare.18 Military affairs, by 
their nature, are the subject of continuous evolution rather than revolution and too 
often in the past have commentators referred to changes in the strategic landscape as 
being ‘revolutionary’ when they are, in essence, ‘evolutionary’.  Much of the debate 
had revolved around what is perceived to be the great success of American military 
technology, particularly in the 1990-91 Gulf War.19  The continuation of the argument 
moves to a prediction that digitised forces will be linked through a computerised 
network to sources of information and to distant fire support.  Singer has pointed out 
that the rise of the computer age and of what is termed ‘robotic’ warfare which 
accompanies the rise of globalization in the twenty first century is calling into 
question the professional identity of the soldier as we now regard him.  The military 
profession developed with the rise of the nation state in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, yet with the challenges presented by globalization in the twenty first, the 
ideas of a uniformed military and the nation state itself are transforming.20  
Governments lose control over financial markets and trade and security threats range 
from terrorists to rogue states to infectious diseases.  The problem of defining the 
future of war, its nature and scope represents a difficult question, with many seeing 
that future as consisting of not localized battles of asymmetry but transnational 
terrorist movements linking all these various conflicts together.21  This shift is 
concurrent with a decline of wars between states, the rise of wars within and the 
problem of separating belligerents, resettling refugees and providing security for 
17 That child soldiers have an increasing utility in post modern conflict within the context of 
asymmetric warfare, and in particular, militant Islam.  Weaponry is rugged, cheap and plentiful, whilst 
conflicts around the world are characterized not as temporary outbreaks of instability but rather as 
protracted states of disorder.  Singer points out that these trends coupled with the socioeconomic 
dislocation of children and changes in the modern battlefield are necessary factors in the emergence of 
the child soldier as a global phenomenon.  (See Ch. 2). 
18 T. Benbow, op cit., p. 9. 
19 CSIS Study Group on Lessons Learned from the Gulf War Interim Report – The Gulf War: Military 
Lessons Learned (Washington, CSIS, 1991), p.11. 
20 P. Singer, Wired for War, The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century, Penguin, 2009, 
p. 362. 
21 P. Singer, ibid., p. 213. 
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humanitarian organizations which, whilst not entirely unknown, is very different from 
traditional demands hitherto asked of the military.22 
 
The emphasis here is, of course, the future, but there is strong evidence that 
transnational terrorist movements are in existence today.  There are international 
organisations dedicated the overthrow of Muslim regimes in the Middle East and 
elsewhere and the establishment of the Islamic state, the khilafah or caliphate.23 Al-
Jihad (Islamic Jihad) is an Egyptian Islamic group that originated in Muslim 
Brotherhood in the late 1970’s and whose aims were to overthrow the Egyptian 
government, an aim now achieved, and to attack American and Israeli targets in Egypt 
and abroad at a multi-national level.  In the 1980’s the group merged with the al-
Quaeda group inside Afghanistan and which was to develop as part of a network of 
groups in Pakistan, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Sudan and Yemen.24  It is 
acknowledged that these examples remain a very long way removed from the model 
envisaged by Singer.  Yet, the examples cited, although demonstrating significant 
local successes in recent years, remain fractured, are riven by internal disagreements 
and have faced overwhelming opposition in the West, still remain matters of concern 
because of their potential for growth and damage to Western interests in the future. 
 
The relevance for the future of child deployment is the existence of a collective 
willingness to use children in the furtherance of their objectives at many different 
levels.  The recent experience of the Finsbury Park Mosque is a case in point.  Young 
people were instructed that ‘God loves people who kill in His name’, and a recurrent 
theme was to the effect that there is no higher duty than to offer themselves (i.e. the 
young) for suicide missions.25  It is now well known that the influence of Abu Hamza 
and the Finsbury Park mosque had a global reach from his followers setting up a jihad 
training camp in Oregon in 1999, to the shoe bomber Richard Reid in Miami in 2001, 
to Guantanamo Bay where many Finsbury Park graduates became incarcerated, to 
Afghanistan and the deployment of young people and to Chechnya where money and 
personnel were sent to aid the Chechen fundamentalist mujahideen.  As of today 
Islamic Jihad in Palestine organise military-style training camps based in the Gaza 
22 See C. Moskos et al., op cit., Ch.1, p. 3. 
23 E. Husain, op cit., p. 76. 
24 F. Barnaby, The Future of Terror, Granta Books, London, 2007, p. 121. 
25 S. O’Neill & D. McCrory, op cit.,  pp. 89-90. 
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Strip in which boys aged from 6 to 16 receive religious and military training learning 
to use guns, dive under obstacles, flaming tyres and sandbags.26 
 
The relevance of this evidence for our subject lies with an irony.  In a technologically 
sophisticated world equipped with weapon systems capable of destroying the world in 
seconds and satellite surveillance apparatus without precedent, the least sophisticated 
amongst us, the child, emerges as an instrument of combat as a counterpoint to such 
developments.  There may be a number of reasons why this is so.  In the first place 
such employment represents nothing new; it follows the pattern of insurgency 
according to the old classical model: hitting an enemy when he is weak, evading the 
enemy when he is strong, taking the offensive when he falls back, circling around 
when he advances and using what forces are at the command of the insurgent; here 
children.27  Children are available and plentiful, and are willing to be used pursuant to 
an orchestrated plan.  In the second instance the power and sophistication of the 
Western militaries and the US in particular, cannot be matched by smaller states and 
certainly not by some terrorist group, even one with an international dimension.  In 
the event that they are to further their aims and ambitions it is necessary that they 
devise an alternative approach.  In this regard we have seen in the Palestinian case 
how a small group of suicide bombers can produce an enormous political impact with 
international repercussions against the Israeli state which is not only strong militarily 
but is also a major regional player.  In the third instance it may be argued that the 
willingness of rogue states and terrorist groups to employ children is in fact a new 
departure.  Terrorism, exploiting modern technology, computerisation and the power 
of modern transport and communication links, is truly universal and has relevance for 
all nations who may come within its purview and whose infrastructure may come 
under attack.  My own personal view is to regard the latter proposition as the 
preferred approach.  The world and the military endeavour are fast changing: to 
recruit, and deploy young people as part of a worldwide terrorist network linked 
together presents a threat which is not only unprecedented but is one in respect of 
which the West has yet to produce an answer.  It is this deployment which represents 
a true revolution in military affairs. 
 
26 The Daily Telegraph, Thursday, 13th June 2013 
27 R. Taber, The War of the Flea, Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice, Paladin, London, 1974, p. 27 
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The most likely form of future deployment or usage of the child soldier remains in the 
Third World and, as Martin Van Creveld points out; too many such countries continue 
to sink into hopeless poverty, confusion and despair of a kind that formed the 
background to genocide in Rwanda.  Many others, whilst more or less peaceful have 
the potential for ethno-religious conflict.  These factors drive mass immigration, and 
once arrived they are torn by the need for assimilation and the desire to maintain their 
own traditions in the face of discrimination.  Social tensions of the kind witnessed in 
the UK and other Western nations are the result and which have the potential to erupt 
into large scale violence.28 
 
Child Soldiers:  A real soldier would never shoot a child would he; after all a 
child is just a child?   
Hypothesis (iii)29 
 
During the middle of the nineteenth century medical science came to recognise that 
human beings developed psychological reactions to the experience of traumatic 
events, and which came to be later called ‘traumatic neuroses’.  Damage to the 
nervous system was first noticed in conjunction with the spread of railway travel, 
whereby persons so transported, including firemen and railway employees, were 
confined to a narrow space and discovered that they were at the mercy of events 
outside their control. A John Duchese came to investigate these manifestations in a 
seminal book entitled On the Railroads and Their Influence on the Health of 
Engineers and Firemen (1857), and in a later publication entitled The Influence of 
Railway Travel on Public Health (1882). 
28 M. Van Creveld, op cit., p. 308. 
29 British infantry when confronted with child soldiers are reported to experience greater psychological 
trauma than when faced with armed adults.  There may be a number of reasons why this may be so and 
which arise from a combination of practical, medical, anthropological, psychological and cultural 
reasons.  Most armed forces, including the British, base much of their experience on structures that 
have subsisted during the latter part of the 20th Century, and which has been termed ‘real soldiering’.  
When regular forces face a concurrent rise in the incidence of the child soldier and which runs contrary 
to the ethos of their own cultural perspectives and training, it is hardly surprising so the argument runs 
that an adverse psychological reaction results from a requirement to shoot children, notwithstanding 
that such a requirement results from an operational need.  Given the stress that the West places upon 
Human Rts. Considerations, how can infantry be taught to place the child soldier question, and more 
particularly the need to engage and where necessary shoot children, in the context of a relevant training 
programme consistent with international law and cultural considerations, if at all?  Does the child 
soldier matter to the ordinary soldier and should the threat such as it may exist be separately 
categorised to any other threat he may face?  Are current training regimes adequate, and is the threat 
such as I have defined the same overstated and does it matter to society as a whole? (See Ch. 2). 
 152 
                                                 
 As the world began to industrialise, pathogenic sources of mental disorder came to be 
recognised as a legitimate basis for compensation and the introduction of welfare 
systems to counteract such manifestations.  Although there was much disagreement 
within the medical profession about the aetiology of hysteria, and in particular 
whether it was a disease in its own right as opposed to what has been described as a 
cluster of subjective associations on the part of doctor and patient,30 there was 
agreement that emotional as well as physical symptoms were commonly associated 
with its diagnosis. 
 
With the advent of the Great War, and as early as December 1914 reports reached the 
War Office in London that large numbers of soldiers had to be evacuated and who 
were reported as suffering from ‘nervous and mental breakdown.’31  As to figures it 
was reported that those afflicted comprised 7-10% of officers and 3-4% of all ranks.  
This was concerning for two specific reasons.  In the first place it was unclear what 
was precisely wrong with those evacuated.  It must be remembered that there was no 
universal agreement as to what nervous disorder was, how it was manifest or how it 
could be treated.  In the second place, the numbers involved were significant and 
inevitably there was consternation as to how the war effort may come to be damaged 
in the event that the trend was allowed to develop unchecked. 
 
With these events the problems of what came to be called ‘shell shock’ started to be 
defined and addressed.  It had an inauspicious beginning. Amongst the High 
Command and Military Doctors in particular, there was what can only be described as 
prejudice against men who suffered with their ‘nerves’; and the all too prevalent view 
that such reactions were indistinguishable from cowardice and were punished as 
such.32  Doctors themselves found that they were under pressure to maintain troop 
supply and the strength of the frontline. 
 
As medical knowledge grew the military became more sympathetic to those who were 
liable to suffer. During the Second World War the problems of morale and the 
30 P. Leese, op cit., p.17. 
31 B. Shephard, op cit., p.21. 
32 C. Corns & J. Hughes-Wilson, Blindfold and Alone, British Military Executions in the Great War, 
Cassell, London, 2005, esp. Ch. 13, Cowardice and the Battle of the Somme, pp. 188-207. 
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contribution which psychiatry could make to minimising desertion and breakdown, 
aiding morale and designing training regimes to assist came to be recognised.  An 
investigation by a Lt. Col. Penton observed: - 
 ‘… the infantry required a better standard of man than technical arms: the 
 stress they meet in battle is greater, the conditions are worse; the tasks that fall 
 to their lot - night patrols and work in extended order- call for a higher 
 standard of individual morale than is needed by those arms that always fight in 
 compact groups, and no other soldier is called upon so frequently to endure 
 prolonged and unrelieved stress under the worst physical conditions.’33 
 
It is not suggested that an engagement with a child at close quarters is necessarily 
going to produce a reaction akin to shell shock or what is more aptly termed ‘post 
traumatic stress disorder’ (PTSD) in more modern parlance, or is even likely to, but 
the question posed by the hypothesis is whether or not an adverse psychological 
reaction is possible in certain instances, perhaps depending upon the individual 
soldier. If the answer is in the affirmative, then does this become an issue about which 
the Army in general, and the infantry in particular, should be concerned about? Any 
soldier, whatever his training may consist of and whatever his experience may be is 
always prone to react badly to a battle experience.  A soldier is first a human being 
and is a soldier second.  Fear is a natural instinct and the control of fear is a function 
of training.34  Yet it should be remembered after all that the battlefield by definition is 
an ugly, dehumanising and inhospitable place which for most people who have not 
experienced its traumas, is unimaginable in terms of its horror and the production of 
distressing experiences which are capable of searing the consciousness of any human 
being. 
 
In Chapter 4 of this thesis it has been observed ‘…that some soldiers found it 
impossible to shoot youngsters,’ and has already been the subject of some discussion.  
This information, as previously stated, was sourced from recent work carried out by 
the late Richard Holmes in his examination of British soldiers recently returned from 
33 R. Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Army in the Second World War, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London, 1958, p. 205. 
34 J. Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, Granta Books, London, 1999, esp. Ch. 3, Training Men to 
Kill, pp. 69-138. 
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Iraq.35  It is difficult to assess whether this evidence is merely anecdotal or whether it 
has a broader basis in fact and is of general application.  However, the word 
‘impossible’ is used and is the subject of stress.  The author, a distinguished military 
historian in his own right, provides no details as to how he arrived at the conclusion 
he has, the number of soldiers he interviewed or the extent to which the opinion is 
contradicted by other soldiers who take a different stance. 
 
Having tested the proposition in Chapter 5 of this thesis by examining the testimonies 
of the US and UK soldiers I have interviewed, and having looked at the matter from 
the perspective of the Israeli experience in Chapter 6, I can see no basis for thinking 
that adverse psychological reactions will result from child engagement that from any 
other form of engagement.  A soldiers’ life is as important to him as to any other 
person and he is likely to preserve it accordingly.  The interviews I have conducted in 
the context of modern engagement, as indeed in the historical context of the Hitler 
Youth starkly demonstrate this view. 
 
Considering in a little more detail the interviews what can be deduced?  Of the 7 
soldiers interviewed in the US and UK examples, 2 had engaged children at short 
range: Soldier B36, and Soldier F37.  At a personal level Soldier B had no children of 
his own, whilst Soldier F had 2 boys and a girl.  Whilst the latter had formalised 
training on the subject of engaging children, and the UK soldier had no such training, 
the answers to the question of adverse psychological reaction are the same: Neither 
would feel worse about shooting a child.  The reasons are similar:  Soldier F considers 
that a ‘…threat is a threat’ whilst Soldier B considers that ‘… the safety of those 
under (his) command is more important than anyone else regardless of age.)  As a 
consequence of the experience, neither feels worse from having shot a child.  It is also 
noted that the age of the children concerned are similar: about 14. 
 
Other comments are varied.  Most of those interviewed view a threat as a threat 
irrespective of the form that threat may take (Soldiers A, C, D, E G).  There is 
disagreement as to the view that a child presents as a greater incipient threat than an 
35 R. Holmes, op cit., p. 317. 
36 UK Sgt. Queen’s Royal Hussars, 26 years experience.  Child engagement in Iraq (Appendix F(ii)). 
37 US Lt. Seal Team 8, 16 years experience.  Child engagement in Iraq (Appendix F(vi)). 
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adult as is contended in some of the literature,38 and disagreement as to whether a 
soldier would feel worse about shooting a child as opposed to an adult.  It is suggested 
that these latter two matters are matters of subjective opinion. 
 
When these findings are compared with the Israeli example, the point is reinforced as 
to the absence of psychological reaction.  I had access to five interviews.  In no case 
was it ever reported that the soldiers concerned in their dealings with the young 
people concerned had any qualms about either the nature of their engagement or the 
manner in which children were treated by them.  Indeed the only matter of remark is 
how brutal the treatment of children was by the soldiers tasked to deal with them. 
Take for example Israeli Soldier C.39 A group of soldiers of which he was part were 
dealing with a retarded boy of 16 who was throwing stones.  The deputy company 
commander threatened both the boy and members of his family with the utterance: 
‘The next time I see him, I don’t care whether he throws a stone or not, I’m going to 
kill him.’  This, apparently, was a reaction by a deputy commander to a boy using 
non-lethal force.   
 
Israeli Soldier E40 remarked in 2009 that he arrested a boy 15 years of age.  The boy 
had been throwing roof tiles at soldiers.  The boy started to cry.  The soldier reports 
that he (the soldier) wanted to kill him (the boy).  He was asked to explain, and the 
soldier reports that they (the soldiers) just hated the boys: ‘… they turn into such 
worms.  I was angry at them for their filth and their misery…’ 
 
Taking these two isolated examples, and the five summarised within Chapter 6, they 
provide some support for the assertion that Israeli soldiers have no special regard for 
the fact that their opposition is comprised of children.  In the above examples it 
appears they had rather more contempt for the children as a consequence of the fact 
that they were children rather than to have a sympathy for them because of age.  
Issues and arguments about morality are all very well but do they have a place on the 
battlefield?  As human beings we would like to think so viewing events from afar, but 
I doubt they hold very much sway in the heat of any engagement. 
 
39 Ch. 6, Israeli Soldier C, Lavi Battalion, Hebron District. 
40 Ch. 6, Israeli Soldier E, Nahal Brigade, Hebron District. 
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 In the historical examples of engagement with the Hitler Youth,41 many who 
encountered the Jugend regarded them with contempt.  Pte. Loffman for example 
describes them as ‘…little mongrels’; Pte. O’Sullivan reports his distaste for their 
‘ruthlessness and their attitude towards those in their charge,’ both soldiers 
commenting upon how the youths treated captive soldiers.  In no case throughout the 
six examples covered by this research did any soldier suggest that they had any 
compunction about engaging such young persons or had any adverse psychological 
reaction; however that may be defined, as a consequence.  Lt. Hibbert, who engaged a 
contingent of Hitler Youth outside Arnhem in 1944, is perhaps typical of all six when 
he states that they were regarded as much as a threat as with any other German unit, 
and if anything, the response was made all the stronger.  These historical examples in 
effect, mirror those more recent interviews and responses in more modern times. 
 
If this is the case, why then is it suggested that any soldier would think it wrong to 
shoot a child in these circumstances?  The following explanations may go some way 
to proffering an answer.  War is universally regarded as a destructive pursuit: It is 
destructive of lives and property; it is demanding of resources in both human and 
material terms; it is damaging to the social fabric of society, both nationally and 
internationally and the cost in human lives over the course of the twentieth century is 
incalculable.  As Liddell Hart once famously observed: ‘The only point in getting into 
a war in the first place is to obtain a better peace.’  It is not therefore surprising that 
the natural instinct of society is to protect itself, and the most vulnerable in it, from 
the influence of its throes.  The child is the most vulnerable of that society and is the 
very antithesis of the prosecution of war.  As Joanna Bourke has pointed out prior to 
the Great War: ‘By the 1870’s, the ideologies of separate spheres had firmly placed 
men and women within secure enclaves in which their roles were clearly 
acknowledged. The womanly woman was gentle, domesticated and virginal: the 
manly man was athletic, stoical and courageous’42  If this is the case in respect of men 
and women, the child was, and is regarded as weak, demanding of nurture and 
protection and innocent. 
41 Ch. 5. 
42 J. Bourke, Dismembering the Male, Men’s Bodies, Britain and the Great War, Reaktion Books, 
London, 1996, pp. 12-13. 
 157 
                                                 
   For most people, although perhaps not soldiers who encounter them in battle, to 
combine a child as part of a war fighting effort is offensive to their own conscience 
and sensibilities.  For that reason it is hardly surprising that they would be horror 
struck to think that a child could be shot in any circumstance even including the field 
of battle. 
 
Child Soldiers:  What, if anything needs to be done to meet the threat? 
Hypothesis (iv)43 
 
One of the main arguments of this thesis notwithstanding, namely that the use and 
deployment of Child Soldiers is a latter day and growing problem, in so far as UK 
forces are concerned it needs to be pointed out that any encounter with an armed child 
is likely to be rare.  In the UK case whilst there have been notable instances of 
encounters with armed children44 in global terms, such instances form very much the 
minority of child engagements across the globe. 
 
During the course of the interviews conducted for this thesis I have not encountered 
any UK soldier who has undertaken formalised training in order to deal with an 
encounter with a child soldier.  Furthermore, during the course of interviews at the 
UK Land Warfare Centre, Warminster45 it was clear that no formalised training 
regime was in existence or was contemplated.  Brigadier Le Grys46 explained that the 
army were at pains to explain to soldiers in general terms the political circumstances 
and strategic purpose behind any deployment prior to them deploying in order to aid 
understanding of the purpose behind any mission, but it is difficult to regard such 
training as pertinent to the specific issues which may arise from engaging children 
deployed by a determined enemy. 
43 It is suggested that the current training regimes in UK forces are inadequate to prepare service 
personnel who are likely to engage child soldiers.  It may equally be the case that the incidence of the 
child soldier is a fact of modern life on the modern battlefield, however it is defined, and no amount of 
training can alter that fact.  Adverse psychological reactions may well be a necessary by-product of 
modern conflict as they have in past conflicts, and child conflict, as this thesis defines it, is merely 
another example.  How have other nations organised their armed forces to cope with this 
manifestation?  As an example, Israel has altered its own ROE to deal with this issue, the upshot being 
that in the intifada more than 20% killed have been 17 and under. 
44 Operation Barras in Sierra Leone and Operation Southern Watch in Iraq by way of example. 
45 14th-15th March 2010. 
46 Interview 3rd September 2008. 
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 There may be a number of reasons why this is so.  It could be argued that in the event 
that such encounters are rare, then if would be wasteful of time and resources to train 
men for such a rarity.  Further, it may be the case as argued by Brigadier Meyer47 that 
the current rules of engagement are sufficient to deal with any eventuality that may 
arise.  In the event that a soldier comes under fire in circumstances where his own life 
is threatened, then that soldier may respond utilising lethal force.  Such rules 
encompass any situation and are without distinction as to whether the threat emanates 
from a child or anyone else.  It must be said that this opinion is concurrent with the 
interviews conducted for this thesis whereby it is concluded that a soldier is 
understandably protective of his own life irrespective of the threat and its source.  
Why then single out children as a special entity deserving of special treatment?  
Further it should be asked what form of training could be devised to meet the needs of 
this particular case? 
 
In respect of interviews conducted for this thesis, no UK soldier spoke of being 
involved in any formalised training programme (Soldiers A, B, and C) or indeed of 
being aware of the existence of any such programme.  This conclusion is, however, in 
contra-distinction to the position that pertained in the US.  Here, Soldiers D and F had 
taken part in formalised training whilst Soldier G was aware of the existence of such a 
programme although had not taken part therein. 
 
What conclusions are to be drawn?  It is perhaps trite to observe that the experience of 
the US military which has a truly global reach and involvement is more likely to have 
encountered child soldiers than in the UK example.  It must therefore follow that it is 
more pertinent for the US to devise specific training schemes as a consequence than 
their UK counterparts.  Given the UK position and the rarity of such conflicts it would 
be difficult to justify the expenditure of scarce resources on schemes which are 
unlikely to have relevance for the vast majority of UK soldiers; not from the point of 
view that they would not encounter them, but more from the perspective that it would 
make no difference to their existing approach. 
 
47 Interview 29th October 2008 
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This view may be fortified by the Israeli experience. As has already been noted, no 
specific training programmes are dedicated to this issue,48 yet numerous examples 
have been cited of child engagement.49  It is clear that the nature of the Palestinian 
disturbances in the Occupied Territories provide extensive opportunities for Israeli 
soldiers to encounter children, but, as has been seen, it makes no practical difference 
to the manner in which her soldiers conduct themselves.  Indeed the only ostensible 
alteration in the Israeli position is from the point of view of altering their own ROE in 
order to permit, not prevent, child engagement of those under the age of 18 
 
When the problem of child soldiers and their encounters with regular forces is 
considered there is a tendency to look at the matter from the perspective of how 
global civil society and UN agencies describe and approach children so engaged as 
vulnerable victims bereft of agency.50  Carpenter is critical for the fact that 
Transnational networks place ‘complex events into a simplistic frame that will capture 
the attention of a Western audience often ignorant and apathetic to world affairs’.51  
The motivation behind this approach is to create sympathy, funding and to underpin 
political will as a basis for multilateral intervention.52  Perhaps this should be a 
warning that considering children from the perspective of vulnerability and sympathy 
risks, from the perspective of the Armed Forces, misunderstanding as to the nature of 









48 Interview with Yossi Mecklenberg on the 15th December 2012 at Regents Park College 
49 Ch. 6. 
50 M. Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy, Oxford UP, 2012, p. 36. 
51 C. Carpenter, ‘Women, Children and Other Vulnerable Groups’, Gender, Strategic Frames and the 
Protection of Civilians as a Transnational Issue, 49 Int’l Studies, Q. 295, 316 (2005). 
52See, A, Veale, The Criminal Responsibility of Former Child Soldiers: Contributions from 
Psychology, in International Criminal Accountability and the Rights of Children, eds. K. Arts & V. 
Popovski, 2006. p. 97. 
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 Child Soldiers: Is it time to regard the law as ineffective? 
Hypothesis (v)53 
 
‘Once it was believed that when the cannons roar, the laws are silent’.54  We now 
know that the number of international legal norms and conventions are substantial and 
no more so than when it comes to considering the curiosity, as many would regard it, 
of the child in battle. The law by its very nature is conservative and slow moving. The 
modern debate in jurisprudence is very much orientated around the application of a 
set of rules and norms to a fast changing and complex set of structures at both a 
national and international level. 
 
At its most basic, the modern law is presaged upon the international state system.  For 
example, all states are required to refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state.55 Yet, as we have already seen the nature of warfare is changing.  Mary Kaldor 
has drawn a distinction between what se describes as ‘new wars’ and ‘old wars’.56  
New wars are considered to be anarchic and invariably arise from state breakdown or 
the disintegration of state institutions.  They are, therefore, more likely to occur within 
a state than between states.  The law of armed conflict may apply to such a situation 
but the body of law that applies is less detailed and very much depends upon the 
53 International law, domestic law and international convention have little or no utility in dealing with 
the issue of child soldiers.  Why is this so?  The use of children in warfare has long been outlawed, yet 
the numbers employed in combat continue to grow to the extent that child soldiers are present in every 
conflict zone US forces operate in.  It is suggested that the political demands of certain states, groups 
and causes outweigh moral imperatives and international convention. Children are above all effective, 
even when utilised unknowingly as is the case in Afghanistan where children are regularly employed to 
plant improvised explosive devices and in the context of the child suicide bomber.  Is the UK obliged 
to recognise that, in effect, law and convention do not really matter to the issue of the safety of her 
soldiers and to operational requirements? The imperatives of the battlefield, as in past conflicts, take 
precedence over the niceties of the law, but what political fallout may result and with what 
consequence? Within the context of the West, it may be argued that inevitable tensions arise from 
training and education based upon respect for law, convention and ethical considerations when set 
against a foe that has no respect for such matters and is willing to use any method, including the use of 
children  to achieve a defined end in battle. 
54 Y. Dinstein, op cit., p.1. 
55 Charter of the United Nations 1945 (UN Charter) Art. 2, para.4. 
56 M. Kaldor, New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Cambridge Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 1999. 
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prevailing circumstances57.  Whilst customary law may apply, internal disturbances 
and tensions may not amount to armed conflict.  It is in this context that children have 
featured as integral dimensions to such conflicts. 
 
In specific terms, however, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child which 
establishes a definition of a child as ‘…any person under the age of 18, unless under 
the law applicable to the child the age of majority is attained earlier’,58 is one of the 
most broadly ratified treatise of all time.59  Perhaps one would be forgiven for 
thinking that this is a consequence of the fact that there is widespread agreement as to 
its aims and principles.  It is the contention of this thesis that this is, in fact, a 
misconception and there are many difficulties in the universal application of such a 
treaty. 
 
The basis and starting point of the Convention is the intention of promoting the best 
interests of the child,60 and not what necessarily conforms with social norms in a 
given country or set of circumstances.  One may ask, is this a realistic position and 
one that is capable of being applied as a working definition across all nations, let 
alone all conflicts.  Further, is it realistic to regard the end of childhood and the 
commencement of adulthood at a particular age, here 18?  It has been pointed out that 
utilising age markers conflicts awkwardly with demographic realities.  In many Third 
World countries children comprise half of the population and in societies racked by 
conflict the percentage may be even higher.61  Is it not therefore reasonable to assume, 
whatever the provisions of the law are concerned, that a substantial proportion of 
young people under the age of 18 are likely to join or be co-opted into a military role 
by force of circumstances and as a consequence of the fact that they form the 
majority? 
 
57 The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, UK Ministry of Defence, Oxford UP., Internal Armed 
Conflicts, p.31. 
58 G.A. Res. 44/25, Art.1, Annex, UN Doc.A/RES/44/25 (20th November 1989)(came into force 2nd 
September 1990). 
59 Not ratified by the US or Somalia. 
60 Art. 3(1). 
61 M. Drumbl, op cit.  The illustration is given that in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 47.1% of 
the population is under 18 (2005 data) whilst in Uganda the figure is 50.5% (2005 data).  Life 
expectancy in Sierra Leone is reported as 33 years for men and 35 years for women. 
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The reason why the age of 18 is adopted is because it sets out a divide between the 
adult and the child.  Whilst this may be understandable in a Western context, is it so 
in developing nations and those the subject of conflict?  Put another way, childhood in 
such societies is not susceptible to such a rigid divide.  Cognitive abilities, rites of 
passage, abilities to serve in the labour force or participation in conflict are factors 
which are heavily contextualised and which are not reflected by the law as it is 
presently drafted.  Even in advanced Western societies neurobiological functions 
continue to develop beyond the age of 18 and as a commentary is well established and 
well known.  Further the various categories of child, adolescent, youth and adult are 
what has been described as ‘porous’,62 and are particularly so during conflict.  There 
is little doubt that ‘legal imagination’ feels comfortable with the categorisation of 
people as adult or child.  It is simple to understand, easy to apply and removes many 
of the difficulties of contemplating cognitive abilities upon which age may have a 
bearing.  The more relevant question is to ask whether or not it is appropriate in 
consideration of child soldiers and those who make up their numbers in an 
international setting? I consider that the answer is ‘probably not’.  It may be argued 
that this is the best that can be devised in the circumstances, to which I would respond 
that to devise a legal scheme which is either too generalised or misapplied is 
potentially worse than to have no system at all, and which potentially brings about 
injustice. 
 
Other legal difficulties may also arise in the application of the law to children.  It is 
well established that International Courts charged with considering war crimes have 
set their face against permitting the defence of duress to be raised.63  In UK domestic 
law the same principle applies to a child charged with murder and attempted murder, 
however susceptible the child may be to duress.64  Is this a realistic position, however, 
which inflates childhood to cover all fighters under the age of 18 at which point 
adulthood begins.  It may be argued that international law and UK domestic law are 
congruent, yet whilst domestic law restricts the defence of duress in murder and 
attempted murder cases as a function of public policy; it is surely inapposite to apply 
62 M. Drumbl, ibid., p. 48. 
63 See for e.g. Prosecutor v Erdemovic Case No. IT-96-22-A; Appeals Judgment (ICTY Appeals 
Chamber, 7th October 1997).  For a statement of the modern law of duress as a defence:  see Archbold 
Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 2013, para. 17-119, p. 1892. 
64 R v Wilson [2007] 2 Cr. App. R. 31 CA. 
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the same principle to the context of warfare and armed conflict. In fact a curious 
dichotomy arises as between the law which is designed to protect children from 
involvement in armed conflict by making it a war crime to so recruit them; and the 
practice to deny a common defence to a child who may have been the subject of 
duress in and about his of her recruitment and what that child is required to do by 
those who seek to recruit them.  Indeed it is often argued that children are forcibly 
recruited, and to save their own lives simply comply with recruitment demands even 
to the extent of participation in atrocities. 
 
The modern law proceeds upon the footing that children do not know the nature of 
their acts and are persons who require protection.  Historically under UK law a child 
aged between 10 and 14 years was incapable of committing an offence upon the 
presumption of doli incapax now abolished.  Modern research is now questioning this 
basic premise.  In a recent study by UNICEF65 young persons who had been involved 
in conflict were asked about their knowledge of the laws of war and matters relating 
to human rights.  Many had an understanding of the basic ideas of what laws were 
attempting to achieve.  Many had demonstrated an ability to act with restraint in 
stressful circumstances, and were aware when they may have acted in cruel fashion as 
opposed to what may be regarded as a more dignified and appropriate response. 
 
If this research is correct and is considered alongside deficiencies in the law as 
presently constituted perhaps it is time to question the utility of the law as it seeks to 
prevent the recruitment of children.  In the first place, by superimposing the rigid 
divide between adult and child the law risks becoming a cumbersome and blunt 
instrument ill-tuned to dealing with the practical exigencies that pertain; and in the 
second it is based upon presumptions about children which may prove to be false. 
 
Law by its nature is not static, but is a constantly evolving structure that moves to deal 
with force of circumstances.  In recent years 2 major pieces of international principle 
which have sought to refine and re-target the fight against child recruitment.66  Firstly 
65 UNICEF, Adult Wars, Child Soldiers: Voices of Children in Armed Conflict in the East Asia and 
Pacific Region 19 (2002). 
66 That is to say the instruments are not binding law. 
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the Cape Town Principles and Best Practices in 1997,67 and secondly the Paris 
Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or 
Armed Groups in 2007.68 The purpose behind these documents is to redraw the 
definition of who is considered a soldier to cover children who do not carry weapons 
at all yet who are involved indirectly in conflict, such as auxiliary activities of those 
forced into sexual servitude.  The latter category is to encompass girls,69 whilst 
attempting to move the definition from state militaries in the official sense to armed 
groupings which may include protest movements, and insurgent actors. 
 
It does not necessarily follow that the attempt to widen the definition is workable at a 
practical level.  Drumbl suggest that to include such a broad range of activities in one 
unitary protected category risks conduct of each child soldier as becoming 
confusingly analogized.70  The purpose behind any assessment of criminal 
responsibility is to assess role and ultimate criminality.  Is it to be suggested that there 
is no distinction between a child who is employed as a porter, and a child who is 
employed as a front line soldier?  It appears that in an attempt to devise a simple and 
single working definition important issues are made more complex by a principle 
designed to fit all circumstances.  Other difficulties arise from how the term ‘armed 
group’ is defined.  Is it a function of size or is it a function of how significant a threat 
it has become?  The law provides no coherent answers and does not appear to cover 
drug cartels.  Further, the law does not distinguish between a criminal gang and an 
armed group intent on overthrowing an incumbent regime. 
 
There is little doubt that the practical effect of international law in preventing or 
circumscribing the use of child soldiers has a mixed and patchy history. Whilst 
nobody would decry the existence of the law and convention and would acknowledge 





67 www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape _Town_Principles (27th - 30th April 1997). 
68 www.child-soldiers.org/childsoldiers/Paris_Principles_March_2007. 
69 The definition that is adopted is thus: ‘children associated with armed forces or groups’. 
70 M. Drumbl. op cit., p. 43. 
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An Afterthought 
 
The themes explored in this thesis and their subjects are on one view, depressing.  
War and its practice are universally destructive.  Where the young are involved in the 
execution of war, and utilised to fulfil its aims in whatever capacity, mankind should 
take notice.  Many pay lip service to the need to create effective measures to prevent 
the recruitment of children; many are involved in continuing and promoting the 
practice for their own ends; many of which are malign ones. 
 
I have concluded that notwithstanding variations in numbers and recruitment, the 
incidence of the child soldier is likely to continue in various forms and to probably 
accelerate as intra-state conflict increases.  The practical means of confronting the 
problem is not obvious; there is no agreement upon legal definitions even leaving 
aside problems of enforcement, and there is evidence drawn from the experiences of 
the UK, the US and Israel that their soldiers will engage children where necessary in 
protection of their own lives and interests and will not flinch from so doing.  In other 
words to engage a person irrespective of the age or sex of the aggressor.  I do not 
suggest that this is anything other than a depressing conclusion:  it is a practical one 
we all should recognise. 
 
It is suggested that it is not the function of any research work to solve that which is 
insoluble.  It is, however a legitimate exercise to draw attention to the manner in 
which the child soldier issue has been considered and the structures that are in place 


































Recent evidence reveals that there are 300,000 children serving as combatants in 
almost 75% of the world’s conflicts.1  The problem is much wider than children 
recruited by armed forces organised upon a national basis, but stretches to those 
organised within rebel and opposition groups.  As Singer observes, 60% of non-state 
armed groups operating in the world utilise children as a matter of course.2  Children, 
moreover, are particularly in demand in relation to terrorist organisations including al-
Quaeda, perhaps as a consequence of the ease by which they can be recruited and 
indoctrinated or perhaps because of their special utility as fighters.  The International 
Institute of Strategic Studies refers to conservative intelligence estimates that indicate 
al-Quaeda is present in over 60 countries and that since 1996 at least 20,000 jihadists 
have been trained in Afghanistan camps,3 and many of which resort to suicide 
attacks.4  In terms of raw numbers, of ongoing or recently ended conflicts in 2002, 
68% have children under the age of sixteen serving as combatants, and in 80% of such 
conflicts, child combatants were present who were under the age of fifteen.5 
 
A more recent example derived from the ongoing Afghan conflict is given of a 14- 
year-old boy, Shakirullah Yasin Ali, described as ‘small and frail’ recruited through a 
madrassa at which he attended and that was run by two mullahs, to attack British and 
American forces because ‘… (They) were against God.’6  The means by which the 
attack would take place was that of suicide bombing.  Shakirullah provides no detail 
as to why he was prepared to carry out such an assignment other than that ‘… (he) 
would get justice for all the people being killed.’  This example is by no means 
isolated, since the humanitarian organisation ‘Child Soldier International’ portrays 
1 Research originally conducted by the Quaker Offices in Geneva, 1998. 
2 P. Singer, Children at War, Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, 2006, p. 30  Within this thesis the 
term ‘child’ is defined as a person under the age of 18 as defined by Article 1, para. 2.2 of the UK’s 
First Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, HMSO, February 1994, p.14. 
3 An Evaluation and Forecast of World Affairs, IISS Strategic Survey, 2003/4, Oxford UP., Oxford, 
May 2004, p.6. 
4 The Annual Review of World Affairs, IISS Strategic Survey 2008 Routledge, London, 2008, p. 297. 
5 R. Barnen, Childwar Database, SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security, Oxford, Oxford UP, 2002. 
6 The Independent, 10th June 2008. 
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children in Uganda as being ‘harvested’ by armed factions particularly in the northern 
part of the country because they are vulnerable and can be easily manipulated.7 
 
What is the explanation behind the growth in the use and deployment of children?  
The immediate impact of the end of the Cold War shifted the focus of power in some 
states by leaving client regimes unsupported and releasing a tide of Cold War materiel 
onto global markets.8  In particular, the end of the Cold War acted against the Sub-
Saharan African states in their search for foreign investment, whilst it became 
increasingly possible for their communities to see how deprived they were in the scale 
of social endowment.9  Given such a context, it is not surprising that terrorist groups 
thrive in such environments whilst the recruitment of children in the furtherance of 
their causes are not only cheap but plentiful to the extent that children now provide a 
new alternative to adult recruiting pools.10  The self-proclaimed Taliban leader has 
recently stated by way of defending a policy of training boys as young as nine to 
become suicide bombers; that such persons are ‘… the nuclear weapons of (the 
Taliban)’, and claims that such children are discriminate in relation to the targets they 
select, unlike, as he further claims, the measures adopted by the west that are by 
contrast, indiscriminate.11 
 
The employment of children in warfare operates at three specific levels.  In the first 
instance, on behalf of the of the legitimate government; in the second, at the behest of 
insurgent and terrorist groups, including those defined as ‘super terrorists’,12 and 
having a defined political objective, perhaps with global reach; and at a third level, on 
behalf of criminal gangs who have no political objective, but whose organisations are 
intent upon self-interest and mercenary motives. 
 
Notwithstanding the existence of international law, the reason why children are 
recruited by insurgent, terrorist and criminal gangs is more easily explained than in 
the case of the nation state.  The former are not bound by international conventions to 
7 D. Rosen, Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism, Rutgers UP, 2005, p. 16. 
8 J. Mackinlay, Globalisation and Insurgency, IISS Adelphi Paper 352, Oxford UP, Oxford, 2002, p. 
15. 
9 J. Mackinlay, ibid. p. 23. 
10 P. Singer, op cit., p. 54. 
11 BBC 2 Newsnight Programme, 24th July 2008. 
12 L. Freedman, ‘The Third World War’, Survival, IISS, Vol. 43, No. 4, Winter 2001-2002, p. 73. 
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which they are not parties.  In addition to the plentiful supply of children, small arms 
have improved in terms of their lethality and simplicity.  Today a handful of children 
can now have the equivalent firepower of an entire regiment of Napoleonic infantry.13  
Illicit arms transfers have expanded since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
whilst huge stocks of military equipment, sometimes vulnerable to theft in poorly 
guarded facilities, and sold with little regard for the purchasers’ bona fides have added 
to the concerns.14  Since 1980 more than 50 countries have experienced significant 
periods of conflict with civilians accounting for at least 90 percent of the casualties.  
In many instances, conflict has caused a complete breakdown of the state, and some 
30 countries have had more than 10 percent of their populations displaced.15  This 
latter point underlines how easy it is for the insurgent to operate, and, in many 
instances, to recruit those displaced.  The problem is compounded by the fact that as 
states disintegrate, so do armies and chains of command,16 whilst forced recruitment a 
not uncommon feature of campaigns designed to intimidate local communities 
continues unabated. 
 
Insurgent and terrorist groups offer an attractive option to displaced children having 
no home and no ostensible means of support.  They provide a home and comradeship; 
they provide respect for the individuals concerned, and a potentially more attractive 
lifestyle option than what destitute and starving children might otherwise expect.  It is 
noted that in a recent survey of child soldiers in four African countries 64% joined 
without any threat of violence.17  In such cases, such groups point to the fact that they 
break no moral codes, even although international law is clear as to its prohibition.  It 
is also clear that given the incidence of violence in the third world and the 
displacement of populations, children will have suffered the effects of warfare.  
Conflict and the militarization of daily life, including police patrols, curfews, armed 
13 P. Singer, op cit., p. 47. 
14 J. Husbands, ‘The Proliferation of Conventional Weapons and Technologies’, in Grave New World, 
Security Challenges in the 21st Century, ed. M. Brown, Georgetown UP., in cooperation with the 
Center for Peace and Security Studies Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service Georgetown U., 
Washington DC., 2003, p. 69 
15‘ Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Context: The Impact of Conflict’, The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, Washington DC., 1st April 1998, pp. 2 & 15. 
16 M. Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor, Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, Chatto & Windus, 
London, 1998, p. 6. 
17‘Wounded Children: The Use of Children in Armed Conflict in Central Africa’, International Labor 
Office, Geneva, 2003. 
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checkpoints and military censorship are already part of their everyday experience.18 
Such extremes of violence, including summary executions, disappearances and death 
squads, produce in young and impressionable people a desire for revenge and a need 
to substitute an annihilated family or social structure.19  The armed group may 
provide that structure, and what appears to be a vicious circle begins again.  In this 
world of war, doctrines of human rights, respect for others and legality have little or 
no purchase.20 
   
There exists much research and comment upon the general question as to how 
children may be protected, usually by operation of law; and from a sociological 
perspective as to how children exposed to and damaged by conflict may be reunited 
into conventional society.  Equally, there is substantial general scholarship dedicated 
to confronting the issue at a supranational level, including the need to tackle third 
world debt, the relief of poverty and the increased input of charities.  The objective of 
this research is to look at the problem from an altogether different angle.  Given the 
growth of the presence of children in modern armed conflicts, with, as Graca Machel 
observes ‘… more of the world being sucked into a desolate moral vacuum,’21 the 
reality is that the world will have to recognise the fact that children and young persons 
are an integral part of the modern battlefield and are likely to remain so in increasing 
numbers. 
 
What is the modern battlefield of which child warriors form part?  Philip Bobbitt in 
his book entitled Terror and Consent 22, questions whether the West knows how to 
win wars against terror in contrast to the manner in which the West was organised to 
defeat the Axis in the Second World War, or the Soviet Union at the end of what he 
terms ‘… the Long War of 1914-1990.’23  In particular, Bobbitt notices that market 
state terrorism ‘… is likely to be as global, networked, decentralised, and devolved 
18 I. Cohn & G. Goodwin-Gill, Child Soldiers, The Role of Children in Armed Conflicts: A Study on 
behalf of the Henri Dunant Institute, Geneva, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 31. 
19 Ibid., p. 32. 
20 M. Ignatieff, op cit., p.6. 
21 G. Machel, ‘Impact of Armed Conflict on Children’, ‘Children of the Gun’, UN Report of the Office 
of the Secretary General, Document A/51/306 & Add.1, 26th August 1996. 
22 P. Bobbitt, Terror and Consent, The Wars for the Twenty-First Century, Allen Lane, Penguin Books, 
London, 2008. 
23 Ibid., p. 11. 
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and to rely just as much on outsourcing and incentivizing as the market state.’24   In 
the context of a Western response to the transnational agenda of groups such as al 
Qaeda, the suicide bomber is the ideal weapon for the outsourcing market state in a 
globalised world to attack Western targets.  Bobbitt observes ‘…All the network 
advantages of redundancy, interoperability, diversity, and decentralized command and 
control are maximized by the outsourced suicide bomber.’25  
 
Numerous examples exist in which Western forces have encountered child soldiers 
both historically and in modern times, including Vietnam, the Gulf Wars, 
Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Liberia, Ethiopia and Nazi 
Germany: they provide practical examples of the nature of the problem.  Yet the 
engagements of children by modern forces present a number of more difficult 
questions.  As Richard Holmes illustrates from his examination of recent testimonies 
of British soldiers serving in Iraq:  ‘Some found it impossible to shoot youngsters.’   
Trooper Ken Boon (describes) ‘… a young lad in his early teens (who) threw a 
grenade.  I could have shot him easily but instead I took cover because I can’t kill a 
child that had probably been told to throw it.  Luckily it never went off and I was very 
shook up after that.’26 
 
Over the last twenty years British Forces have been called upon to confront 
contingents of  child soldiers in a variety of deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan and 
parts of Africa including the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone.  In 
the United Kingdom itself the National Security Strategy seeks to quantify the threat 
of terrorism, placing it first in the list of ‘threats and risks.’27  The study suggests that 
‘the UK faces a serious and sustained threat from violent extremists, claiming to act in 
the name of Islam.’  Networks and individuals aspire to cause mass casualties, to 
mount suicide attacks, to use chemical, biological and radiological weapons, to target 
critical national infrastructures, and to use new methods including that of electronic 
attack.  Many such threats not only utilise children, but are conceived upon their very 
availability and adaptability to such tasks.  It is perhaps arguable that such children 
are not soldiers at all, but are merely ‘civilians’ engaged in enterprises that are better 
24Ibid., p. 45. 
25 Ibid., p.53. 
26 R. Holmes, Dusty Warriors, Modern Soldiers at War, Harper Perenial, London, 2007, p. 317. 
27 IISS Strategic Survey 2008, Routledge, London, 2008, p. 160. 
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dealt with by police and law enforcement agencies rather than military operations.  
However, the scale and nature of the child-soldier phenomenon suggest otherwise. 
 
It is hypothesised that the incidence of child soldiers is a growing phenomenon, 
despite the existence of legal prohibitions forbidding such deployment.  As to the 
British experience it has been pointed out that ‘… current British Military Doctrine 
makes no mention of child combatants and thus seems to suggest that British forces 
have no official policies on dealing with child soldiers, nor do they dedicate any 
specific training to the subject.  This would seem a doctrinal gap when account is 
taken of the fact that British peacekeeping forces have on occasions been deployed in 
regions where child soldiers are utilised.’28 
 
Reliance is often placed by commentators and the military upon the provisions of 
international law as a means by which forces may be protected from the incidence of 
child soldiers.  There is no doubt, as shall be seen, that international law is well-
developed and applicable across the globe, yet as Jenny Kruper has indicated, 
international humanitarian law does not necessarily keep up with the changes in the 
nature of warfare,29 and many nations and armed groupings for their own political and 
military ends, largely determined by self-interest, choose not to comply with its terms. 
 
This thesis is an attempt to consider whether a doctrinal gap exists in the case of 
British Armed Forces.  It would be beyond the scope of this work to suggest the likely 
future deployments of UK forces, or the manner in which the existing threat of 
terrorism is likely to manifest itself in Britain, yet the manner in which British Forces 
may be called upon to fight, the manner in which they are organised and trained in the 
future upon the modern battlefield forms a central theme. 
 
One possible approach to the problem is to explore it from the perspective of current 
training programmes within the British Army, and with particular reference to its 
current rules of engagement.  In addition to an investigation of such programmes at 
28 A. Mircica et al. ‘The Psychological Well-Being of Professional Armed Forces Personnel Child 
Soldiers: A Literature Review,’ Research Acquisition Organisation, Defence Academy, Shrivenham, 
Swindon, carried out under the terms of Enabling Contract No. RT/COM/4/008, p. 8. 
29 J. Kruper, Military Training and Children in Armed Conflict: Law, Policy and Practice, Nijhoff, 
Amsterdam, 2005, p.98. 
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the basic and higher level, a series of interviews with soldiers utilising questionnaires 
designed for the purpose have been conducted together with an examination of 
contemporary documentation.   The questionnaires are intended to cover a sample of 
the spectrum of the British experience, and directed to infantry commanders and 
infantrymen. A comparative survey of the experience of the US and Israeli experience 
utilising a similar medium was similarly conducted.  By this method the following 
questions are addressed: - 
 
(1). the extent to which the issue of child soldiers present a threat to regular forces? 
 
(2).the theatres of war and the strategic contexts in which such soldiers may be 
deployed? 
 
(3). upon a comparative basis, how have other western forces engaged with the 
problem as I have defined it, and how have such forces modified their training 
programmes and their rules of engagement to suit the context of their respective 
deployments? 
 
(4). what lessons can be learnt from the experience of other forces, and how may they 
be applied to future deployments of western forces and likely experience of British 
forces? 
 
(5). what psychological manifestations have arisen from the recent experience of 
British forces in engaging child soldiers? 
  
Children and Conflict 
 
 
Within modern western society there is an assumption that children are special.  They 
are properly regarded as ‘…naturally and typically resident in the non-political 
sphere, namely of the innocent, weak and vulnerable, in families and houses, schools 
and workplaces.’30 They demand and require special protection.  This thesis and its 
research, is concerned with the issue of the child that fulfils the role and function of a 
30 H. Brocklehurst, Who’s Afraid of Children? Children, Conflict and International Relations, Ashgate, 
Aldershot, 2006, p. 140. 
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combat soldier operating in the modern world.  Yet the very notion of a ‘child soldier’ 
is the antithesis of what society regards as a soldier, since modern society, for good 
reason, regards a ‘child soldier’ as not only peculiar but a political anomaly.  A 
curious dichotomy however arises, since although armed children are able to wield 
significant military power and pose a real threat to regular forces, they also attract 
comment as victims and ‘…as the ultimate essentialized civilians in need of 
humanitarian and/or political assistance.’31 
 
The battlefield is the traditional stage upon which the soldier carries out his duty.  As 
Keegan and Holmes have pointed out, although ‘much … in life is terrible and 
terrifying … in no other circumstances than the battlefield does man confront the 
knowledge that he is present in that place for the purpose of suffering death at the 
hands of fellow man, and that he must kill if he is not to be killed himself.’32  It is also 
clear that the battlefield is a place without either mercy or pity, and where emotions 
admired by humanity such as gentleness, compassion and tolerance ‘…have room to 
neither operate nor place to exist.’33  
 
There is no doubt that it is apposite to apply the idea of a ‘child’ requiring special 
protection or as a potential ‘victim’ to the context of a modern liberal democratic 
society, based upon respect for the traditions of human rights and the rule of law.  
Within our own jurisdiction for example, the right of a child to enjoy family life is the 
subject to specific guarantee.34  Examination of history reveals another interpretation:  
children were neither regarded as special nor deserving of special protection.  Indeed, 
the contrary was invariably the case where children were made the subject of acts of 
brutality and deliberate targeting.  Some examples provide a historical context. 
 
As part of the Norman Conquest, William the Conqueror carried out a series of 
campaigns in order to cement his authority.  One such campaign is commonly referred 
to as the ‘Harrying of the North’ (1069-1070).  The campaign was directed, not only 
at those perceived to be direct ‘enemies’, but also at communities by means of the 
ravaging of contested territory, a common method of medieval subjection.  It is 
31 Ibid. 
32 J. Keegan & R. Holmes, Soldiers, A History of Men in Battle, Guild Publishing, London, 1985, p. 21. 
33 Ibid., p. 21. 
34 European Convention of Human Rights:  Article 8. 
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recorded that ‘… (William) commanded that all crops and herds, chattels and food of 
every kind should be brought together and burned to ashes with consuming fire, so 
that the whole region north of the Humber might be stripped of all means of 
sustenance…In consequence … more than 100,000 Christian folk of both sexes, 
young and old alike, perished of hunger.’35   The following century during the 
crusades, before the crusaders reached the Middle East, the traditional start to any 
expedition was to attack Jewish communities in Europe, even to the extent of wiping 
out whole communities, including ‘… tender children of whatever age or sex.’36 
Other historical examples indicate how children were specifically targeted as a 
consequence of being children.  Foremost among them arguably arises during the 
invasions of King David I of Scotland (1138), during which the blood of slaughtered 
children was drunk from a stream: the stream being specially dammed to provide a 
receptacle for this purpose.37 
 
It could well be said that such examples tells us less about children per se but more 
about the historical period to which they belong. This was a time of trial by ordeal, of 
trial by battle introduced by the Norman Conquest, the exercise of capital punishment 
in a variety of bloodthirsty forms and, in so far as England was concerned, a country 
that suffered from anarchy, plague and revolt.  If life was ‘nasty, brutish and short’ in 
the Hobbesian sense, why should children be treated any better or regarded any 
differently than other members of the population? 
 
It is generally accepted that the first recorded occasion when children were deployed 
as soldiers in warfare is 1212 when a contingent referred to as the ‘Children’s 
Crusade’ set out to join Christians fighting to capture the Holy Land.38  Singer points 
out that this was not a case of children at war, but a march of mostly unarmed boys 
from northern France and western Germany  who sought to take back the Holy Land 
by what was described as ‘…the power of their faith’39.   
 
35 Orderic Vitalis, The Ecclesiastical History, ed. and trans. M. Chibnall, Oxford UP., Oxford, 1969-81, 
p. 230. 
36 S. McGlynn, By Sword and Fire, Cruelty and Atrocity in Medieval Warfare, Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, London, 2008, p.153. 
37 Ibid. p. 216. 
38 H. Brocklehurst, op cit., p. 33. 
39 P. Singer, op cit., p. 12. 
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What does emerge, however, across the sweep of history up to and including our own 
time is how children have been exploited, barbarism and military recruitment 
notwithstanding and despite the slow but gradual development of national and 
international legal structures designed to protect them.   In his study of Fijian warfare 
in the nineteenth century, Carneiro has pointed out that cannibalism was an important 
element of warfare at that time.  Captives were ordinarily devoured, and cannibalism 
did not respect sex or age, with captive women and children being eaten just as 
readily as men.40  During the course of the same century the US Civil War was a war 
of child soldiers.  The example exists of a child as young as eight enlisting in the Ohio 
Volunteer Infantry,41 although Singer cautions against what he describes as ‘historic 
myth’ by making the distinction between children that were an integral part of the 
armed forces in which they served, and those who performed supporting and 
subsidiary roles.42   Nonetheless, the fact remains that it has been estimated that out of 
a total of 2.7 million soldiers involved in that conflict, more than a million were under 
the age of 18, with 300,000 being under the age of 13.43 
 
The American experience is instructive since it was in that conflict that the first 
hesitant steps were taken to regulate by law the manner in which warfare came to be 
fought, recognising, from a humanitarian point of view what was acceptable and what 
was not.  The Lieber Code of 1863 instituted in order to control the use of poisons in 
war declared that ‘… the use of poison in any manner be it to poison wells, or food or 
arms, is wholly excluded from modern warfare.  He that uses it puts himself out of the 
pale of the law and the usages of the law.’44  Enlightening this may have been in 
relation to a particular type of weapon system, but in so far as the deployment of 
children is concerned as part of regular forces, there is scant evidence to suggest that 
children were distinguished from adults. 
 
40 R. Carneiro, ‘Warfare in Fiji and the Cauca Valley’, in R. Ferguson, ‘The Anthropology of War’, 
Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1990, p. 204. 
41 M. Banks, ‘Avery Brown (1852-1904), Musician: America’s Youngest Civil War Soldier’, 
America’s Shrine to Music Newsletter, February 2001. 
42 P. Singer, op cit. p. 15. 
43 D. Burke, The Civil War: Strange and Fascinating Facts, Grammercy, New York 1991, p. 263. 
44 US War Dept. General Orders 100, 24th April 1863, Art. 70. 
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It is perhaps trite to observe that the written history of the world is, in the main, a 
history of warfare.45  This stark reality is probably a function of the fact that the 
means by which the world lives, and the state system that rules the vast majority of 
the world’s population, was forged and maintained through violence, violence that has 
increased in scale and severity throughout history.  In his study of the history of 
warfare, Richard Weigley has identified what he describes as the ‘chronic 
indecisiveness of warfare’ as being responsible for ‘…the spontaneous resort to 
deeper and baser cruelties,’46 especially during the seventeenth, nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries as the mass militarization of populations became ever more 
common in an attempt to break the deadlock engendered by the developing 
industrialised world.  In particular, Keegan points out that mass militarization in the 
poor world resulted not in liberation but, on the contrary to the entrenchment of 
oppressive regimes.47  
 
The Recruitment of Children – A Problem of Definition? 
 
A child is a person under the age of 18 years.  This definition derives from 
international law, and in the case of the UK, is set out within The UK’s First Report to 
the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child.48  In conformity with the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child that was formulated by the 
General Assembly in 2000, contracting parties are obliged to take such steps to ensure 
that children under the age of 18 are not compulsorily recruited into the armed forces 
of those contracting parties,49 and further steps to ensure that such persons do not take 
a direct part in hostilities.50 
 
 Although this chapter will consider the detail of international legal protection 
for children within a different context, one of the more depressing conclusions to be 
derived from this subject is the fact that without prejudice to the development of 
45 J. Keegan, A History of Warfare, Hutchinson, London, 1993, p. 386. 
46 R. Weigley, The Age of Battles, The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo 
Bloomington, Indiana UP., Indiana, 1991, p. 543. 
47 J. Keegan, op cit., p. 57. 
48 See in particular Article 1, para. 2.2 of the First Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, HMSO, February 1994, p.14. 
49 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict, 2000, ILM 1286, 1287 (2000) (Article 2). 
50 (Article 1), 1287. 
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sophisticated legal structures, the deployment of children has continued to grow at a 
rapid rate, and upon the scale already mentioned.  Significantly, certain states and 
armed groups, perhaps for differing reasons, appear not only content to recruit 
children, but follow such a course as part of their active policy.  In the recent past the 
regime of Saddam Hussein recruited boys as young as ten, following their 
indoctrination with Ba’athist Party ideology to become known as ‘Ashbal’ Saddam, or 
Saddam’s Lion Cubs.  The famous account of Ishmael Beah, a 13-year-old boy being 
recruited into the government militia of Sierra Leone;51 the policies of Hamas and 
other militant Palestinian Groups actively recruit children for the purposes of suicide 
bombings and other acts of terrorism, and the example exists of two children, one 
eight years of age, attacking an Israeli settlement in Gaza in the name of martyrdom.52 
 
Given the relative sophistication of international legal structures designed to protect 
children, the question arises as to why so many signatories to such instruments honour 
them by breach?  In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, both are signatories to the 
First, Second, Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 (‘the 1949 
Convention’), Sierra Leone is a signatory to not only the 1949 Convention, but also 
the Additional Protocol I of 8th June 1977, the Additional Protocol II, and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981 (the Banjul Charter).  Similarly, 
Somalia is a signatory of the 1949 Convention, the Banjul Charter, and is additionally 
a signatory to The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.   It is 
suggested that it is not necessarily the case that such nations have no regard to the 
obligations to which they are signatories; it is more likely to be a function of the 
political circumstances that pertain in those nations that make breaches almost 
inevitable.53  Ignatieff points out that the West proceeds from a universalist ethic 
based upon ideas of human rights, whilst the nations that are cited as examples, start 
from a particularist ethic that defines the tribe, the nation, or ethnicity as the limit of 
legitimate moral concern.54  Further, it is an all too obvious a feature within the 
51 I. Beah, A Long Way Gone, Memoirs of a Boy Soldier, Fourth Estate, London. 2007, especially pp. 
105-113. 
52 See D. Rosen, op cit., Ch. 4 ‘Fighting for the Apocalypse, Palestinian Child Soldiers’, p. 92. 
53 By way of example Afghanistan is a signatory to the Convention on the Rts. of the Child as well as 
the First, Second, Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions of  12th August 1949, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rts. 1966 yet within its jurisdiction children are regularly employed in 
large and increasing numbers in combatant roles. 
54 M. Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor, Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, Chatto & Windus, 
London, 1998, p. 6. 
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context of international society that child soldiers are particularly prominent within 
weak, corrupted or quasi-states where terrorist networks find safety.55  In many 
instances these phenomena are a consequence of European decolonisation, a process 
that resulted in the creation of new states that lacked legitimate institutions and 
borders.  Much the same problem resulted following the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia.  It is significant that since the end of the Second World War the 
preoccupation of the Security Council has been with the problem of Civil War as 
opposed to international conflicts, their incidence and the manner in which they are 
fought.56  
 
Any nation, however cynical a stance it may choose to adopt in the formulation of its 
own national policies must have some regard to world opinion, its moral codes and 
laws.  The extent to which financial aid is offered by the West may be dependent 
upon the extent to which a particular state is prepared to follow international norms 
and demonstrate a satisfactory human rights record.  What is striking, however, is the 
extent to which in the post-war world at least, the incidence of child soldiers is 
manifest in the developing world or in nations which are impoverished from a 
financial, political or social perspective.  Some have been made the subject of 
reference in this chapter.  In 1991 the Swedish Red Cross and the Raoul Wallenberg 
Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law convened a conference entitled 
‘Children at War’.57  In addition to expressing deep concern that children are 
permitted to take part in hostilities, the Council of Delegates requested the Henri 
Dunant Institute to study the issues of recruitment and participation of children as 
soldiers in armed conflict and advise upon measures to reduce such participation.  The 
study conducted field research to identify state and non-state entities that recruit 
children, and to identify the factors that are pertinent to their participation.58  In 
particular, conflicts in selected countries, namely: El Salvador, Guatemala, the Israeli 
occupied territories, Liberia and Sri Lanka were chosen for the purpose of individual 
55 K. Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism, IISS Adelphi Paper 364, Oxford 
UP, Oxford, 2004,  p. 71. 
56 A. Roberts & D. Zaum, Selective Security, War and the United Nations Security Council since 1945, 
IISS Adelphi Paper 395, Routledge, London, 2008, pp. 33-36. 
57 Children at War, Report from the Conference on Children at War, Stockholm, Sweden, 31st May – 
2nd June 1991, Raoul Wallenberg Institute, Report No. 10. Lund. 1991. 
58 Resolutions adopted by the Council of Delegates, November 1991, Red Cross, Jan-Feb, 1992, pp. 
41-42. 
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case studies.  Other countries, the subject of study, include Ethiopia, Mozambique, 
Peru and the Sudan.  The point is well demonstrated that child soldiers are deployed 
in nations having much in common: the incidence of internal conflict, a break down in 
government authority and the law.  Notwithstanding the fact that the nations which 
were the subject of the study are signatories to international conventions prohibiting 
the use of child soldiers, each for example are signatories, inter alia, to the 1949 
Convention, the problem continues. 
 
Given the Third World dimension of the incidence of child soldiers, the problems of 
civil war as a consequence of decolonialisation in the post war world, the growth of 
‘universal interdependence’,59 and the fact that international law proceeds from the 
universalist perspective already mentioned, the question that needs to be addressed is 
whether it reasonable to expect nation states in the Third World to apply laws 
protecting young people to their own population?  It should be borne in mind that this 
is not an issue of regarding the Third World as being ‘backward looking’ in the 
manner in which they regard children, since modern research has demonstrated that in 
terms of moral and cognitive development children reach levels comparable with 
adults between 12 and 14 years of age,60 it is more a question of addressing whether it 
is appropriate to apply laws and principles developed in the west and to make them 
the subject of universal application to nations and in circumstances where they do not 
easily sit. 
 
 In 1960 Philippe Aries published the influential text L’Enfant et la vie familiale sous 
l’ancien regime published and translated into English as Centuries of Childhood in 
1962.  In short, the central thesis is that it was not until the late seventeenth century 
that the concept of childhood emerged.  Archard summarises the argument thus: - 
 
‘In medieval society the idea of childhood did not exist; this is not to suggest that 
children were neglected, forsaken or despised.  The idea of childhood is not to be 
confused with the affection for children: it corresponds to an awareness of the 
59 See A. Colas, ‘Taking Sides: Cosmopolitanism, Internationalism and ‘complex solidarity’, 
International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 5, Sept. 2011, p. 1064 where it is argued that the chief driver of 
global inequality and political jurisdictional differentiation is global capitalism. 
60 H. Brocklehurst, op cit., p. 6.  Note also in UK law as far as children between 10 and 14 are 
concerned s. 34 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 leaves them to be treated as equally as adults in a 
criminal court. 
 22 
                                                 
particular nature of childhood, that particular nature which distinguishes the child 
from the adult, even the young adult.  In medieval society, this awareness was 
lacking.’61 
 
According to Aries, there is little doubt that infants, who are defined as those under 
the age of seven, were recognised as being fragile and vulnerable, their parents, 
however, were indifferent to them, and treated their death with casualness.62  The 
tenor of Aries’ argument has been made the subject of criticism upon a number of 
fronts, most particularly in relation to the nature of the evidence that he employs to 
develop and support his case, yet the book had a major impact upon the subject of 
social history, and is recognised to be the first historical study of childhood. 
 
Within the western and modern world, the fact that children are distinct from adults is 
an accepted truth.  As Achard points out, children have different games and clothes to 
adults; they are apart from the adult world of work, the child inhabits a world that is 
sexually innocent whilst the adult inhabits one that knows, whilst the undertaking of 
formal education provides a distance from the adult world the child is eventually to 
inhabit. 
 
One of the major criticisms of the Aries thesis is the argument that infants were 
treated by their parents with indifference, and whose death was treated with 
casualness.  Other research has questioned such a conclusion.  In the Roman world for 
example, based upon Roman depictions of children’s bodies, and a corresponding 
enjoyment of childish features, an interest in children as individuals is apparent as 
opposed to regarding children as being extensions of the family or as sources of 
labour.63 Objection is also taken to the ‘presentism’ of the Aries work, upon the 
footing that history did have a concept of childhood and children; it is merely the case 
that history considered such concepts differently to present day society.  
 
The relevance of definitions to the theme of this thesis is the fact that if international 
law is predicated upon the universalist ethic developed in the West, is it appropriate to 
61 D. Archard, Children, Rights and Childhood (2nd Edition), Routledge, London  2004, pp. 19-20. 
62 Ibid, p. 20. 
63 S. Dixon (ed.), Childhood, Class and Kin in the Roman World, Routledge, London, 2001, p.10. 
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apply such principles to the context of non-Western culture?  Within the Aries thesis a 
ten-year-old person was undoubtedly a child, yet it is to be noted that in many non-
Western cultures entry into adulthood is marked at the time of puberty: eight to ten in 
the case of girls, and ten to twelve in the case of boys.64  As Archard observes, it 
would be wrong to suggest that such cultures ‘lack a concept of childhood’, it is 
merely the fact that they have a different conception of childhood to our own. 
 
This problem draws into sharp relief the difficulty of applying universal laws to 
particular sociological situations in circumstances where the principles upon which 
they are based may neither be recognised nor understood.  A similar problem arises in 
the example of child labour and the application of Article 32 of the United Nations 
Convention of the Rights of the Child.65  Leaving aside the fact that the problem can 
occur even within the context of developed economies, the problem is prevalent 
within the developing world as in the case of child soldier deployment.  Many 
societies expect their children from a very early age to perform tasks in order to 
contribute to the subsistence of their social structure.66  According to a literal 
application of Article 32 it may invariably be the case that what is expected of a child 
and is regarded as being perfectly normal within a given social group, may, offend 
against the Article.  Such is the problem of applying universalist principles to 
particular situations where such principles, at best do not easily fit, and at worst, are 
wholly inapposite.  
 
There is little doubt that the deployment of children in conflict, particularly in the 
developing world is neither prevented nor even restricted by the issuing of legal 
pronouncements, even in the event that they are adopted by most of the nations of the 
world.  The problem, and its incidence, is multi-faceted and complex.  Quite apart 
from the utility of children to those who are engaged in conflicts, those tasked with 
the problem of preventing the spread of their recruitment have the added difficulty of 
confronting the fact that there is no universal acceptance of when childhood ends and 
when adulthood begins, or indeed how it may be defined. 
64 D. Achard, op cit., p. 32. 
65 (Article 32) accords a child the right ‘ to be protected from economic exploitation and from 
performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be 
harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.’ 
66 D. Archard, op cit., p. 38. 
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The Legal Protection of Children 
 
If a legal system reflects the values of a society of which it forms part, so a system of 
international law will reflect the values of international society in so far as state actors 
define them.  There is little doubt that there is broad international consensus that 
children require special protection as a consequence of their peculiar vulnerability.  If 
the Law of International Armed Conflict (LOIAC) posits a fundamental principle of 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants (civilians)67, then children are 
regarded as the ultimate civilians demanding of special protection. 
 
The distinction has a long history.  In the Book of Deuteronomy (Chapter 3, verses 
eighteen and nineteen) the following appears: - 
 
18.  AND I commanded you at that time, saying, The Lord your God hath given you 
this land to possess it: ye shall pass over armed before your brethren the children of 
Israel, all that are meet for the war. 
 
19.  But your wives, and your little ones, and your cattle shall abide in your cities 
which I have given you. 
 
The writings of Plato (c. 427-347 BC) discuss the conduct of war including the 
treatment of enemies, the rules of warfare and the question of military rewards and 
punishments.  In particular, he draws a distinction between combatants and children, 
whom, he recommends, should be permitted to be spectators of war, (war that he 
regards as a permanent feature of human affairs), but who should not be part of the 
conduct  or execution of war.68 
 
In broad terms the modern legal structure of the LOIAC, beyond customary 
international law and specific treaty law, is contained within The Hague Conventions 
of 1899 and 1907, and The Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, 
also known as the Red Cross Conventions of 1949.  Whilst the purpose of these 
67 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] ICJ Rep. 
226,257. 
68 Plato, The Republic, trans. H. Lee, Penguin Classics, Harmondsworth, London, 1955, pp. 224-225. 
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instruments is to humanise the conduct of warfare as much as is possible 
commensurate with the exigencies of the need to fight, and to cement the distinction 
between combatant and non-combatant; they provide little protection in the context of 
the child soldier, who, in many cases, are deployed at the sub-conventional level. 
 It is not easy for irregular forces to comply cumulatively with the seven Geneva 
Conventions or even with the core four Hague Conventions.69 The point is further 
demonstrated by the fact that, as we shall observe, armed criminal gangs utilise the 
services of the child soldier.  If it is not easy for irregular forces to comply with the 
Conventions, it is all the harder for the armed criminal gang, even upon the unlikely 
assumption that they have an interest in compliance. 
 
In relation to the particular, a host of provisions are included in the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, and in the Additional Protocol I of 1977(‘Protocol I’) with a 
view to protecting women and children.  Children, even at early ages, can be used in 
various capacities in wartime.70  Article 77(2) of Protocol I obligates contracting 
parties not to recruit children under the age of fifteen, and to take what is described as 
‘…all feasible measures to ensure that such children do not take a direct part in 
hostilities.’  This undertaking is affirmed by Article 38(2) of the 1989 Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, adopted by the General Assembly.  Although set out in an 
Article, the distilled view is that this provision does no more than reflect customary 
international law.71  The matter is taken further by Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Rome 
Statute that makes the conscripting or enlisting of children under the age of fifteen 
into the national armed forces, or using them to participate actively in hostilities, a 
war crime. 
 
In conformity with the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, (formulated by the General Assembly in 2000), contracting parties are obliged 
to ensure that children under the age of eighteen years shall not be recruited into their 
69 Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge 
UP., Cambridge, 2004, p. 41. 
70 H. Mann, ‘International Law and the Child Soldier’, 36 ICLQ 32, 35 (1987). 
71 M. Happold, ‘Child Soldiers in International Law: The Legal Regulation of Children’s Participation 
in Hostilities’, 47 NILR 27, 47 (2000). 
 26 
                                                 
armed forces.72  This provision thereby raises the ‘recruitment bar’ from fifteen to 
eighteen. 
 
The Mental and Physical Resilience of Children 
 
This chapter has already observed how children provide a new alternative to adult 
recruiting pools and how such groups and nations provide an attractive option to 
displaced children having no home and no ostensible means of support.  What is 
perhaps less obvious is the extent to which it is demonstrated that children are adept 
and well suited to particular forms of military endeavour that provides an added 
impetus to their utility and recruitment potential. 
 
Brocklehurst makes the point that maturation, whilst being a distinguishing feature of 
children in separating them from adults in terms of needs and expectations is distinct 
from physical development which continues into and beyond adulthood culminating 
at the age of 25.73  Before the age of 5 a child is likely to absorb more toxins than for 
the rest of its adult life, although it has been argued that the very fact of immaturity 
may be a feature of its resilience.  Van Bueren observes: 
 
‘While an adult may be severely affected by a traumatic experience and as a result 
suffers some personality alteration, a child’s personality, in the absence of pre-
existing development, may not be altered, but actually developed by a traumatic 
event.’74 
 
In the context of the adult, Dr. Roger Pitman has suggested that emotional 
experiences of an extreme and unpleasant nature may generate activity in the 
endocrine system that results in the production of powerful and recurring memories in 
the brain, whilst other researchers have found that Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) produces changes in the axis between the brain the pituitary and adrenal 
72 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict, 2000, 39 ILM 1286, 1287 (2000) (Article 2). 
73 H. Brocklehurst, op cit., p. 6. 
74 G. Van Bueren, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box’ in G. Van Bueren (ed.), Childhood Abused: Protecting 
Children against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Ashgate, 
Dartmouth, 1998, p. 60. 
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glands.75  What of the child?  It is a matter of conjecture as to whether or not the same 
transformation occurs in the underdeveloped brain in contra distinction to the 
developed. 
 
Numerous studies have been undertaken with children who have suffered direct 
violence in relation to the question as to whether or not they are affected by 
violence,76 yet there is little work on the impact upon children of simply living in a 
society that experiences ongoing violent conflict and a risk of violent death.  Some 
suggest that children who are so exposed exhibit no higher levels of anxiety than 
those who have never experienced such circumstances.  Others have suggested that 
living in such situations of continuous and violent conflict tends to minimise the 
implications of their own exposure to violence, or may not recognise the symptoms of 
psychological stress associated with trauma.77  
 
What is clear is that any fighting force however constituted and in whatever context it 
is called upon to fight and whether at a conventional or sub-conventional level, must 
have regard to two questions.  Firstly, how does a state or organisation get men to 
fight?  In the west, and in countries having democratic values, without the traditional 
weapons of punishment and execution, how were men to be got to risk their lives in 
battle?78  Secondly, how may fear be made the subject of management so as to 
maximise the numbers of troops who will carry the fight?  The latter point was the 
subject of the seminal post- Second World War study by Marshall and the need to 
organise discipline, training needs and personnel in order to conform to this 
fundamental need.79 Whilst the context of the child soldier may be different, the 
principle is the same. 
 
75 B. Shephard, A War of Nerves, Soldiers and Psychiatrists 1914-1994, Pimlico, London, 2002, pp. 
388-389. 
76 See E. Cairns, ‘Children and Political Violence: an Overview’, International Journal of Behavioural 
Development, 1994, 17(4), 669-74. 
77  ‘Children and Violence’, Report of the Commission on Children and Violence convened by the 
Gulbenkian Foundation and chaired by Sir William Utting, Gulbenkian Foundation, London, 1995, p. 
200. 
78 B. Shephard, op cit, p. 230. 
79 S. Marshall, Men Against Fire, The Problem of Battle Command in Future War, Gloucester, Mass., 
1947, p. 21. 
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Whatever view is taken of the scientific position that may or may not explain the 
utility of children deployed in battle, a considerable body of historical evidence exists 
that demonstrates the resilience of children in different forms of conflict and their 
seeming ability to draw upon strength in order to survive, and, more importantly, to 
survive more effectively than the adult.  It is all the more surprising when it is noted 
that numerous historical examples demonstrate that resilience without the children 
concerned ever having undertaken any formalised training regime. 
 
(i). Children in Nazi Europe 
 
It has been observed that the phrase ‘Nazi Europe’ is linguistic shorthand that denotes 
the countries of Europe that were brought under Nazi occupation by either occupation 
or invasion.80  Numerous countries suffered from occupation, but others suffered 
without being invaded.  Children, whom the Nazis considered to be Jewish, 
irrespective of how they may have regarded themselves, were fatally at risk under 
Nazi rule and policy.  As a conservative estimate, it is considered that a total of 
9,600,000 Jews lived in Nazi Europe under their rule.81 
 
Upon deportation to death and slave labour camps, of which Auschwitz/Birkenau is 
an example, it has been noted that young people who entered such networks shed their 
childhood with their name.  They were robbed of their youth just as they were 
stripped of their clothes, their packages and their hair,82 to the extent that they were 
no longer in a position to be the children of the parents they accompanied.  Jack 
Rubinfeld was a survivor of the Rzeszow motor factory.  He recalls:  
 
‘I had to grit my teeth and bear it, and try to show that I was tough, that I was just like 
the adults.  I could take it just as an adult.  I was an adult.’83 
 
Other children had different experiences, like the 16 year old Magda Somogyi and her 
sister who she closely resembled to the extent that it was believed they were twins: 
80 D. Dwork, Children With a Star, Jewish Youth in Nazi Europe, Yale UP., New York,  1991,  p. xvi. 
81 G. Reitlinger, The Final Solution, The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe 1939-1945, (2nd 
Edition), Valentine Mitchell, London 1968, Appendix I, p. 533. 
82  D. Dwork, op cit., p. 228. 
83  Ibid., p. 229. 
 29 
                                                 
they took on the care of each other and others.  On an emotional level, the experience 
of being inducted into Auschwitz, of being forcibly separated from their families, and 
in their particular case, of being sent to a special ‘twins barrack’ for the purpose of 
experimentation by Dr. Mengele was ‘a shock into maturity’.84 
 
The story of the Jewish child experience in Europe throughout this period, is full of 
examples by which children were forced to confront the situation in which they found 
themselves and to make decisions appropriate for an adult as a price for their own 
survival, referred to by Lawrence Langer as ‘choiceless choices’.  Older children 
could not be forced to hide; should they leave their parents?  Who should accompany 
their parents and other family members when called towards the transports?  What 
resettlement transport would be best for the family?  In slave camps, which work 
detail would be the most secure?  In respect of these decisions, children were part of 
the decision process; decisions that involved life and death, and decisions moreover 
that few people in the course of their lives have contemplated. 
 
The experience of Anne Frank revealed in the diary that she commenced in June 1942 
is a case in point when she was forced into hiding in an Amsterdam office building in 
order to escape deportation.  The text is revealing not only for its lucidity but also for 
its insight into her circumstances and her determination to survive in the teeth of 
extreme adversity.  On the 4th April 1944 she wrote: 
 
‘I want to go on living even after my death!  And therefore I am grateful to God for 
giving me this gift, this possibility of developing myself and of writing, of expressing 
all that is in me.’85 
 
These were the words of a 15-year-old child, the daughter of German Jews who 
emigrated from Germany in 1933, and was part of a family who, less than a month 
after her 13th birthday was forced to choose between answering a Gestapo summons 
or to enter hiding.  It was in this context that the family chose the latter and the 
famous diary was the product. 
84  Ibid., p. 229. 
85 A. Frank, The Diary of Anne Frank, Pan Books, London, 1954, diary entry for Tuesday 4th April 
1944, p. 167. 
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It may be said that the case of Anne Frank is an isolated example of a young person 
having unique qualities having little or no application to the issue of child soldiers.  
Whilst it is undoubtedly true that Anne Frank was unique, there are many examples to 
be found in this dark period of history that demonstrate remarkable abilities in 
adversity calculated to adapt so to ensure survival both from a mental and physical 
perspective.  Foremost amongst them is the study of 732 concentration camp 
survivors by Martin Gilbert and published in 1996 under the title The Boys, Triumph 
over Adversity, and their individual stories of survival and endurance against 
seemingly impossible odds and circumstances.86  One of the striking features of this 
study is how, following liberation, the group identified a need to maintain the intense 
companionship which had been created in the camps and which led to the setting up 
of ‘The Primrose Club’ in July 1947.87 
 
Again it may be said that child camp survivors are not soldiers whatever horrors they 
had to endure; yet it can be argued that the intensity of the friendships that were the 
subject of the study, forged in extremis, adversity, and in war are identical to the 
recollections of soldiers and their opinions about comradeship.  After the Great War a 
Lieutenant Stoneham (Royal Artillery, 1917) recalls: - 
 
‘The comradeship among men was really most extraordinary and very difficult to 
describe.  On one occasion I was offered a safe job behind the lines if I would care to 
join Brigade Headquarters.  It was very tempting but I didn’t want to go.  There was 
something about the relationship with the men that one didn’t want to break.  One 
would somehow have felt a traitor to them, so I refused it and stayed with them.  
Somehow one had a very strong sense of belonging.’88 
 
George Coppard in his book With a Machine Gun to Cambrai89 is instructive upon the 
same point in that the author joined the Army in August 1914 underage, transferring 
to the Machine Gun Corps in February 1916. He writes in almost childlike prose 
86 M. Gilbert, The Boys, Triumph over Adversity, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1996, especially 
Chapter 8, ‘Surviving as Slaves’, pp. 197-212; and Chapter 9, ‘On the Death Marches’, pp. 213-235. 
87Ibid., p. 377. 
88 M. Arthur, Forgotten Voices of the Great War, Ebury Press, London, 2003, Taped Interview with Lt. 
E. Stoneham RA, p. 200. 
89 G. Coppard, With a Machine Gun to Cambrai, IWM, London, 1980. 
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about the excitement he felt in being transferred to a specialist unit and to the sense of 
belonging and commitment as a consequence.90  
 
The above examples show that children in warfare are able to develop their own 
means of coping with stress in ways that are every bit as effective as adults. 
 
(ii). Children and the Blitz 
 
So far as official records go the first of the air raids on London came in the early 
hours of 25th June 1940.91  The objective was to destroy the will of the British nation 
to resist.  Necessarily, aerial attack was indiscriminate by its nature and intended to 
kill, maim and render homeless the population that was the subject of attack including 
the children of the population as a central component.   
 
Notwithstanding initial fears, including governmental fears, underpinned by the 
evacuation of children from London and other cities and an official document 
prepared by The Imperial Defence Committee that 600,000 people would die and 
more than a million would suffer injury,92 the evidence is that raids did not affect 
morale, and more particularly, that children were less effected than adults.  This is 
supported by the existence of contemporary psychological studies and evidence of 
observers who reported upon the reactions of children to the blitz.  In 1941 Vernon 
reported: - 
 
‘All observers seem to agree that raids have even less effect upon children than adults.  
One might have supposed that they would be more susceptible to the operation of a 
‘fear instinct’ which is stimulated by loud noises.  Though sometimes frightened by 
the sirens or explosions when they wake up, those that I and others have observed go 
to sleep again remarkably easily.’93 
90 Ibid., p. 66 
91 L. Mosley, London Under Fire 1939-1945, Pan Books, London, 1971, p. 85 
92 Quoted in L. Mosley, ibid. pp. 14-15. See also R. Overy, The Bombing War, Europe 1939-1945, 
Allen Lane, 2013, p.27, as to City vulnerability and modern infrastructure which, it was believed, 
would unravel and provoke social catastrophe  For a discussion upon and the failure of attacks on 
morale see pp. 169-185. 
93 Quoted in D. Laming, Understanding Human Motivation: What makes people tick? Blackwell 
Publications, London, 2004, Heading ‘Terror’ p. 31. 
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 The point is taken further by other war time observers that for older children the 
sights and sounds of sirens and air raids were seen as thrilling events, and acted with 
what has been described as ‘…a sense of defiance’.94  A good example is provided by 
the diary of a Colin Perry: - 
 
‘Yes, thunder alive, there over Croydon were a pack of planes so tine and practically 
invisible in the haze and – by God!  The Hun was bombing Croydon airport … At last 
the war was here!  At last I was seeing some excitement.  Anti-aircraft guns threw a 
dark ring around the darting planes, Spitfires and Hurricanes roared into battle … 
Boy, this was IT!95 
 
What is perhaps remarkable, particularly given the strategic intention of the raids is 
the fact that so few children were adversely affected.  The following is probably 
representative of the available evidence: - 
 
‘I can’t say that I was ever frightened as such.  I’m not trying to make out I was very 
stoic, but it was all such an adventure in some ways.  It probably seems terrible in 
retrospect, but there we are, this was going on, and we just carried on with life …’96 
 
Later studies of children exposed to political violence around the world including in 
Northern Ireland,97 has indicated that around 10% of children may have suffered 
psychological consequences as a result.  Even in the most extreme circumstances only 
50% of children have any discernible reaction.98  In 1989 a study of refugee families 
indicated that there were no differences between children whose parents had been 
tortured and those whose families were simply refugees.99 
 
94 S. Longden, Blitz Kids, The Children’s War against Hitler, Constable, London, p. 88. 
95 Colin Perry, Junior clerk, Upper Tooting, London, diary entry for 15th August 1940, quoted in  L. 
Smith, Young Voices, British Children Remember the Second World War, Viking, IWM, London, 
2007, p. 106. 
96 Peter Smith, Schoolboy, Petts Wood, Kent, in L. Smith, ibid., p. 112. 
97 E. Cairns & R. Wilson, ‘Coping with political violence in Northern Ireland’, Dept. of Psychology, U. 
of Ulster, Coleraine, Soc. Sci. Med. 1989, 28(6), 621-624. 
98 C. Liddell et al., ‘Psychological effects of War and Violence on Children’, Notes of a conference in 
Washington DC in May 1991 entitled ‘From Riots to reconciliation’, Hillsdale, NJ, 1993, p. 374. 
99 F. Allodi, ‘The Children of Victims of Political Persecution and Torture: A Psychological Study of a 
Latin American Refugee Community’, Int. Journal of Mental Health, Vol.18, No. 2, pp. 3-15. 
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Does this mean that the conclusion may be drawn that children are therefore more 
resilient than adults?  The problem here is one of interpretation.  It may be the case 
that the majority of children are more resilient than adults when subjected to violence 
of which the Blitz is an example.  It may equally be the case that ‘no reaction’ is, of 
itself, a defence mechanism, and the ‘lack or scarcity of feelings is the most severe 
problem that arises in children exposed to war.’100  Researchers have suggested that 
variations in the child’s reaction may depend upon factors such as age, gender, 
personality and environmental factors, including the family.  From the perspective of 
this research it is suggested that it does not matter whether the evidence is interpreted 
positively or negatively, since the evidence demonstrates collectively that children 
have an ability to withstand violence from a mental point of view, and which makes 
the child soldier such a potent threat, particularly when their psychological resilience 
is coupled with military training and a military structure that provides a supportive 
familial caste. 
 
(iii). Enlisted Children 
 
History tells us that there is little that is new in the deployment of child soldiers in 
battle.  Rosen reminds us that in preindustrial societies there is no single fixed 
chronological age at which young people enter into the rituals of war.101  What is 
perhaps surprising is the ferocity that many have demonstrated in the pursuit of the 
military contract upon which they are embarked.  The Renamo guerrilla movement in 
Mozambique bears witness to the fact that some children were made to attack or kill 
members of their own family as a means of further bonding them with Renamo.102  
Fleming points out that the children were programmed to feel little fear or revulsion 
for what they had perpetrated, and thereby carry out such attacks ‘… with greater 
enthusiasm and brutality than adults would…’103 
 
100 R. Punamaki, Resilient Characteristics in Traumatised Children, quoted in C. Agaibi ‘Promoting 
Resilience in 21st Century Disaster Victims using Evidence from Trauma Survivors’, Ohio 
Psychological Association, Aug. 2006, Vol.53, p. 7. 
101 D. Rosen, op cit., p. 4. 
102 H. Brocklehurst, op cit., p. 117. 
103 J. Fleming, ‘Children in bondage: Young soldiers, labourers and sex workers.’ Sunday Independent, 
Johannesburg, 13th August 1995, reproduced in World Press Review, January 1996, p. 9. 
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The question of the ‘programming of children’ has a well trodden historical 
precedent.  On the 6th June 1944 at Caen, Allied troops experienced their first 
encounter with a generation of soldiers drawn from the Hitler Youth.  It was reported 
that ‘… the troops of the 12th SS Division who were holding this sector, fought with a 
tenacity and ferocity seldom equalled and never excelled, during the whole 
campaign.’104  Another tank commander recalls: ‘… they sprang at allied tanks like 
wolves, until we were forced to kill them against our will.’105  It is also recorded that 
encounters with units having a significant Hitler Youth component were often 
horrifying.  In the fighting for the Ruhr pocket Hitler Youth were utilised to ambush 
American troops often inflicting severe casualties.106   
 
History has also revealed how members of the Hitler Youth were called upon to 
undertake some of the most barbaric acts of the Nazi era during the closing months of 
the war.  During the evacuation of the Stutthof concentration camp in West Prussia on 
the 20-21st January 1945 some 6,500-7000 Jews were rounded up for evacuation and 
marched eastwards in readiness for embarkation from the port of Pillau to prevent 
their liberation by the Russians.  They eventually made their way to the Baltic town of 
Palmnicken on the Samland coast.  Upon it becoming clear that evacuation to the west 
was impossible the question arose as to what should be done to get rid of them.  The 
Gau leadership hit upon the idea of entombing the Jews in a disused mineshaft.  
During the night of the 30th January the local mayor, a longstanding and fanatical 
member of the Nazi Party summonsed a group of armed Hitler Youth members, plied 
them with alcohol and set them down to the disused mine shaft to guard some 50 
Jewish women and girls who had earlier tried to escape, until they were all taken out 
two by two to be shot.107 
 
What is the key to an understanding of the recruitment and performance of such 
children?  Part of the answer lies with the demands of the war effort.  Under the 
104 C. Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, Collins London, 1952, p. 377. 
105 H. Koch, The Hitler Youth, Origins and Development 1922-1945, MacDonald Janes, 1975, p. 246; 
see also M. Burleigh, The Third Reich, A New History, Pan Books, London,  2001, pp. 235-237, 
detailing the rejection of traditional values within society, the brutalisation of manners and the loss of 
parental control when children were exposed to the new ideology. 
106 C. Ryan, The Last Battle, Collins, London, 1966, p. 226. 
107 I. Kershaw, The End, Hitler’s Germany 1944-45, Allen Lane, 2011, p. 185, quoting, inter alia, M. 
Bergau, Tod an der Bernsteinkuste:Ein NS-Verbrechen in Ostpreussen, in E. Frohlicke (ed.), Als die 
Erde brannte: Deutsche Schicksale in den letzen Kriegstagen, Munich 2005, pp. 99-112. 
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pressure of events and the requirements of the war effort, all forms of basic military 
training in Germany were reduced from 1943 onwards, and from January of that year 
anti-aircraft batteries were manned by members of the Hitler Youth from the age of 
15.108  Performance, of the kind that the examples indicate, is more difficult to 
explain.  Youngsters who had lived their minority within the Third Reich were likely 
to have been influenced by its teachings109.  In 1937 the nine years of secondary 
education had been reduced to eight whilst the influence of the Hitler Youth had 
diminished the authority of many teachers whilst the war saw an increase in the 
ideological content of the curriculum.110  At the end of the war many believed that the 
hour had come to fight against the ‘Bolshevik Hordes’, and the Appell to the last 
Einsatz, 111 no doubt spurred young people to fight until the final surrender on the 9th 
May 1945, in the knowledge that their world, the only world that they knew, was 
about to collapse.112  Others, no doubt, believed the ideology of Nazism, whilst Nazi 
students saw the war as an opportunity for showing their commitment and 
demonstrating their bravery and winning medals.113 The same point may be made in 
relation to the recruitment of Hitler Youth to the ‘Werwolf’ partisan style guerrilla 
activities first mooted in 1943.114 
 
In her recent study of women in the Nazi regime Wendy Lower comes close to 
pinpointing the motivation of young persons enlisted to serve within it when she 
speaks of a generation becoming ‘… consumed by (ideology) and with such urgency 
and seriousness.  For those who had to turn Nazi racial ideology into practice, there 
were inherent contradictions to overcome and fuzzy notions clarify.  To that end, 
jurists, scientists, doctors and bureaucrats, developed systems, laws and procedures 
such as the Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honour and the Reich 
108 H. Koch, op cit., p.239. 
109 See for example G. Milton, Wolfram, The Boy who Went to War ,Sceptre, London, 2011, especially 
Ch. 4,’ Flying the Nazi Flag’, pp. 61-80, and the account of how a family opposed to the Hitler regime  
became immersed in its influence and teachings to the extent that opposition or autonomy of thought 
was obliterated. 
110 R. Evans, The Third Reich at War, Penguin Books, London, 2009, p. 594. 
111 H. Koch, op cit., p.249; see also W. Gehlen &D. Gregory, Jungvolk, The Story of a Boy Defending 
Hitler’s Third Reich, Casemate, Philadelphia & Newbury, 2008, esp. Ch. 18, ‘Our Last Bullet’, pp. 
229-270 
112 See also I. Kershaw, op cit,  Ch. 2, Collapse in the West, p. 66;  
113 R. Evans, op cit., p. 595. 
114 I. Kershaw, op cit., p. 279. 
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Citizenship Law (‘the Nuremberg Laws’)’115 for this purpose.  By 1944, and upon the 
tide of war having turned decisively against Germany, the young who were now 
called upon to carry the fight, had been immersed in such thinking; many throughout 
the entirety of their lives. As Lower further points out: ‘… the racial-utopian goals 
and nationalist agenda sparked a revolutionary consciousness among ordinary 
Germans and excited a new patriotic activism.’116  Difficult although it may be to 
comprehend when judged in a modern setting, it has to be remembered that to kill for 
the Nazi cause was a subject in which participants could take pride.  A theme of 
special relevance for this thesis notes that the young are attracted to terror regimes and 
groupings of which the Nazi state was such an example, yet there is a further aspect to 
the Hitler regime that further explains the manner in which the Jugend set about their 
task of defending Germany and that is the specific teachings of a state organised along 
racial lines to which the young had been made subject.  There was nothing especially 
new or ‘Germanic’ about the concept of eugenics.117 Indeed at the time of the Boer 
War in the UK the problem of ‘the multiplication of the unfit’ and the dangers posed 
to the advancement of a race were prevalent even at Government level and ideas 
about the need to introduce measures to prevent the feeble-minded from procreating 
were widely circulated .118 Within Hitler’s Germany, however, such concepts were 
taken to an extreme with the SS representing the excesses of Nazi medicine and a 
state constructed along racial lines and ideas of racial hygiene.  In particular, once 
certain groups such as gypsies and Jews had been identified as a distinct and 
degenerate species, then like animals they could be used for experiments and treated 
without moral scruple.119 
 
Like all historical examples care must be taken not to draw conclusions from 
circumstances which are peculiar to their own times and which may have limited 
115 W. Lower, Hitler’s Furies, German Women in the Nazi Killing Fields, Chatto & Windus, London, 
2013, pp. 62-63. 
116 Ibid., p. 74. 
117 The science of producing improvements in the type of offspring produced through inherited 
characteristics. 
118 See for e.g. G. Oram, Worthless Men, Race, eugenics and the death penalty in the British Army 
during the First World War, Francis Boutle, London, 1998, esp. ‘The Imperial Crisis’, pp. 78-79. 
119 B. Muller-Hill, Todliche Wissenschaft (Reinbeck bei Hamburg 1984). English trans. by G. Fraser as: 
Murderous Science. Elimination by Scientific Selection of Jews, Gypsies and Others: Germany 1933-
1945 (Oxford, 1988), quoted in P. Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics between National 
Unification and Nazism 1870-1945 ,Cambridge UP., Cambridge, 1989, p. 564.  See also Channel 5, 
21st November. 2013, ‘Children of the Master Race’ and the Lebensborn Programme founded in 1935. 
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value when applied generally or to other contexts.  There is little doubt that the 
commitment of Hitler Youth in the latter stages of the war was unique in terms of the 
ferocity in the manner in which they fought to sustain a regime that was about to pass 
into history, perhaps unique in the history of children committed to battle, but what 
light does the phenomena of the Jugend throw upon the deployment of children in 
more modern settings? 
 
A substantial case may be made that the example of the Hitler Youth was no more 
than a peculiar product of its own time.  As Kershaw demonstrates, the fight to the 
end in Germany in 1945 owed not just to Hitler in person, but to the character of his 
rule and the mentalities that had upheld his charismatic domination.120 It is within the 
latter category that the Jugend came to play a significant part in sustaining the 
commitment of young people to fight for the only world they had come to know 
against the fear of Bolshevik occupation.  Yet this introduction has also touched upon 
other factors which may induce a child to become part of an armed force or grouping 
and whether from the perspective of his own free will, in order to provide an 
alternative home to one that has been destroyed by war or revolution, or through 
compulsion at the hands of the unscrupulous.121 
 
Nobody would argue that a child can develop the same physical strength as a 
developed adult, but given the nature of modern warfare the significance of physical 
strength in individual troops becomes potentially less relevant as motivation and 
mental strength become more so.  In this regard the question identified by Shephard 
and made the subject of reference earlier in this chapter becomes vital: ‘How were 
men to be got to risk their lives in battle?’122  It is important to emphasise that since 
the end of the Second World War, warfare has undergone a revolution in the 
manufacture of personal weapons. In addition to their ease of use and adaptability, it 
is estimated that there are approximately a total of five hundred million small arms in 
the world,123 added to this figure are the ever increasing developments in the 
miniaturisation of weaponry and bomb making equipment, including nuclear arms 
potentially deployable at the sub-conventional level.  Children, and the willingness to 
120 I. Kershaw, op cit., p. 400. 
121 p. 4 ante. 
122 B. Shephard, op cit., Ch. 16, New Ways of War, p. 230. 
123 C. Cobb, ‘Arms & Africa on UN Agenda This Week.’ All Africa.com, July 9, 2001. 
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enlist children in warfare and the readiness to get them to risk their lives, are part of 
that revolution.  Accordingly, the debate about the effectiveness of enlisted troops in 
modern conflict is likely to revolve more around issues of mental willingness, 
adaptability and resilience than of physical strength.   
 
A useful example to place the above sentiments in context is the case of Northern 
Ireland and the impact of the troubles on children.  It has been suggested that the 
militarization of children within the province of Northern Ireland begins with their 
acceptance of violence as a political tool for defined aims, and ends with the 
enlistment of children in what is perceived to be the armed struggle.124  From an early 
age it is noted that Catholic children demonised the British soldier and his presence in 
the province; such attitudes having expression in role play and fear.  Child gangs are 
perhaps a feature of modern life, yet they contribute to opinion forming and education 
in young people; perhaps of the wrong sort, with such children becoming involved in 
youth wings of paramilitary groups on both sides of the political divide.  The mental 
and youthful enthusiasm of such groups is not lost on those who seek to tap their 
strength for their own purposes. 
 
 Awareness and communication between children has been explored in a variety of 
different social studies, including that of Myra Bluebond-Langner and her study of the 
insight of children as having terminal leukaemia in a large American hospital in the 
mid-west.125  Whilst being a long way from the examples of child soldiers considered 
in this thesis, the case study is instructive in its treatment of how terminally ill 
children come to know that they are dying even although they have not been told and 
before death became imminent, and how they are able to conceal that knowledge from 
their parents and medical staff.126  One of the points made by the study is to 
emphasise how children became astute observers when thrust into the strange and 
threatening world of hospital, complex treatments, remission and relapse and the 
deaths of other children, referred to as an acquired ‘self-concept’.127  Of particular 
124 M. Fraser, Children in Conflict, Harmondsworth, Penguin, London, 1973, p. 140. 
125 M. Bluebond-Langner, The Private Worlds of Dying Children, Princeton UP, New York, 1978. 
126  Ibid., p. ix. 
127  Ibid., p. 173. 
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note is the manner in which the insight of the subject children manifested itself in 
their play, symbols and references.128 
 
The study explains its findings by reference to what is described as ‘a socialization 
process’.  It is suggested that what is being described is identical to the process by 
which children become accustomed to conflict, adept and skilled at fighting for ill-
defined causes, and perceiving the world in which they have come to live in such a 
manner that will assist their survival. 
 
The Regular Soldier and the Child – the Future? 
 
Historically, there is nothing new in the concept of child soldiers, whether from the 
point of view of deployment in non-combatant or in combatant roles.  What is new, 
however, is the readiness by which many nations in the modern world, and many non-
state actors, are prepared to recruit and deploy children for what they regard as their 
own strategic and political ends. The world can have no confidence in legal 
mechanisms to halt the spread of this phenomenon: modern international law has tried 
over the course of the last century, and whilst such efforts should not be decried, they 
have been seen to fail.  This failure is a function of the fact that the engine that drives 
the need for children to be deployed in battle is more powerful a force than the legal 
mechanisms that seek to contain it. 
 
As is also clear, the engine that drives the phenomenon is multi-faceted; consisting of 
the spread of cheap weaponry, the miniaturisation and effectiveness of small arms, the 
breakdown of government in the Third World, the demand for soldiers who will fulfil 
missions having little regard to political nuances, the numbers in which child soldiers 
can be found, and above all, their effectiveness as soldiers, are but some factors 
responsible for the growth of this modern problem.  Singer points out that at the turn 
of the twenty first century, child soldiers have served in significant numbers on every 
continent of the globe save Antarctica.129 
 
128  Ibid., p. 198. 
129 P. Singer, op cit., p. 16. 
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The problem is not so much a welfare issue that revolves around an imperative to 
assist children in the circumstances they find themselves; it is a problem that vitally 
affects regular forces called upon to confront such children.  Numerous examples 
exist within the last decade of British troops being deployed against children.  
Foremost amongst them is Operation Barras in which members of the SAS attacked 
the self styled ‘West Side Boys’ in Sierra Leone, and in the more recent examples of 
British troops being deployed against children in Iraq and Afghanistan.  How 
equipped mentally are such troops equipped to confront such threat?  If current British 
Military Doctrine makes no mention of child combatants130, and no specific training 
is dedicated to the subject, is it not time for that stance to change?  Is it reasonable to 
send troops into battle without adequate training for the battlefield they are called 
upon to confront? The purpose behind this thesis is to address these questions in order 









   










130 A. Mircica et al. op cit., p. 14. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
APC   Armed Personnel Carrier 
 
AIAI   Al-Itihad al Islami 
 
CTCRM  Commando Training Centre Royal Marines 
 
EBO   Effects Based Operations 
 
EBW   Effects Based Warfare 
 
ECHR   European Commission of Human Rights 
 
ICC   International Criminal Court 
 
ICJ   International Court of Justice 
 
ICLQ   International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
 
IDF   Israeli Defence Forces 
 
IDTLWC  International Defence Training and Land Warfare Centre 
 
IED   Improvised Explosive Device 
 
IISS   International Institute for Strategic Studies 
 
IJRL   International Journal of Refugee Law 
 
ILO   International Labour Organisation 
 
IWM   Imperial War Museum 
 
KCL   King’s College, London 
 
LOIAC  Law of International Armed Conflict 
 
MOD   Ministry of Defence 
 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
 
NCO   Non Commissioned Officer 
 
NILR   Netherlands International Law Review 
 
NGO   Non Governmental Organisation 
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PLO   Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
 
PTSD   Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
 
RENAMO  Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana 
 
ROE   Rules of Engagement 
 
RTO   Recovery Time Objective 
 
SC   Security Clearance 
 
UN   United Nations 
 
UNAMIR  United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda 
 
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund (formerly United Nations  
   International Children’s Emergency Fund) 
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